United States v. Buntin

• Decision Date: 01 February 1882
• Citation: 10 F. 730
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. BUNTIN. [1]
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

10 F. 730

UNITED STATES v. BUNTIN. ^[1]

United States Circuit Court, S.D. Ohio, Western Division.

February, 1882

Channing Richards, U.S. Dist. Atty., for prosecution.

John Johnston and H. J. Buntin, contra.

The testimony showed that there was no school for colored children in the subdistrict in which the prosecuting witness resided. The school for white children was situated about three miles from his house. The township board of education had established a separate school for the colored children of the township, under the provisions of section 4008 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio, which is as follows:

'When in the judgment of the board, it will be for the advantage of the district to do so, it may organize separate schools for colored children. The boards of two or more adjoining districts may unite in a separate school for colored children, each board to bear its proportionate share of the expense of such school according to the number of colored children from each district in the school, which shall be under the control of the board of education of the district in which the school is situated. '

This school was located about five miles from the prosecuting witness' home.

The other facts appear in the opinion.

BAXTER C.J.

(charging jury.) Much has been said and quite an array of books produced to prove that a criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of every crime. The proposition, when properly understood, is correct. But what is a criminal intent? This depends somewhat upon the nature of the crime with which the accused is charged. The decision of Judge Rives, which has been read to the court in your hearing, was made in a case in which a jury commissioner was indicted for excluding persons from serving as jurors. The essence of the crime, in that case, consisted in the exclusion of colored men from serving as jurors on account of their color. They might have been excluded for want of sufficient intelligence, or other good and valid reason; and, if so, the defendant would not have been guilty. Hence the motive actuating the accused became a material inquiry. His motive was the principal element of the crime, and it was incumbent on the government to prove the unlawful intent, which in that case constituted the offence before a conviction could be lawfully demanded. The same may be said in relation to many other crimes. The crime of passing counterfeit money consists in the passing of it with a knowledge of its spurious character. If passed without such knowledge there would be no legal guilt. The same may be said of the crime of forgery, as knowledge and an intent to defraud are essential elements of the crime. A great many other cases, illustrative of the principle, might be cited if it were deemed necessary. Let us see how far it is applicable to the case now under consideration.

Through amendments to the constitution of the United States, which now constitute part of that instrument and are parts of the supreme law of the land, those of our fellow-citizens who were held in slavery were emancipated, and clothed with all the rights of citizenship. They have, under the constitution, all the rights that you and I possess. Yea, more: having just emerged from servile condition, and being incapable of defending themselves against the aggressions of the more intelligent and stronger race, statutes intended to secure to them the full benefit of the recent constitutional amendments have been passed for their special protection. Among others, congress has enacted (Rev. St. Sec. 5510) that 'every person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any inhabitant of any state or territory to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the constitution and laws of the United States * * * on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color or race, * * * shall be punished,' etc.

It is important to note the intent and scope of this statute. The mere fact of defendant having excluded the colored boy mentioned in the indictment from the privileges of the school taught by him, would not be a violation of the act. More than this must be proven before you will be authorized to convict. He must have been excluded under some color of law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom of the state, and on account of his color. If, therefore, this defendant did exclude the colored boy named in the indictment from the privileges of the school taught by him, after being requested by the trustees of the subdistrict to permit him to enter it, claiming the right to do so under authority of the statute providing for the separate education of colored children in schools to be established and maintained for that purpose, and did so on account of his color, the court instructs you that you ought to find him guilty as charged, unless you shall find in his favor upon the question of fact to which I will hereafter direct your attention.

We will, however, before presenting the question of fact upon which the result in this case depends, notice the several defenses urged by defendant's counsel: 1. It incidentally appeared in the progress of the examination of the witnesses that a civil suit had been prosecuted against the defendant to recover damages for the deprivation of the rights of the prosecuting witness alleged in the indictment in this case; and it is insisted by counsel that that civil suit in which damages were recovered 'exhausted the remedy,' and bars this prosecution. This defence, gentlemen, cannot be maintained. The prosecution and recovery in the civil suit does not, in the least, preclude the government from the prosecution of this indictment. The civil suit was for the wrong inflicted on the individual; this indictment is for the wrong done, or supposed to have been done, to the public; and the result of the former case can in no way affect the result to be reached in this one.

2. The defendant has been permitted to introduce witnesses to prove that he is a man of good character. The law presumed as much before the evidence was adduced. This evidence was followed by an elaborate argument, supported by numerous authorities, it impress the court with its importance and value. The authorities are all right. But have they any application to the facts of this case? The defendant has testified in his own behalf, and upon his examination admitted that a separate school had been provided for the education of the colored children of his district, to which he thought the prosecuting witness ought to have gone; that notwithstanding the request of the trustees to defendant to receive and instruct the prosecuting witness in the school which he was teaching, he thought he had no right to be taught there; and that, acting under color of the law which provided a separate school for colored children, and because the prosecuting witness was a colored boy, he, the defendant, declined to permit him to enter the school taught by him, but excluded him therefrom. Such is the testimony of the defendant himself. There is, then, nothing left in the case on which the evidence of defendant's good character can have any legitimate bearing. If a defendant, being indicted for a breach of a criminal law, admits all the elements that enter into and constitute the crime, of what avail is good character? If defendant were to deny the facts alleged in the indictment; if he were to insist that the evidence on the part of the prosecution was untrue; if he were to make and present an issue of fact as between himself and other witnesses, or even stand upon his plea of 'not guilty,-- THEN, and in either of such events, the jury, in passing upon the question of defendant's guilt or innocence, would be authorized to consider the evidence of his good character, and give to it just as much weight as they in their judgment believed, in view of all the other evidence in the case, it was entitled to; and in case the evidence of his guilt or innocence was evenly balanced, evidence of defendant's good character would be sufficient to justify an acquittal. But as the defendant, as a witness, admitted the exclusion of the prosecuting witness from the privileges of the school, and that he excluded him under color and by authority of a statute of the state, and because of his color, the evidence of defendant's good character becomes immaterial, and is entitled to no consideration at your hands.

3. It has been further contended that as defendant was advised by counsel and acted in the belief that he was authorized by law to exclude the witness from the school, he is guiltless of any crime, and entitled, on this ground, to an acquittal. But this position, gentlemen, cannot be conceded. If the advice of counsel could be pleaded and relied on as a good defence to an indictment for a violation of the criminal laws, the execution of these laws would depend more on the construction which the accused and their legal advisers might place upon them, than upon their interpretation by the courts. In fact if such was the proper ruling, the recent amendments to the national constitution would, through the advice of counsel, and the honest or simulated convictions of offenders, be rendered nugatory or eliminated from that instrument. The principle contended for is, to a limited extent, applicable to civil actions. For instance, if A. procured B. to be prosecuted for an alleged crime, and B. should be acquitted thereof, and sue A. for having had him prosecuted without probable cause, the law, in its tenderness, would permit A. to prove that he acted in good faith upon the advice, honestly obtained, of a reputable attorney, as a defence to B.'s suit. But the principle...