United States v. C.S.
Decision Date | 15 May 2020 |
Docket Number | Nos. 19-1254,19-2770,s. 19-1254 |
Citation | 968 F.3d 237 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. C.S., Appellant |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Kim D. Daniel [ARGUED] Office of United States Attorney Middle District of Pennsylvania 228 Walnut Street, P.O. Box 11754 220 Federal Building and Courthouse Harrisburg, PA 17108 Counsel for Appellee
Quin M. Sorenson [ARGUED] Office of Federal Public Defender 100 Chestnut Street Suite 306 Harrisburg, PA 17101 Counsel for Appellant
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges.
C.S., a seventeen-year old, was adjudicated delinquent as a result of threats he made in an Internet chatroom dedicated to discussing terroristic attacks, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). During several conversations, C.S. made threats against a local church. Although juvenile proceedings are usually sealed, the District Court permitted the Government to notify the church that it was the subject of a threat and that the party who communicated the threat had been prosecuted. The order did not identify C.S.
C.S. appeals the judgment and the notification order, arguing that the District Court: (1) erred in finding that his statements qualified as threats under § 875(c), and (2) violated the confidentiality provisions of the Juvenile and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 ("JDA"), Pub. L. No. 93-415, 88 Stat. 1109 ( ), in allowing the Government to notify the church of the threats. Because the evidence proved that C.S. made threats that violated § 875(c) and the District Court acted well within its discretion in issuing the notification order, we will affirm.
C.S. participated in online group chats. One of those chats was dedicated to discussing the Islamic State. The Islamic State is a terrorist organization, often referred to as "ISIS," an acronym for the "Islamic State in Iraq and Syria." App. 135.
In the chatroom, C.S. used a screenname that evoked allegiance to Islamic fundamentalist guerrillas, and he shared a photo of himself wearing a headscarf and a headband of another terrorist organization, Hamas. He had conversations with, among others, "Zubair," who lived outside Pennsylvania. App. 137. C.S. and Zubair discussed obtaining ISIS weaponry and conducting ISIS-inspired attacks. One of their conversations proceeded as follows:
Later, after exchanging pictures of themselves in Islamic fighter garb, Zubair sent a photo of the Washington Monument. App. 633. The conversation continued:
The two then discussed the appropriate weapons and their experience with them. The conversation thereafter turned to a discussion of churches in their respective areas:
The conversation continued about various targets:
The next day, the two returned to their discussion about targeting Christians and a church:
In addition to the conversations with Zubair, C.S. made statements in the chatroom to a confidential informant that echoed his statements to Zubair. When asked in the group chat if he lived close to Washington, C.S. replied that he lived close to Washington, Philadelphia, New York, and Harrisburg and that "there is a big ass church" near him. App. 511. The confidential informant asked C.S. if he would attack soon and what he wanted to target. C.S. replied that he was "still preparing and gathering equipment" and App. 383-85.
Law enforcement thereafter searched C.S.’s home and cell phone. In his home, agents discovered assault rifles, ammunition, a crossbow, a headscarf, smoke bombs, grenade casings, military-style ammunition vest and gear, and a longbladed knife. His cell phone revealed Internet searches, literature about making explosives, Islamic Jihadi propaganda videos depicting beheadings, and photos of C.S. posing with his assault rifle while wearing military gear and head scarf.
The Government charged C.S. with making interstate threats in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) and filed a certification to proceed under the JDA because C.S. was under eighteen years old.2 The District Court held a delinquency hearing, where the Government presented the chatroom transcripts, the results of the searches, and C.S.’s post-arrest statements to law enforcement. For his part, C.S. testified that he made the statements to impress others in the chatrooms, to make friends, and to have others believe that he was serious about his statements, but that he never intended to carry out the attacks.
The District Court found C.S. delinquent. The Court held that, despite C.S.’s testimony about his underlying motivations, C.S. intended that his statements be taken as meaningful threats, so they qualified as threats under § 875(c). The Court also found that C.S. possessed equipment and materials that showed that he intended his statements to be taken seriously. After the hearing, the Court released C.S. to the custody of his mother and placed him on house arrest pending final disposition.
After the adjudication, the Government moved under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act ("CVRA"), 18 U.S.C. § 3771, to notify the church and the local police department of his threats and placement on house arrest. The Court held that the local police were not "crime victims" under the CVRA, but that the church was a "crime victim." App. 11. The Court, relying on our precedent in United States v. A.D., 28 F.3d 1353 (3d Cir. 1994), then observed that while the JDA provides that juvenile proceedings are generally confidential, it had the discretion to issue an order permitting the Government to notify the leader of the church that:
App. 13-14. C.S. appealed that notification order, and, at his request, the Court stayed the notification pending appeal. The Court thereafter sentenced C.S. to time served and juvenile delinquent supervision until his twenty-first birthday. C.S. appealed the final disposition, and we consolidated the appeals.
We have two tasks in this case: first, to examine the sufficiency of the evidence and, second, to evaluate whether the District Court had the discretion to lift the confidentiality that shields juvenile proceedings by permitting notification to the victim of the threats.
We consider "a sufficiency challenge de novo," and "review the record ‘in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt[ ] beyond a reasonable doubt.’ " United States v. Hendrickson, 949 F.3d 95, 97 n.2 (3d Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc)). In reviewing a conviction or adjudication for violating § 875, we are mindful that "[w]hether a speaker's language constitutes a threat is a matter to be decided by the trier of fact," and the factfinder's decision is "entitled to great deference by this [C]ourt." United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 555 (3d Cir. 1991).4
We review the District Court's notification order for abuse of discretion. United States v. Under Seal, 853 F.3d 706, 725 (4th Cir. 2017) ( ); In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., LLC, 409 F.3d 555, 563 (2d Cir. 2005) ( ); A.D., ...
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