United States v. CADILLAC HARDTOP
Decision Date | 13 December 1963 |
Docket Number | No. 63-C-92.,63-C-92. |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Libelant, v. ONE 1963 CADILLAC HARDTOP, Motor No. 63 G 007901. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin |
James B. Brennan, U. S. Atty., by William J. Mulligan and Franklyn M. Gimbel, Asst. U. S. Attys., for libelant.
Dominic H. Frinzi, James M. Shellow, Milwaukee, Wis., for claimant.
The United States of America initiated a libel proceeding against a certain 1963 Cadillac, seeking its forfeiture pursuant to the provisions of Title 49, Section 782, of the United States Code of Laws. Claimant has moved this court to suppress certain evidence alleged to have been illegally seized. On August 29, 1963 (220 F.Supp. 841), this court decided that a civil forfeiture proceeding is in the nature of a criminal sanction, and therefore a motion to suppress may be brought as in a criminal prosecution.
On February 10, 1963, at approximately 7:50 A.M., Officer John Randa of the Narcotics Detail, Milwaukee Police Department, received an anonymous telephone call. The caller stated that "Matthew Crumble has got narcotics at Bibbs' house." After this call, Officers Randa, Thelen, and Budnowski proceeded in an unmarked squad car to Bibbs' residence located at 3223 West Center Street. Nothing was observed there or in the immediate neighborhood.
While driving back to the police station, the officers recognized the vehicle, which is the subject of the instant action, as a vehicle which Matthew Crumble had been known to drive on prior occasions. As the vehicle approached them, it turned south on North 15th Street. The squad car likewise turned south and had followed it one block when the officers observed a violation of an arterial stop at the corner of North 15th Street and West Kilbourn Avenue. The squad car continued to follow the Cadillac east on Kilbourn Avenue and then north on 14th Street. The Cadillac was stopped just south of the intersection of North 14th and West State Streets. Officers Randa and Thelen proceeded to the driver's side of the car. Officer Budnowski went to the passengers' side of the car. The three occupants of the car were all known to the officers. Richard Ashley O'Neil was the driver, Alberta Daigre was seated in the center of the front seat, and Matthew Crumble was seated to her right. The occupants of this automobile were known or suspected narcotic users. The following events then occurred:
1. Mr. O'Neil was informed that he had violated an arterial stop sign and was asked to produce his driver's license. He was either ordered from the car or got out voluntarily.
2. Alberta Daigre was behaving in an obnoxious and abnormal manner.
3. Officer Budnowski either ordered or asked the passengers, Crumble and Daigre, to get out of the car.
4. As Crumble alighted from the passengers' side, Officer Thelen observed an aluminum foil packet fall from his hand to the floor of the car immediately behind the front seat.
5. The packet was immediately recovered, and all three occupants of the car were arrested for possession of narcotics. Subsequently a marijuana cigarette was found by Officer Randa behind the driver's seat. The aluminum foil packet contained a substance thought by the officers and Crumble to be marijuana.
Attorneys for the claimant have moved this court for an order suppressing the packet, its contents, and the cigarette for use as evidence in this libel proceeding. Claimant makes the following contentions:
1. The search was unreasonable because it was made without a search warrant and not incidental to the traffic arrest.
2. The search was unreasonable because it was not supported by probable cause.
The search in question was conducted by state officers, and the evidence is sought to be used in a federal court in a civil action which possesses the characteristics of a criminal sanction. Federal standards must therefore be applied. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960). The constitutionality of any such search ultimately rests upon the reasonableness of the search. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed. 1399 (1947). That criterion in turn depends upon the facts and circumstances — the total atmosphere of the case. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 S.Ct. 430, 94 L.Ed. 653 (1950). Basically then, the problem is a factual one. See United States v. Harris, 321 F.2d 739 (6th Cir. 1963).
The arrest in this case was an arrest for an arterial stop sign violation. Claimant contends that a search of the vehicle and its occupants under circumstances which provided no indication of threat or harm or escape by use of concealed weapons cannot conceivably be said to be an incident of the arterial stop sign arrest. Therefore, the search is claimed to be unreasonable and not the incident of a valid arrest.
If an arrest is a sham or front for making a search, the arrest and the ensuing search are illegal. Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1961); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed. 1399 (1947); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 52 S.Ct. 420, 76 L.Ed. 877 (1932); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 78 S.Ct. 1253, 2 L.Ed.2d 1514 (1958). Likewise, a minor traffic violation will not generally justify a search of the vehicle and its passengers. This principle has been recognized by many courts. See Byrd v. State, 80 So.2d 694 (Fla.1955); People v. Zeigler, 358 Mich. 355, 100 N.W.2d 456 (1960); United States v. Tate, 209 F.Supp. 762 (D.Del.1962); People v. Mayo, 19 Ill.2d 136, 166 N.E.2d 440 (1960). The judicial guidelines are, however, by no means clear. The Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, pointed this out:
* * *"Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 235, 80 S.Ct. 683, 4 L.Ed. 2d 668 (1960).
There is a common thread running through all cases upholding a search without a warrant. The searcher must have in mind some reasonably specific thing he is looking for and reasonable grounds to believe it is in the place being searched. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed. 1399 (1947); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 S.Ct. 430, 94 L.Ed. 653 (1950); Abel v. United States, 363 U.S. 217, 80 S.Ct. 683, 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (1960). At the outset, the objectives of the search must be incidental to the particular arrest. In the case of a stop sign violation, there is no fruit of the crime. The means whereby the crime was committed is the vehicle itself. Further, there is no contraband associated with such a violation. The arrest must provide the reasonableness. To hold otherwise would do violence to the very protection that the constitutional requirements of the fourth amendment are designed to afford.
It is claimant's position that the search began when Crumble and Alberta Daigre were ordered from the automobile by Officer Budnowski. It is claimed that this act of ordering the passengers out of the car constituted an arrest and the first step in conducting the search. In the absence of any showing of a reasonable apprehension of harm or an attempted escape, the claimant contends that the search...
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