United States v. Brown
| Decision Date | 08 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2:12-cr-00224 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. CURTIS DELAY BROWN, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
Before the Court is Defendant Curtis Delay Brown's second Motion to Reduce Sentence Pursuant to Section 404 of the First Step Act (ECF No. 332) (“Motion”). In 2015, Mr. Brown was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e) (ECF Nos. 19, 169), and he is currently serving a term of imprisonment of 180 months followed by a two-year term of supervised release (ECF No. 182).
On May 17, 2020, Mr. Brown filed his first Motion to Reduce Sentence (ECF No. 289) in which he argued that his latent tuberculosis and substantial efforts to rehabilitate himself constituted “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for his release as required by the First Step Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The Court denied the first Motion to Reduce Sentence without prejudice. (ECF No. 306.)
Based on the record now before the Court as to Mr. Brown's second and presently pending Motion to Reduce Sentence, which the Court has carefully considered and evaluated pursuant to its authorized discretion in such matters, the Court concludes that Mr. Brown has demonstrated extraordinary and compelling reasons sufficient for this Court to reduce his sentence and that a sentence reduction is consistent with the sentencing factors articulated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Mr. Brown's situation supports the grant of the relief he seeks, and the Court therefore GRANTS Mr. Brown's Motion to Reduce Sentence (ECF No. 332) on the terms as set forth in this Opinion and the Court's accompanying Order.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr Brown was convicted by a jury on May 20, 2015 of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). (ECF No. 305, at I.)[1] He was sentenced on July 2, 2015 to 180 months of imprisonment-the mandatory minimum that applied under § 924(e) given his prior criminal conviction record-followed by two years of supervised release. (ECF Nos. 182; 305, at 1-2.)
Mr Brown previously filed a Motion to Reduce Sentence pursuant to Section 404 of the First Step Act on May 17, 2020 (ECF No 289), which the Court denied (ECF Nos. 305,306). On January 23, 2021, Mr. Brown filed the presently pending Motion, his second Motion to Reduce Sentence (ECF No. 332), reiterating some of the arguments he made in his first Motion and making new ones on top of those. The Government filed a Response on February 9, 2021 (ECF No. 340), to which Mr. Brown replied (ECF No. 343). The Court heard oral argument on the Motion on March 25, 2021. (ECF No. 350.)
On August 2, 2021, the Court stayed Mr. Brown's second Motion to Reduce Sentence pending the Third Circuit's decision in United States v. Andrews, which was expected to address “the scope of a district court's authority to determine what types of circumstances may even be considered to rise to the level of extraordinary and compelling,” including whether district courts are bound by U.S. Sentencing Commission policy statements issued before the latest amendments to § 3582(c)(1)(A) via the First Step Act. (ECF No. 393, at 1-2.) It appeared to the Court that the Third Circuit's anticipated Andrews decision would likely impact the Court's consideration and resolution of Mr. Brown's Motion, given that the Motion asserts multiple bases for compassionate release or sentence reduction that are not necessarily covered by the Sentencing Commission policy statements but that may be factors that a district court is permitted to consider. (See id.) The Court ordered that once Andrews had been decided, the parlies were to file statements of position as to the impact, if any, that the decision in Andrews had on Mr. Brown's Motion. (Id. at 2.) The Third Circuit issued its decision in Andrews on August 30, 2021, 12 F.4th 255 (2021), and the parties filed their statements of position thereafter (ECF Nos. 396, 397). The Court lifted the stay as to Mr. Brown's Motion on December 21, 2021 after the Third Circuit issued its mandate as to the Andrews case. (ECF No. 399.)
During the pendency of Mr. Brown's Motion, on August 17, 2021, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) released Mr. Brown to home confinement pursuant to the CARES Act. (ECF No. 395, at 1.) BOP records indicate that Mr. Brown is still on home confinement. See Find an Inmate, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited July 8, 2022)[2]
“(A]s a general matter, a court cannot modify a term of imprisonment after it has been imposed without specific authorization.” McMillan v. United States, 257 F. App x 477, 479 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Dillon v United States, 560 U.S. 817, 819 (2010) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)). One such specific authorization is the First Step Act's amendment of 18 U.S.C. § 3582, also known as the compassionate release statute. As amended, that statute allows a court to reduce a defendant's term of imprisonment if “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). In addition, the court must consider: (1) whether the defendant has exhausted the appropriate administrative remedies; (2) the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to the extent that they apply; and (3) whether such a reduction is consistent with applicable U.S. Sentencing Commission policy statements. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
III. DISCUSSION
After analyzing the record, the Court concludes that Mr. Brown has demonstrated extraordinary and compelling reasons for this Court to reduce his sentence, with such reasons specifically consisting of the combination of his severe hypertension, his obesity, and his extraordinary record of rehabilitation. Further, the Court concludes that consideration of the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) weighs significantly in favor of reducing Mr. Brown s sentence.
The Court first considers whether Mr. Brown has complied with § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement. Prior to petitioning a district court for relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A), a defendant must first file an administrative request for compassionate release or a sentence reduction with the warden of the facility where the defendant is incarcerated; the defendant must then either (1) “fully exhaust[] all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf' or (2) wait 30 days from the date on which the defendant filed an administrative request with the warden. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Either option for administrative exhaustion under § 3582(c)(1)(A), standing alone, is sufficient to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. See United States v. Harris, 973 F.3d 170, 171 (3d Cir. 2020) ().
Here, the Court concludes that Mr. Brown has met the administrative exhaustion requirement. According to his Motion and exhibits attached to it, Mr. Brown submitted a compassionate release request “based upon his deteriorating health to the Warden of FCI Hazelton on December 1, 2020” and upon his rehabilitation efforts, and “[t]he Warden denied his administrative request by letter dated December 17, 2020.” (ECF Nos. 332, at 3; 332-2, at 1; 3323, at 1.) Mr. Brown then filed this Motion on Januaiy 23, 2021, which is beyond 30 days from the date on which he filed his request with the Warden at FCI Hazelton.
Next, the Court must determine whether (1) Mr. Brown's medical conditions, generally or specifically in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, in the context of (2) Mr. Brown's demonstrated rehabilitation, constitute “extraordinary and compelling reasons” such that § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) would permit this Court to release Mr. Brown from incarceration or reduce his sentence.
Section 3582 does not define the phrase “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” See § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Instead, Congress delegated that task to the U.S. Sentencing Commission. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) (). The Sentencing Commission defined “extraordinary and compelling reasons” under the pre-First Step Act version of § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) in a policy statement contained in § IB 1.13 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, relating to the BOP's discretion to reduce a prisoner's term of imprisonment. As relevant here, that policy statement, via its application notes, provides that extraordinary and compelling reasons include, among others, (1) “a serious physical or medical condition . . . that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she is not expected to recover” and (2) reasons other than those specifically enumerated that are extraordinary and compelling on their own or in combination with enumerated reasons. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. n. (1)(A)(ii).
The Sentencing Commission has not issued an updated policy statement since the First Step Act became law. See United States v. Rodriguez, 451 F.Supp.3d 392, 396 (E.D. Pa. 2020). In United States v. Andrews, the Third Circuit explained that given the lack of an updated applicable Sentencing Commission policy statement defining “extraordinary and compelling...
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