United States v. California Oregon Land Company No California Oregon Land Company v. United States No 14, 17 1902
Decision Date | 21 April 1902 |
Docket Number | Nos. 4,5,s. 4 |
Citation | 48 L.Ed. 476,192 U.S. 355,24 S.Ct. 266 |
Parties | UNITED STATES, Appt. , v. CALIFORNIA & OREGON LAND COMPANY NO 4 CALIFORNIA & OREGON LAND COMPANY, Appt. , v. UNITED STATES. NO 5 Argued March 14, 17, 1902. Ordered for reargument |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Mr. Charles W. Russell for the United States.
Messrs. John F. Dillon, Aldis B. Browne, and Alexander Britton for the California & Oregon Land Company.
These are cross appeals from a decree of the United States circuit court. The bill was brought for the purpose of having certain patents of land issued by the United States declared void. These patents were issued on April 2, 1873, to the Oregon Central Military Road Company, under an act of Congress of July 2, 1864 (13 Stat. at L. 355, chap. 213), granting lands to the state of Oregon to aid in the construction of a wagon road, and in pursuance of a grant of the same lands by the state to the road company on October 24, 1864. The California & Oregon Land Company claims through mesne conveyances from the patentee. The ground of the bill, so far as the argument before us is concerned, is that the lands in controversy were within the Klamath Indian Reservation, and therefore were 'lands heretofore reserved to the United States' within the proviso reserving such lands in the grant of July 2, 1864. As our decision is upon grounds independent of this question, it is unnecessary to state the legislation and facts upon which that controversy turns.
One of the pleas of the land company is that on August 30, 1889, the United States filed an earlier bill in the United States circuit court in respect of these same lands, praying, like the present one, that the patents be declared void; that the land company pleaded matters showing that the patents were valid, and also that it was a purchaser for valuable consideration, without notice; and that on March 29, 1893, a final decree was entered, finding the facts to be as alleged by the land company, including the allegation that the land company was a bona fide purchaser for value, and dismissing the bill on that ground. The land company also filed a cross bill in the present suit to enjoin the allotments of said lands and the issue of patents for the same to the Indians. The cross bill was demurred to.
The circuit court sustained the demurrer, adjudged the plea to be bad, and entered a decree declaring the patents void. We have to deal only with the before-mentioned plea.
The former bill was brought in pursuance of the act of Congress of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat. at L. 850, chap. 377). This act recited that the Oregon legislature had memorialized Congress, and had alleged that certain of the wagon roads in the state were not completed within the time required by the grants of the United States, and therefore enacted that suits should be brought in the United States circuit court against all claimants of any interest under the grant of 1864, and certain others, The court was authorized to render judgment of forfeiture The act of March 2, 1896 (29 Stat. at L. 42, chap. 39),1 also confirmed the title of bona fide purchasers.
By § 2,
On the general principles of our law it is tolerably plain that the decree in the suit under the foregoing statute would be a bar. The parties, the subject-matter, and the relief sought all were the same. It is said, to be sure, that the United States now is suing in a different character from that in which it brought the former suit. There it sued for itself,—here it sues on behalf of the Indians. But that is not true in any sense having legal significance. It would be true of a suit by an executor as compared with a suit by the same person on his own behalf. But that is because in theory of law the executor continues the persona of the testator, and therefore is a different person from the natural man who fills the office. This is recognized in Leggott v. Great Northern R. Co. L. R. 1 Q. B. Div. 599, 606, cited for the United States. Here the plaintiff is the same person that brought the former bill, whatever the difference of the interest intended to be asserted. See Werlein v. New Orleans, 177 U. S. 390, 400, 401, 44 L. ed. 817, 822, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 682. The best that can be said, apart from the act just quoted, to distinguish the two suits, is that now the United States puts forward a new ground for its prayer. Formerly it sought to avoid the patents by way of forfeiture. Now it seeks the same conclusion by a different means,—that is to say, by evidence that the lands originally were excepted from the grant. But in this as in the former suit, it seeks to establish its own title to the fee.
It may be the law in Scotland that a judgment is not a bar to a second attempt to reach the same result by a different medium concludendi. Phosphate Sewage Co. v. Molleson, 5 Ct. Sess. Cas. 4th Series, 1125, 1139; although in the same case on appeal Lord Blackburn seemed to doubt the proposition if the facts were known before. S. C. L. R. 4 App. Cas. 801, 820. But the whole tendency of our decisions is to require a plaintiff to try his whole cause of action and his whole case at one time. He cannot even split up his claim (Fetter v. Beale, 1 Salk. 11; Trask v. Hartford & N. H. R. Co. 2 Allen, 331; Freeman, Judgm. 4th ed. §§ 238, 241); and, a fortiori, he cannot divide the grounds of recovery. Unless the statute of 1889 put the former suit upon a peculiar footing, the United States was bound then to bring forward all the grounds it had for declaring the patents void, and when the bill was dismissed, was barred as to all by the decree. Werlein v. New Orleans 177 U. S. 390, 44 L. ed. 817, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 682; Bienville Water Supply Co. v. Mobile, 186 U. S. 212, 216, 217, 46 L. ed. 1132, 1134, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 820; Hoseason v. Keegen, 178 Mass. 247, 59 N. E. 627; Wildman v. Wildman, 70 Conn. 700, 710, 41 Atl. 1; ...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Crowson v. Cody
... ... 476, 93 So. 420; Grand Bay Land Co. v. Simpson, 205 ... Ala. 347, 87 So. 186; ... 259; ... Perkins v. Moore, 16 Ala. 17. Where the necessary ... amendments are desired ... divide the grounds of recovery." United States v. C ... & O.L. Co., 192 U.S. 355, 24 ... 738, 741; ... United States v. California & O. Land Co., 192 U.S ... 358, 24 S.Ct. 266, ... Northern Pacific Railway Company brought a suit in equity ... against Slaght, who ... ...
-
Marin v. Augedahl
... ... under the Constitution and laws of the United States. See Great Western Telegraph Co. v. Purdy, ... solvent mutual fire insurance company, against whom a general assessment on the policy ... California & Oregon Land Co., 192 U. S. 355 [24 Sup ... Kramer, 87 Minn. 392, 92 N. W. 227 (1902) in a suit upon an assessment order, made under ... ...
-
Magnolia Petroleum Co v. Hunt
... ... 20, 1943 ... Rehearing Denied Jan. 17, 1944 ... See 321 U.S. 801, 64 S.Ct. 483 ... IV, § 1 of the Constitution of the United States, an award of compensation for personal ... Magnolia Petroleum Company, petitioner here, employed respondent in ... California & O. Land Co., 192 U.S. 355, 358, 24 S.Ct. 266, ... Apparently only one other state, Oregon, has a statute comparable to this. See Oregon ... ...
-
DC Federation of Civic Associations, Inc. v. Volpe
... ... VOLPE et al ... No. 23870 ... United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia ... of projects involving the use of park land "unless there is no feasible and prudent ... 17 As a result Congress required each state to hold ... "directions almost like a construction company, how to proceed with the construction." Cong.Rec ... 820, 46 L.Ed. 1132 434 F.2d 458 (1902); United States v. California and Ore. Land Co., ... ...