United States v. C.L.T., 3:16–CR–30041–RAL

Decision Date09 September 2016
Docket Number3:16–CR–30041–RAL
Citation207 F.Supp.3d 1054
Parties UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. C.L.T., Defendant
CourtU.S. District Court — District of South Dakota

Meghan N. Dilges, U.S. Attorney's Office, Pierre, SD, for Plaintiff.

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO TRANSFER CASE TO JUVENILE COURT AND SEALING CASE

ROBERTO A. LANGE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Defendant C.L.T.1 was indicted on March 15, 2016, on one count of aggravated sexual abuse of a child and two counts of abusive sexual contact of a child by force. Doc. 1. All counts allege that C.L.T. committed the offenses "[o]n or about or between the 1st day of August, 2013, and the 31st day of May, 2015," in Indian country in the District of South Dakota. Doc. 1. The alleged victim of the aggravated sexual abuse and on one count of the abusive sexual contact is C.L.T.'s young niece A.C., while the alleged victim on the remaining charge of abusive sexual contact is his even younger niece S.W.

C.L.T. filed a Motion to Transfer Case to Juvenile Court, Doc. 29, arguing that the only time he possibly could have committed such offenses was before the date range in the indictment, which was before he turned 18 and therefore was a juvenile. C.L.T. was born in late March of 1995, and was indicted in this case before his 21st birthday. The indictment alleges a 22 month time span when C.L.T. would have been between 18 and 20 years of age.

The government opposed C.L.T.'s motion to transfer. Doc. 32.

The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act requires juveniles not be prosecuted in federal court, absent a certification process. 18 U.S.C. § 5032. Because C.L.T. was under the age of 21 when indicted, whether C.L.T. was 18 or younger than 18 at the time of the commission of any offense is a jurisdictional barrier to whether he can be tried as an adult.2 See United States v. Ceja–Prado , 333 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003). Relatively few cases address the burdens and standard of proof to use in determining a defendant's juvenile status. United States v. Juvenile Male , 595 F.3d 885, 896–97 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) ("There is a paucity of cases addressing the appropriate allocation of the burdens and standard of proof in a hearing to determine juvenile status "). The statute itself is silent on such issues. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032. Both C.L.T. and the government cite to United States v. Salgado–Ocampo , 50 F.Supp.2d 908 (D. Minn. 1999), for the applicable standard. Doc. 30 at 12; Doc. 32 at 4. In Salgado–Ocampo , on remand from the Eighth Circuit to determine the defendant's juvenile status based on conflicting claims as to the defendant's date of birth, the district court reasoned that an initial burden fell on the government to

offer prima facie evidence of defendant's adult status. If the government satisfies this burden, defendant must then come forward with evidence of his juvenile status. If the defendant comes forward with such evidence, the government has an opportunity to rebut with any additional information.

Id. at 909.

The first disagreement between the parties is whether the indictment itself constitutes prima facie evidence of the defendant's adult status. An indictment represents the grand jury's determination of probable cause. Kaley v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1090, 1097, 188 L.Ed.2d 46 (2014) ("[A]n indictment fair upon its face, and returned by a properly constituted grand jury, we have explained, conclusively determines the existence of probable cause to believe the defendant perpetrated the offense alleged." (alteration in original and internal quotes removed) (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh , 420 U.S. 103, 117 n.19, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975) )); see also United States v. Allen , 406 F.3d 940, 946 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (noting that one of the "primary purposes of the grand jury [is] ... to make ‘the determination whether there is probable cause to believe a crime has been committed’ " (quoting United States v. Calandra , 414 U.S. 338, 343, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974) )). This indictment alleges that C.L.T. committed the crimes on or between about August 1, 2013, and May 31, 2015. Doc. 1. C.L.T.'s date of birth is not in question; it is in March of 1995. Under these circumstances, the indictment constitutes prima facie evidence of C.L.T.'s adult status at the time of the alleged offenses. See, e.g. , Beavers v. Henkel , 194 U.S. 73, 85, 24 S.Ct. 605, 48 L.Ed. 882 (1904) (holding "the indictment is prima facie evidence of the existence of probable cause" in habeas corpus cases seeking removal to another district); Moore v. Hartman , 571 F.3d 62, 67 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (affirming and collecting cases from many districts determining an indictment constitutes prima facie evidence of probable cause in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics , 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), retaliatory prosecution claims); see alsoZike v. Advance Am., Cash Advance Ctrs. of Mo., Inc. , 646 F.3d 504, 510 (8th Cir. 2011) (recognizing that the Missouri Supreme Court has determined that when grand jury indicts, there is prima facie evidence of probable cause in malicious prosecution cases).

