United States v. Caillier

• Docket Number: 22-30383
• Decision Date: 30 August 2023
• Parties: United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Larry Caillier II, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

1

United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Larry Caillier II, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 22-30383

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit

August 30, 2023

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana USDC No. 6:10-CR-76-01

Before KING, SMITH, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge:

After pleading guilty to one count of receiving child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A), Larry Caillier II was sentenced to a 168-month term of imprisonment followed by a 15-year term of supervised release. During Caillier's term of supervised release, the district court modified a number of the special conditions imposed. Caillier appeals, challenging the district court's jurisdiction to modify his supervised release conditions, and contesting the substantive reasonableness of the conditions imposed. Because the district court has jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) to modify conditions of supervised release, and because the district court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning these conditions, we affirm.

I

Caillier was released from prison on February 25, 2022, and began serving his fifteen-year period of supervised release. Caillier's original conditions of supervised release included two special conditions: (1) Caillier was required to participate in a sex offender treatment program; and (2) Caillier was prohibited from having "access to a computer, or an interactive computer service as directed by the United States Probation Office." Two months into Caillier's term of supervised release, the United States Probation Office petitioned the district court to modify his release conditions as follows: (1) that Caillier participate in a sex offender treatment program; (2) that he "not have Internet access on his personal computer, PDA, or any other device, without the approval of the U.S. Probation Office" and "[i]f internet access is granted [Caillier] shall comply with the requirements of the Computer Monitoring Program"; (3) that he submit to polygraph testing as part of his therapeutic program; (4) that he not view or possess any materials depicting or describing sexually explicit conduct or child pornography; and (5) that he refrain from associating with any minor unless the minor's guardian is present, except for incidental contact in normal commercial life.

The Probation Office petitioned for these modifications without alleging that Caillier had violated the terms of his supervised release. The district court held a hearing in which Caillier was represented by counsel and heard Caillier's objections regarding the modified conditions. The district court ultimately granted the Probation Office's petition over Caillier's objections, and modified Caillier's terms of supervised release to include all of the new conditions. Caillier appeals, arguing that: (1) the district court did not have jurisdiction to impose new supervised release conditions, and (2) the new conditions of supervised release are substantively unreasonable.

II

Caillier contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction to modify his conditions of supervised release because the change in circumstance that precipitated the modification was a ruling that one of his conditions was unconstitutional. Caillier's argument makes two assumptions. First, that a modification of supervised release conditions cannot be based on the illegality of one of those conditions. Second, that the district court only has authority to modify conditions of supervised release if there is a change in circumstance.

A

Caillier's first assumption-that district courts lack jurisdiction to modify conditions based solely on the grounds that the conditions are illegal-is correct.

District courts have jurisdiction to modify supervised release conditions only for statutorily enumerated reasons, such as to ensure deterrence or protect the public. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). Those reasons-a subset of the factors considered during initial sentencing under § 3553(a)- do not include a change in law holding one of the conditions illegal. See id. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e).

We have held, in the context of a restitution order, that a district court does not have jurisdiction to modify conditions of supervised release on the grounds that those conditions were determined to be unlawful. United States v. Hatten 167 F.3d 884, 886 (5th Cir. 1999). We have previously relied on Hatten to reject challenges to the legality of a condition of supervised release brought under § 3583(e)(2). See, e.g., United States v. Zimmerman, 481 Fed.Appx. 199, 201 (5th Cir. 2012) ("Zimmerman cannot challenge the legality or constitutionality of the special conditions of his supervised release in a § 3583(e)(2) motion."); Matthews v. United States, 378 Fed.Appx. 451, 452 (5th Cir. 2010) ("[A] district court lacks jurisdiction under § 3583(e)(2) to modify conditions of supervised release on grounds of illegality.").

However, this case is unique in that it is the government, not Caillier, that is allegedly using the § 3583(e)(2) motion as a vehicle to challenge an allegedly unlawful condition.

We now clarify that a district court cannot modify an unlawful condition under § 3583(e)(2) if the illegality of that condition is the basis for modification, regardless of whether it was the defendant or government who brought the motion challenging the conditions. See Hatten, 167 F.3d at 886 (concluding that § 3585(e)(2) does not provide a jurisdictional basis for modifying conditions on the grounds that the conditions were illegal, where both the defendant and the government had sought modification of those conditions). In the case at hand, however, Caillier's appeal fails because the government did not move for modification solely on the basis of illegality, and the district court did not premise its ruling on the illegality of the special condition.

According to Caillier, the Probation Office moved for modification of the supervised release conditions because one of Caillier's original special conditions, the condition that barred him from all access to a computer, was ruled unconstitutional. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98, 108 (2017). However, the Probation Office's petition before the district court contains a multitude of reasons for the modification. The Probation Office stated that it sought modification of the terms of Caillier's supervised release to "allow the defendant to be granted monitored internet access, to bring the conditions into conformity with current national and local U.S. Probation Office policies, . . . to assist the U.S. Probation Office to better monitor the defendant, and to reduce potential risk to the community." These stated reasons are not only in line with the § 3553(a) factors, they also show that this petition was not brought solely on the basis of the illegality of a condition.

Further, the district court did not base its ruling on the alleged illegality. Rather, at the hearing on the petition the district court focused on protecting the public. In making a modification determination the court is required to consider "general punishment issues such as deterrence and public safety[,]" and these deterrence and community safety issues were discussed throughout Caillier's hearing. Hatten, 167 F.3d at 886.

Therefore, the district court in this case had jurisdiction because its ruling was based on public safety and general deterrence.

B

Caillier contends that even if the district court's ruling was not based on the illegality of a condition, the district court still lacked authority to modify his conditions of supervised release because there was not a "change in circumstance" that precipitated the modification nor was there a "compelling cause" for the modification.

We have found no cases, and Caillier does not cite any, requiring a "change in circumstance" or "compelling cause" to modify a condition of supervised release. This argument is meritless given the language of § 3583(e)(2) allowing for modification of supervised release "at any time" prior to its expiration or termination. We also note that the Second, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have all specifically held that a district court can modify a defendant's conditions of supervised release pursuant to § 3583(e)(2) even without a showing of changed circumstances. See United States v. Parisi, 821 F.3d 343, 347 (2d Cir. 2016); United States v. Evans, 727 F.3d 730, 732 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Davies, 380 F.3d 329, 332 (8^th Cir. 2004); United States v. Bainbridge, 746 F.3d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. Begay, 631 F.3d 1168, 1172 (10th Cir. 2011). The district court thus had jurisdiction to modify Caillier's supervised release conditions. Accordingly, changed circumstances are not a jurisdictional requirement for modification of a condition of supervised release.

III

Caillier also challenges the substantive reasonableness of the modified supervised release conditions. When preserved substantive reasonableness challenges to conditions of supervised release are reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Ellis, 720 F.3d 220, 224 (5th Cir. 2013). Unpreserved challenges to special conditions are reviewed for plain error. United States v Weatherton, 567 F.3d 149, 152 (5th Cir. 2009). We have previously noted an ambiguity in our caselaw as to the appropriate standard of review where a defendant moves for modification of his supervised release conditions under § 3583(e)(2) without having first objected to the imposition of the original conditions. United States v. Doyle, 865 F.3d 214, 214 n.1 (5th Cir. 2017); United States v. Blank, 854 F. App'x. 559, 561 (5th Cir. 2021). This case is...