United States v. Bull

• Decision Date: 22 February 2022
• Docket Number: 4:20-cr-00691-SRC
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. LESTER A. BULL and CHARLES STROZIER, Defendants.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. LESTER A. BULL and CHARLES STROZIER, Defendants.

No. 4:20-cr-00691-SRC

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division

February 22, 2022

ORDER

STEPHEN R. CLARK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Two defendants in this multi-defendant drug-distribution conspiracy case, Lester A. Bull and Charles Strozier, filed various motions to suppress; after conducting two evidentiary hearings, the Magistrate Judge recommended the denial of the motions. These defendants then filed objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, claiming that delays in their presentment necessitate that the Court suppress statements and evidence that law enforcement obtained following their arrest. Strozier additionally insists that alleged Fourth-Amendment violations mandate the suppression of evidence. Having conducted a de novo review of the record and the law, the Court finds no Rule 5 or Fourth Amendment violation and overrules the objections.

I. Procedural background

Pending before the Court are Bull's Motion to Suppress Statements, Doc. 130, and Motion to Suppress Evidence, Doc 170, and Strozier's Motion to Suppress Evidence for Violation of Rule “5A(1)(a) [sic]” of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Doc. 181, and Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence in Violation of Defendant's Fourth Amendment Rights, Doc. 182^[1]. The Court referred Bull's and Strozier's motions to United States Magistrate Judge Noelle C. Collins. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). After holding two evidentiary hearings, Judge Collins issued a Report and Recommendation detailing her factual findings, legal conclusions, and recommendation on Bull's and Strozier's motions. Doc. 231; see also Docs. 130, 136, 138, 157, 170, 175, 179, 181, 182, 188, 191-1, 191-2, 192, 211, 219. The Report and Recommendation recommends that the Court deny Bull's and Strozier's motions. Doc. 231 at p. 26. Bull and Strozier filed separate objections to the Report and Recommendation, Docs. 239, 245, 246, and the United States filed a response, Doc. 248; neither Bull nor Strozier filed any replies. As such, the matter is now ripe for ruling.

II. Standard

When a party objects to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation, the district judge must conduct a de novo review of the portions of the report, findings, or recommendations to which the party objected. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (“A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.”); United States v. Lothridge, 324 F.3d 599, 600 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)). In making its de novo determination, the Court reviewed the entire record, including the transcripts of the July 20, 2021, and November 30, 2021, evidentiary hearings as well as the exhibits entered into evidence at those hearings. See Docs. 130, 136, 138, 157, 170, 175, 179, 181, 182, 188, 191-1, 191-2, 192, 211, 219, 231, 239, 246.

Strozier does not raise any specific objections to Judge Collins's Report and Recommendation, just general ones. See Doc. 246. The Court discourages this practice, as it fails to identify specific findings or conclusions that Strozier claims should have been decided differently, or why. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (“A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” (emphasis added)). Nonetheless, the Court has conducted a de novo review, and sets forth its findings below. See Belk v. Purkett, 15 F.3d 803, 815 (8th Cir. 1994).

III. Discussion

A. Findings of fact

Neither Bull nor Strozier specifically objects to the findings of fact in the Report and Recommendation. Nonetheless, the Court has conducted a de novo review and finds that Judge Collin's has accurately set forth the facts supported by the record. Accordingly, the Court adopts, incorporates, and sustains all findings of fact as set forth in Judge Collins's Report and Recommendation. Doc. 231.

B. Conclusions of law

1. Bull's motions

Bull's two motions, Docs. 130 and 170, turn on whether the United States violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment and Rule 5 by failing to present him to a judge for a timely initial appearance.

a. The Fourth Amendment and the 48-hour rule

Bull and Strozier erroneously assert that the Supreme Court's decisions in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) and County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991) tether Rule 5 to the Fourth Amendment. See Docs. 130, 170, 181. Neither Gerstein nor Riverside even mentions Rule 5, and the Eight Circuit has ruled that the Gerstein/Riverside 48-hour standard and Rule 5 are conceptually distinct.