The next disagreement between the parties is whether, once C.L.T. comes forward with evidence of juvenile status, the government's burden to rebut that evidence and show adult status is by a preponderance of the evidence, as the government contends, or beyond a reasonable doubt, as C.L.T. argues. Doc. 30 at 13; Doc. 32 at 5. The weight of authority establishes that the government's ultimate burden to rebut evidence of defendant being a juvenile is by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Garcia–Flores , No. 88–5470, 1991 WL 17448, at *3 (9th Cir. Feb. 15, 1991) ; Salgado–Ocampo , 50 F.Supp.2d at 909 ; State v. Arot , 838 N.W.2d 409, 412 (N.D. 2013) ; People of the V.I. ex rel J.G. , 59 V.I. 347, 362–64 (V.I. 2013) ; State v. Ali , 806 N.W.2d 45, 54 (Minn. 2011) ; People v. Nguyen , 222 Cal.App.3d 1612, 272 Cal.Rptr. 523, 526 (1990) (interpreting a state statute); In re R.L. , No. FJ–06–1777–07, 2008 WL 5123000, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 8, 2008) (per curiam) (same). These cases offer only sparring explanation for the reasoning beyond the standard, but such a standard makes sense in juvenile status cases. See, e.g. , Ali , 806 N.W.2d at 54 ("[B]ecause the criminal defendant and the State have an equal interest in trying the defendant in the proper court, preponderance of the evidence is the proper standard of proof ...."). A preponderance of the evidence standard regarding juvenile status makes sense. Otherwise, a defendant who committed a crime at a time when it was unclear whether he was over or under 18 could avoid prosecution altogether simply by showing reasonable doubt existed as to whether he was over or under 18 at the time of the offense. With a preponderance of the evidence standard, the Court has an opportunity to decide whether the weight of evidence supports trying a defendant as an adult or juvenile. Moreover, burden shifting, like that used in Salgado–Ocampo , generally employs the preponderance of the evidence standard. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 802–04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) (applying a burden shifting approach using the preponderance of the evidence standard in a discrimination suit); United States v. 7725 Unity Ave. N. , 294 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 2002) (applying a burden shifting approach using the preponderance of the evidence standard in civil forfeiture cases); United States v. Wallace , 845 F.2d 1471, 1473–75 (8th Cir. 1988) (approving a burden shifting approach using the preponderance of the evidence standard in civil commitment cases where the defendant has been acquitted by reason of insanity in prior criminal case). But see United States v. Davis , 260 F.3d 965, 968–69 (8th Cir. 2001) (approving a burden shifting framework relating to nonqualifying felonies in sentencing that used a preponderance of the evidence standard for the existence of the felonies, but a clear and convincing evidence standard once the burden shifted to the defendant to prove they were nonqualifying).

The remaining issue is a factual one—whether the government has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that C.L.T. was at least 18 when the criminal acts allegedly occurred. This Court held an evidentiary hearing on August 22, 2016, to hear testimony and receive evidence from both sides on that issue. The matters set forth below represent this Court's understanding of the facts using a preponderance of the evidence standard, do not otherwise reflect factual findings, and are not meant to imply that C.L.T. is anything other than presumed innocent at this time.

In January of 2016, Bureau of Indian Affairs Special Agent Tino Lopez received a call from S.W.'s mother to report an allegation of sexual abuse by C.L.T. Special Agent Lopez then met with S.W.'s mother as well as the mother of A.C. Those two mothers are C.L.T.'s older sisters; C.L.T. is the uncle of A.C. and S.W. The two mothers apparently reported that their daughters had disclosed that C.L.T. had done something sexual to them.

On January 14, 2016, Angela Lisburg, a family nurse practitioner at the Central South Dakota Child Assessment Center, met separately with A.C. and then S.W. Lisburg is a trained and experienced forensic interviewer of children and used accepted protocols to conduct separate videotaped forensic interviews of A.C. and S.W. that day.3

A.C., who was 10 in January of 2016, was emotional and initially reluctant to explain what happened. A.C. ultimately described her uncle C.L.T. having her touch and put in her mouth his "private part" when C.L.T. was babysitting her, S.W., and other children at S.W.'s house in S.W.'s mother's bedroom. A.C. identified on a diagram the private part as being in the groin. A.C. at one point said that C.L.T. babysat her and S.W. at S.W.'s...

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