United States v. Browne
| Decision Date | 18 March 2008 |
| Docket Number | Criminal No. 2007–59. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Tevon Jareem BROWNE, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Virgin Islands |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Ishmael Meyers, Jr., AUSA St. Thomas, U.S.V.I., for the Plaintiff.
Jesse A. Gessin, AFPD St. Thomas, U.S.V.I., for the Defendant.
Before the Court is the motion of Tevon Jareem Browne (“Browne”) to dismiss the information filed in this matter pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161, et seq. (the “Speedy Trial Act,” or the “Act”). For the reasons stated below, the Court will deny the motion.
On February 27, 2007, Browne allegedly entered the Arturo A. Watlington Post Office in St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands wielding two large butcher knives.
Browne was arrested and advised of his rights on March 16, 2007.1 At the advice of rights proceeding, the government moved for pretrial detention, and the Magistrate Judge scheduled a preliminary and detention hearing for March 21, 2007. During the March 21, 2007, hearing, the government moved for an evaluation of Browne's mental competency to stand trial. The hearing did not result in a ruling on the detention motion or the motion for a competency evaluation.
Magistrate Judge entered an order granting the government's motion for a competency evaluation. On April 19, 2007, the Magistrate Judge entered an order granting the government's motion for pretrial detent¿
The Forensic Evaluation (the “Report”) of Browne's mental competency to stand trial was completed and signed by a staff psychiatrist and a staff psychologist on September 17, 2007. Also on September 17, 2007, the Butner Complex Warden signed a Certificate of Restoration of Competency to Stand Trial, which he sent to the Court along with the Report and a letter indicating that Browne “is now competent to stand trial....” (A.F. Beechler Letter, Sept. 17, 2007.)
On September 26, 2007, the Magistrate Judge conducted a status conference in this matter. At the September 26, 2007, status conference, the Magistrate Judge indicated that the Court had been advised that the Report had been completed. However, the Court had not yet received the Report from Butner. The defense attorney requested an order directing the immediate production of the Report, complaining that Browne had been in custody for over six months since his arrest.
On October 3, 2007, the Magistrate Judge held another status conference in this matter, during which he stated that the Court had received the Report from Butner. The Court, the prosecutor, and the defense attorney all affirmed that they had reviewed the Report. The Magistrate Judge informed the parties that Browne was in the process of being transported from Butner back to the District. At the October 3, 2007, status conference, the defense attorney indicated a desire for prompt disposition of the matter.
The matter again came before the Magistrate Judge for a status conference on October 17, 2007, at which time the Magistrate Judge stated that Browne was still in the process of being transported from Butner back to the District.
On October 22, 2007, the government filed a two-count information against Browne. Count One charges Browne with threatening to assault Postal Inspector Steve Stebbins with intent to retaliate against him on account of the performance of his official duties, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) and (b)(4). Count Two charges Browne with possession of dangerous weapons in a federal facility, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 930(a).
On December 11, 2007, Browne returned to the District of the Virgin Islands from Butner.2 On December 12, 2007, a hearing was conducted in this matter. During that hearing, Browne moved for pretrial release. The Magistrate Judge granted the motion from the bench. Additionally, the trial in this matter was scheduled for January 28, 2008.
On December 19, 2007, Browne filed a motion to modify the conditions of his release.
A status conference was held in this matter on January 9, 2008. The Magistrate Judge did not rule on Browne's pending motion to modify conditions of release during the January 9, 2008, status conference.
On January 24, 2008, Browne filed the instant motion to dismiss for violations of the Speedy Trial Act.3
The Magistrate Judge granted Browne's motion to modify the conditions of release on January 25, 2008.
On February 1, 2008, the Court entered an Order rescheduling Browne's trial for February 19, 2008. The matter came before the Magistrate Judge for a status conference on February 6, 2008, during which the defense attorney stated that he was still waiting for a written plea agreement from the government to present to his client. On February 8, 2008, the government filed its opposition to Browne's motion to dismiss.
On February 13, 2008, the Court entered an Order rescheduling the trial in this matter for March 17, 2008.
The Speedy Trial Act “give[s] effect to the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial by setting specified time limits after arraignment or indictment within which criminal trials must be commenced.” United States v. Lattany,
982 F.2d 866, 870–71 (3d. Cir.1992) (quotation omitted). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) ( “Section 3161(b)”) “[a]ny information or indictment charging an individual with the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with such charges.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) (1990). Additionally, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (“Section 3161(c)(1)”) requires that a defendant charged in an indictment or information must be brought to trial within seventy days after the filing date of the indictment or information, or the date of the defendant's first court appearance, whichever comes later. Id. at § 3161(c)(1).
The Speedy Trial Act provides that
[t]he following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within which an information or an indictment must be filed, or in computing the time within which the trial of any such offense must commence:
(1) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including but not limited to—
(A) delay resulting from any proceeding, including any examinations, to determine the mental competency or physical capacity of the defendant;
...
(F) delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion.
...
(H) delay resulting from transportation of any defendant from another district, or to and from places of examination or hospitalization, except that any time consumed in excess of ten days from the date an order of removal or an order directing such transportation, and the defendant's arrival at the destination shall be presumed to be unreasonable;
...
(J) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty days, during which any proceeding concerning the defendant is actually under advisement by the court.
Id. at §§ 3161(h)(1)(A), (F), (H), (J).
If, after excluding time for permissible delays, an information is not filed against the defendant within thirty days, or if the defendant is not brought to trial within seventy days after the information is filed, the information must be dismissed.4See id. at § 3162(a)(1)-(2) (1975); see also United States v. Hamilton, 46 F.3d 271, 275 (3d Cir.1995) .
Browne claims that this matter must be dismissed because the thirty-day period for filing the information and the seventy-day period for bringing him to trial were both exceeded in this case.
Browne argues that the 30–day period set forth in Section 3161(b) was violated due to non-excludable time that elapsed between the March 22, 2007, order directing his psychological evaluation and his May 15, 2007, arrival at Butner. Browne points out that he was not transported to Butner within the ten-day allowable transportation period set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(H) ( “Section 3161(h)(1)(H)”). He asserts that any transportation delay exceeding that permitted under Section 3161(h)(1)(H) is not excludable for speedy trial purposes. According to Browne's calculations, 44 non-excludable days passed after the order for his mental evaluation before he arrived at Butner, exclusive of reasonable delays for transportation and hearing dates. Browne also claims that a total of 139 non-excludable days passed between his arrest on March 16, 2007, and the filing of the information on October 22, 2007.
The government contests Browne's calculations, asserting that the entire period from the March 21, 2007, hearing until October 2, 2007, when the government received the Report from Butner, should be excluded under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(A) (“Section 3161(h)(1)(A)”). In the government's view, only 22 non-excludable days elapsed between Browne's arrest and the filing of the information.
Courts disagree regarding the extent to which delays resulting from transportation of a defendant to and from the place of his examination are excludable from the speedy trial count.5 Some courts hold, as the government argues, that all delays in transporting a defendant to and from the place of examination are excludable as proceedings to determine the defendant's mental competency under Section 3161(h)(1)(A), notwithstanding the provisions of Section 3161(h)(1)(H). See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez, 918 F.2d 329, 333 (2d Cir.1990) (); United States v. Tewid, 86 Fed. Appx....
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