United States v. Burch

• Decision Date: 09 October 1915
• Docket Number: 5781.,5780
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. BURCH. SAME v. RIDER.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California

226 F. 974

UNITED STATES v. BURCH.

SAME v. RIDER.

Nos. 5780, 5781.

United States District Court, N.D. California.

October 9, 1915

John W Preston, U.S. Atty., and M. A. Thomas, Asst. U.S. Atty., both of San Francisco, Cal.

Paul A Myers and Lloyd A. Myers, both of San Francisco, Cal., for defendants.

Walter E. Hettman, of San Francisco, Cal., amicus curiae.

DOOLING District Judge.

The indictment here is in two counts. The first charges that the defendant knowingly transported in interstate commerce by means of two automobiles running over the public highways of the United States from Wheeling, in the state of West Virginia, to San Francisco, in the state of California, a certain woman for an unlawful purpose, to wit, that she should live and cohabit with him as his mistress and concubine. The second count alleges transportation by the defendant by the same means and between the same points of the same woman, with the intent in the defendant that the said woman should engage in the practice of prostitution and give herself up to debauchery. It is not averred in either count that the automobiles were common carriers, and the ownership of such automobiles is alleged to be to the grand jury unknown. One of the automobiles is averred to have been used in transporting the woman from Wheeling to Ft. Bridger, in the state of Wyoming, and the other to have been used for such transportation from Ft. Bridger to San Francisco. It is further averred that the automobiles were run and operated by defendant and one Charles Rider. A demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the indictment; the grounds of the demurrer being that the indictment states no offense. Upon argument it appeared that defendant's contention is that no offense is stated, because there was no element of interstate commerce, as the automobiles are not alleged to have been common carriers.

This case appears to be the first one under the so-called White Slave Traffic Act to present this question. The act provides in its first section:

'That the term 'interstate commerce,' as used in this act, shall include transportation from any state or territory or the District of Columbia to any other state or territory or the District of Columbia.'

And in its second section it provides:

'That any person who shall knowingly transport or cause to be transported, * * * in interstate * * * commerce, * * * any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose, * * * shall be deemed guilty of a felony.'

It is argued for the government that the recital in the first section, 'that the term 'interstate...