In Gerstein, the Supreme Court “held that the Fourth Amendment requires a prompt judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to an extended pretrial detention following a warrantless arrest.” Riverside, 500 U.S. at 45(citing Gerstein). In making a probable cause determination required by the Fourth Amendment:

The sole issue is whether there is probable cause for detaining the arrested person pending further proceedings. This issue can be determined reliably without an adversary hearing. The standard is the same as that for arrest. That standard- probable cause to believe the suspect has committed a crime-traditionally has been decided by a magistrate in a nonadversary proceeding on hearsay and written testimony, and the Court has approved these informal modes of proof.

Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 120.

In Riverside, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the Constitution does not contain a specific time limit, and adopted a 48-hour outside limit to satisfy Gerstein's promptness requirement: “a jurisdiction that chooses to offer combined proceedings must do so as soon as is reasonably feasible, but in no event later than 48 hours after arrest.” 500 U.S. at 57; see also 500 U.S. at 56 (“[W]e hesitate to announce that the Constitution compels a specific time limit…[but] we believe that a jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of Gerstein. For this reason, such jurisdictions will be immune from systemic challenges.”).

In Chavez-citied by both Bull and Strozier-the Eighth Circuit noted that “Rule 5(a) and the Gerstein/Riverside standard, while related and analogous, are distinct concepts.” United States v. Chavez, 705 F.3d 381, 383 n.2 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Garcia- Echaverria, 374 F.3d 440, 452 n.17 (6th Cir. 2004) (“It is not entirely clear to what extent the [Riverside] rule and Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(a) overlap.”), and United States v. Encarnacion, 239 F.3d 395, 398 n.2 (1st Cir. 2001) (“While the Rule 5(a) and Fourth Amendment contexts are certainly analogous, the 48-hour rule is a requirement of the Fourth Amendment, not Rule 5(a).” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Doc. 130 at p. 2; Doc. 170 at p. 2; Doc. 181 at p. 2. Regardless, the Gerstein/Riverside Fourth-Amendment standard requires not a hearing but a judicial determination of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest. 500 U.S. at 57. Under Rule 4(a), a judge's issuance of an arrest warrant necessarily entails a probable-cause determination. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 4(a) (“If the complaint or one or more affidavits filed with the complaint establish probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it, the judge must issue an arrest warrant . . .”); see also Green v. Byrd, 358 F.Supp.3d 782, 794-95 (E.D. Ark. 2018) (“The Fourth Amendment does not require a suspect to be present for the probable cause determination when that determination is made in the context of an application for a warrant.”), aff'd, 972 F.3d 997 (8th Cir. 2020).

On de novo review, the Court finds that by issuing arrest warrants, a Magistrate Judge made a judicial determination of probable cause within 48 hours of the arrests of Bull and Strozier; therefore, no Fourth-Amendment violation occurred. Neither Bull nor Strozier had a probable-cause hearing within 48 hours of arrest, but U.S. Magistrate Judge Shirley Padmore Mensah made probable-cause determinations within 48 hours of their arrest-in compliance with Gerstein and Riverside-by issuing arrest warrants. See Docs. 23-24; see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 4(a). As such, the Court overrules Bull's and Strozier's objections as to their Fourth-Amendment delay-in-presentment arguments, Docs. 239, 246.

b. Rule 5(a)

The Court next addresses whether a Rule 5 violation occurred. The common-law rule of “prompt presentment” required an arresting officer to bring a prisoner before a magistrate “as soon as he reasonably could.” Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 306 (2009). In 1943, the Supreme Court examined the question of how to enforce a number of federal statues codifying the presentment rule. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 342 (1943) (citing, among others, 18 U.S.C. § 595 (1940), which provided that “[i]t shall be the duty of the marshal, his deputy, other officer who may arrest a person . . . to take the defendant before the nearest . . . judicial officer . . . for a hearing”). In McNabb, federal agents, in “flagrant disregard” of the prompt-presentment requirement, interrogated several murder suspects for days, and only after the suspects had confessed, did they bring them before a magistrate. 318 U.S. at 334-338, 345. Finding the confessions were obtained during a period of unreasonable delay, the Supreme Court held them inadmissible. Id. at 347.

“Shortly after McNabb, the combined action of the Judicial...