United States v. Broyles, 13154.

Decision Date19 March 1970
Docket NumberNo. 13154.,13154.
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. John Douglas BROYLES, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Barry T. Winston, Chapel Hill, N. C., for appellant.

W. Arnold Smith, Asst. U. S. Atty. (Warren H. Coolidge, U. S. Atty., on the brief), for appellee.

Daniel H. Pollitt, Chapel Hill, N. C. (Charles E. Lambeth, Jr., Thomasville, N. C., James Mattocks, High Point, N. C., and Norman B. Smith, Greensboro, N. C., on the brief), for North Carolina Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae.

Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, and SOBELOFF, BOREMAN, BRYAN, WINTER, CRAVEN and BUTZNER, Circuit Judges.

WINTER, Circuit Judge:

Persisting in the claim, rejected by his local board, that he is a conscientious objector, John Douglas Broyles refused to submit to induction into the armed forces. He was indicted, tried and convicted for violating 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 462(c) and committed under the Federal Youth Corrections Act. He appeals, and we reverse.

I

Broyles, the twenty-five year old son of a retired Army officer, first registered under the Selective Service Act on December 14, 1963, when he was nineteen years of age. To the conscientious objector portion of the questionnaire, he responded, "Does not apply."

Broyles was granted a series of student deferments from February 11, 1964, through August 11, 1966. During this period he studied at Duke University, from which he received an A. B. degree. After graduation, Broyles volunteered for and was accepted for service in Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA), and he requested an occupational deferment (II-A) for the period June 30, 1966, to August 15, 1967.

On August 11, 1966, Broyles was reclassified I-A. He immediately wrote to his local board indicating that he had completed his VISTA training in Atlanta and had been assigned and sent to Chicago. He advised that he wished to appeal the denial of his request for an occupational deferment.

On September 8, 1966, the local board forwarded Broyles' file to the appeal board and the following January the appeal board voted unanimously to retain Broyles' classification of I-A. Broyles was notified of this action by written notice mailed January 27, 1967.

By letter dated May 1, 1967, Broyles requested Form No. 150 — the special form for claiming classification as a conscientious objector. This was furnished, completed and returned promptly. On May 16, 1967, the board voted unanimously to reject the claim of conscientious objection and continue the I-A classification. Broyles was notified of this action and advised of his right to personal appearance and appeal. On May 25, 1967, he was ordered to report for a physical examination. Before the physical examination was conducted, Broyles asserted his privilege of personal appearance and stated that if not classified as a conscientious objector he wished to exercise his right to appeal. Enclosed with the letter setting forth these statements, Broyles furnished letters from four individuals in support of his claim of conscientious objection.

Broyles' physical examination was conducted July 21, 1967, and he was found acceptable. On August 22, 1967, the local board was advised that Broyles' VISTA service had been concluded.

On November 14, 1967, Broyles appeared before the local board. Prior to his appearance he was requested to furnish a written statement of what he expected to tell the board when he appeared. Broyles responded by a series of inquiries why the board felt his claim was insufficient, what additional information the board might desire, and what previous information the board would like to have clarified. No transcript of the appearance or detailed summary of what occurred was made, but the board recorded, "there was nothing new brought out during the personal appearance other than that the registrant wanted the board to answer questions, and they advised him that they would not answer questions that he requested." On the same day, the board voted unanimously to continue Broyles' classification as I-A.

Advised of this action, Broyles took a second unsuccessful appeal. In April and May, Broyles wrote to his local board reasserting his conscientious objection. In the April letter, he stated his willingness to serve in the medical corps in Vietnam or in a hospital or school in the United States. In his May letter, he articulated his inability to understand the denial of I-O classification. He respectfully asked his board to reexamine the material which he had submitted and to consider the restatement of his beliefs set forth in the letter. He also included a letter of support from his father. Finally, he requested the local board to seek review from the Presidential Appeal Board in his behalf. The board declined to reopen the matter, and on May 2, 1968, Broyles was ordered to report for induction on May 31, 1968. He appeared at the induction center, but refused to be inducted and filed a written statement of his refusal.

II

Broyles makes numerous arguments why his conviction should be reversed. On the initial consideration of his appeal by a panel of this Court, it appeared that neither the local board, the appeal board, nor anyone else ever stated why Broyles' claim of conscientious objection was denied. We requested the filing of supplemental briefs and ordered the case reargued on the question of under what circumstances and to what extent should a local selective service board be required to articulate its reason for denying a registrant's request to be classified as a conscientious objector. It is that issue which we find dispositive of this case.

III

The record shows that Broyles established prima facie his entitlement to classification as a conscientious objector.

His conscientious objector's questionnaire recites that he is not presently a member of any organized religious group, although he received his early religious training in the Episcopal Church and has had associations with the Unitarian Church. One of the letters in support of his claim also shows that he has had contacts with The United Church of Christ-Friends.

In describing his religious beliefs, Broyles states that he believes in a "Life Force," which is "supreme," and which constitutes the "basic driving energy of the universe." This Life Force directs Broyles' conscience and "there are often commands which outweigh the duties arising from a human relationship." The essence of his claim is described in the following language:

"Because I see the Life Force as the ultimate and supreme force of the universe and human life is sacred, and because I must follow the dictates of my conscience, I find killing and war utterly negative, sinful and wrong. For the same reason I would find it impossible to serve in the capacity of a medical soldier whose basic objective was to fix up a man so he could go quickly and kill again. Also, I could not obey an order to treat a man less seriously wounded before a man who was almost dying. If I were to patch up a soldier, it would have to be for his sake as a human being and not for the sake of further killing and more fighting."

In addition to the formal religious contacts, Broyles stated that his beliefs were derived from his parents and his own religious readings. He said that, although his father was a professional Army officer, he taught him great respect for human life and his mother instilled the qualities of compassion and tolerance. Beginning in high school and continuing through college, he had read and been influenced by books on Eastern philosophy and Eastern religion and books of certain twentieth century theologians, including Tillich, Niebuhr and de Chardin. As an example of his practice of his beliefs in the sanctity and goodness of human life, Broyles cited his work with the Congress of Racial Equality in 1964, as well as his association with VISTA. He said that his beliefs and the conclusions drawn from work with his fellow men crystallized into his position of conscientious objection and that, in the spring of 1967, he first heard that under existing law he might be entitled to classification as a conscientious objector. These factors and the immediate threat of the draft led him to make formal application for classification as a conscientious objector.

In response to the question of what circumstances did he believe warranted the use of force, he replied that except in defense of himself or loved ones he would not resort to force. In an elaborate answer, he concluded that his beliefs concerning the use of force would not permit him to serve in the armed forces.

Impressive backing for Broyles' claims is contained in the letters filed in support of the statements contained in his conscientious objector questionnaire. In one, a retired Army officer who had known him for over twenty years wrote that he disagreed "completely and vehemently" with Broyles' stand but that there was "no question in my mind as to the sincerity or honesty" of the claim. He added that Broyles' stand "is consistent with his life, action and thought" and that "his religious training and beliefs apparently have been synthesizing for him particularly during the past 8 years," and that Broyles' belief "to him * * * has the same weight as more orthodox religious convictions."

In another letter, a college president who had known Broyles for over ten years wrote, "I am certain that his stand on military service results from his religious training and belief," that as a child Broyles was not pugnacious or belligerent and that Broyles sincerely held beliefs closely akin to Unitarian doctrine.

By this evidence, Broyles showed prima facie that he was conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form, and that these views resulted from his religious training and belief and not from essentially political, sociological or philosophical views or a merely personal code....

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