United States v. Bynes
| Decision Date | 29 August 2019 |
| Docket Number | CR418-153 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. FRANK H. BYNES, JR., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia |
Before the Court are defendant's First Motion to Dismiss the Indictment pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c), doc. 97, defendant's First Motion to Dismiss Indictment as Unconstitutionally Vague, doc. 98, and defendants First Motion to Strike Surplusage, doc. 99. For the following reasons, the motions should be DENIED.
Defendant was indicted in a 48-count indictment in June of 2018. Doc. 3. Counts 1-39 were for unlawful dispensation of controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and counts 40-48 were for health care fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1347. Id. An initial appearance was held on June 21, 2019, and he was arraigned on June 27, 2018. Doc. 8, doc. 27. Discovery commenced and defendant requested that the Court approve an expenditure for an expert on October 31, 2018 and November 28, 2018. Docs. 54 & 56. The Court granted that motion on December 3. Doc. 57. However, the case did not proceed to trial as a superseding indictment was filed on April 3, 2019, reducing the number of counts to 17.1 Doc. 71. As with his initial indictment, the charges are divided into two types; counts 1-14 are for unlawful dispensation of controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and counts 15-17 are in for health care fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1347. Id. Defendant filed two motions to dismiss the superseding indictment—one arguing that it is faulty under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c) and one arguing that it is unconstitutionally vague—and one motion to strike surplusage. Docs. 97-99. For the following reasons, they should be DENIED.
Defendant argues that the indictment is defective under Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 7(c)(1). Doc. 97. He argues that Counts 1-14 fail to adequately allege an actus reus or to provide an adequate basis for distinguishing negligence or regulatory matters from a criminal drug-dealing activity. Doc. 97-1 at 2. He claims that the lack of specific allegations of "drug dealing as conventionally understood" makes the indictment defective. Id. He also challenges the allegations that he did not do something "adequately," "sufficiently," or "thoroughly" as these are value judgments. Id. at 8-10. He also argues that the indictment does not claim that the patients treated actually lacked a legitimate need for the substances prescribed. Id. at 9. He contests the allegations that he "failed to act" are merely a reflection that he exercised poor medical judgment and was a bad doctor not that he is criminally liable. Id. at 10. He likewise argues that the Government should be required to plead that defendant had actual knowledge that the prescribed medications would not be used for medicinal purposes. Id. at 12. He also argues that the Government must show that he dispensed a controlled substance knowingly and intentionally, and that he did so without a legitimate medical need. Id. Finally, he argues that the counts fail to adequately allege the essential element of mens rea. Id. at 14-15.2
As to Counts 15-17, defendant argues that the indictment fails to adequately allege mens rea and that the counts cannot be based on the prescribing conduct alleged as that conduct involved merely treatment decisions. Id. at 18-20. Similarly, defendant contends that the allegations in the indictment cannot be predicated on HCBP (Health Care Benefit Providers) policies and decisions, or industry practices alone as these regulations lack the force of law. Id. at 22.
The Sixth Amendment right of an accused "to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation," U.S. Const. amend. VI, is implemented by Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c), which requires that an indictment set forth "a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged." An indictment is sufficient under the Constitution and Rule 7(c) if it (1) sets forth the elements of the charged offense in a manner which thoroughly informs the defendant of the charge against which he must defend and (2) enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974); United States v. Critzer, 951 F.2d 306, 307 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. McMath, 2013 WL 5799004 at * 4 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 16, 2013). An indictment is generally sufficient if it simply parrots the wording of the statute itself, provided the statutory language sets forth all the elements of the offense. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117; United States v. Ramos, 666 F.2d 469, 474 (11th Cir. 1982); see also United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 109 (2007). Ultimately, " 'the appropriate test . . . is not whether the indictment might have been drafted with more clarity, but whether it conforms to minimal constitutional standards.' " United States v. McGarity, 669 F.3d 1218, 1235-36 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Varkonyi, 645 F.2d 453, 456 (5th Cir. 1981)). Thus, if the indictment quotes the statutory language and provides a date and place for the alleged criminal activity, there is no further requirement to detail the factual proof that will be relied upon. United States v. Crippen, 579 F.2d 340, 342 (5th Cir. 1978); accord United States v. Powell, 767 F.3d 1026, 1030 (10th Cir. 2014).
In the case of Counts 1-14, the indictment alleges for each circumstance that defendant unlawfully dispensed a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The indictment also alleges that on a particular date, defendant knowingly and intentionally dispensed particular controlled substances to particular individuals in particular quantities and that he did it not for a legitimate medical purpose and not in the usual course of professional practice. Likewise, the remaining counts alleging healthcare fraud state that defendant submitted false and fraudulent claims to Medicare, Tricare, or Medicaid on particular dates for particular controlled substances dispensed to particular beneficiaries; that each claim costs a particular amount of money; and that defendant knew that the prescriptions were not issued for a legitimate medical purpose by an authorized individual practitioner acting in the usual course of professional practice and, therefore were ineligible for reimbursement. These allegations are sufficient under Rule 7(c) because they track the statutory language and adequately inform the defendant of the charges against which he must defend. Although defendant quibbles with the language used the indictment, he does not allege that he would be unable to plead or defend against the charges.3 Accordingly, the motion should be DENIED.
Defendant alleges that Counts 1-14 are unconstitutionally vague because they fail to include any allegations of what would traditionally be considered drug dealing.4 Doc. 98-1 at 2. He argues that the indictment's claims are based upon "perceived deficiencies in care, or faulty medical judgment". Id. He claims that the Controlled Substances Act ("CSA") under which defendant was charged is unconstitutional, facially and as applied, because treatment of patients with chronic pain is constitutionally protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendment. Defendant argues that because pain management treatment is a "complex landscape of scientific and ethical issues where the answers are seldom clear," that attempts to regulate it run afoul of the constitution. Doc. 98-1 at 7. He also alleges that the CSA fails to "provide the physician with sufficient breathing space to exercise the discretion and professional judgment necessary to make complex scientific and ethical decisions." Id. at 15.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that registered physicians "can be prosecuted under section 841 when . . . their activities fall outside the usual course of professional practice." United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 124 (1975). Numerous courts have found that the terms "legitimate medical purpose" and "usual course of professional practice," United States v. Robinson, 253 F. Supp. 3d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2017), are not vague as applied to health care professionals.5 Indeed, this district has already dealt with an identical challenge to the constitutionality of the CSA as it applies to physicians. United States v. Bird, 2017 WL 9482459 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 27, 2017). In that case, the defendant alleged that the CSA was unconstitutionally vague because it contained no uniformly defined "standard of care." He cited to United States v. Collier, 478 F.2d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 1973)6 where that court held "in the course of his professional practice" restricts a physician to "dispensing or prescribing drugs in the bona fide treatment of a patient's disease." The Court determined that the standard was not vague merely because it does not "delineate the precise circumstances constituting the bounds of permissible practice." Id.
A similar logic applies in this case. The language defendant identifies is neither vague on its face, nor is it subject to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. All that is required of a criminal statute is that it "define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (citations omitted). In other words, the law must "give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly," and cannot leave government actors "free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in...
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