United States v. Campbell, 13–CR–419 (DLI)

• Court: United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of New York)
• Writing for the Court: DORA L. IRIZARRY, Chief United States District Judge
• Citation: 266 F.Supp.3d 624
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, v. Leon CAMPBELL, also known as "Country," and Ronald Williams, also known as "Blackman," "Jermaine," "Leon Gordon," and "Marcus Reese," Defendants.
• Docket Number: 13–CR–419 (DLI)
• Decision Date: 06 July 2017

266 F.Supp.3d 624

UNITED STATES of America,
v.
Leon CAMPBELL, also known as "Country," and Ronald Williams, also known as "Blackman," "Jermaine," "Leon Gordon," and "Marcus Reese," Defendants.

13–CR–419 (DLI)

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Signed July 6, 2017

Nathan Daniel Reilly, Hiral D. Mehta, Margaret Elizabeth Lee, Tyler Joseph Smith, United States Attorneys Office, Brooklyn, NY, for United States of America.

Norman Trabulus, Law Office of Norman Trabulus, Ilissa R. Brownstein, New York, NY, Susan Gail Kellman, Brooklyn, NY, Mark Steven DeMarco, Law Offices of Mark S. DeMarco, Bronx, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

DORA L. IRIZARRY, Chief United States District Judge

On November 8, 2016, defendant Ronald Williams ("Williams") filed a pretrial motion seeking an order, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.2(c)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 4241, compelling his codefendant Leon Campbell ("Campbell") (hereinafter collectively, "Defendants") to undergo a criminal responsibility examination. See Mem. of Law in Supp. of Pretrial Mot. for a Crim. Resp. Exam. of Leon Campbell on Behalf of Def. Ronald Williams ("Williams Mot."), Dkt. Entry No. 245. Both the United States and Campbell oppose the request. See Ltr. in Opp. to Ronald Williams' Mot. ("Campbell Opp."), Dkt. Entry No. 250; Mem. of Law Opp'g Def. Ronald Williams' Mot. Req'g a Crim. Resp. Exam. of Leon Campbell ("Gov't Opp."), Dkt. Entry No. 251. The matter was fully submitted¹ upon the submission of Williams' reply papers. See Reply Mem. in Supp. of Pretrial Mot. for a Crim. Resp. Exam. of Leon Campbell on Behalf of Def. Ronald Williams ("Williams Reply"), Dkt. Entry No. 252.

For the reasons set forth below, Williams' motion is denied.

DISCUSSION ²

Williams' motion stems from four charges in the Superseding Indictment that allege Defendants participated in: (1) a conspiracy to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(C) ; (2) a conspiracy to commit obstruction of justice murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(k) and 1512(a)(3)(B)(i) ; (3) a conspiracy to commit murder-for-hire, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a) ; and (4) a conspiracy to commit a Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). See Superseding Ind., Dkt. Entry No. 141 at ¶¶ 1–3, 7. The Supreme Court "has repeatedly said that the essence of a conspiracy is an agreement to commit an unlawful act." United States v. Jimenez Recio , 537 U.S. 270, 274, 123 S.Ct. 819, 154 L.Ed.2d 744 (2003) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Conspiracies are crimes of specific intent and, as such, a conviction requires that "the [G]overnment establish[ ] beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the specific intent to violate the substantive statute," and form an agreement with at least one other person to do so.

266 F.Supp.3d 627

United States v. Hassan , 578 F.3d 108, 123 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. DiTommaso , 817 F.2d 201, 218 (2d Cir. 1987) ) (emphasis in original).

Williams claims that the proposed examination is crucial to his defense against the four conspiracy charges because, if he could establish that Campbell lacked the mental capacity to enter into agreements at the times of the alleged offenses, no conspiracies would exist.³ Williams Mot. at 6. Williams asserts that "[t]he only question ... is whether this Court may order" Campbell to undergo a criminal responsibility examination, against his will and his counsel's advice, so that Williams may advance his defense. Id. at 3–5. The Court finds that, under the circumstances of this case, it may not enter such an order.

I. STATUTORY AUTHORITY

Williams' arguments derive from the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and associated statutes. Although Williams readily acknowledges that no precedent exists to support his argument, he asserts that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.2(c)(1) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241 (" § 4241"), 4242 ("§ 4242") grant courts, in spirit, if not in practice, the authority to compel any defendant to undergo a criminal responsibility examination against his or her will. Id. at 2–5. While these provisions "contemplate a defendant filing notice of a psychiatric defense, and the court ordering the defendant to be examined in conjunction with that defense, at the behest of the [G]overnment," Williams maintains that the Court should grant his application because he stands in a position equivalent to that of the Government in the contemplated scenario. Id. at 4. In opposition, the Government correctly notes that "no court has ever ordered a 4242 Exam under similar circumstances." Gov't Opp. at 3.

As an initial matter, Williams' motion is made solely pursuant to § 4241. Reliance on this statute is completely misplaced, as the Court previously noted at an oral argument on this motion.⁴ That statute concerns the mental capacity to stand trial and undergo post-release proceedings. See United States v. Bumagin , 114 F.Supp.3d 52, 55–56 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) ; United States v. Shenghur , 734 F.Supp.2d 552, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ; see also United States v. Hutchinson , 253 Fed.Appx. 883 (11th Cir. 2007) (results of tests performed to determine a defendant's competence to stand trial were inadmissible to negate that defendant's specific intent to enter into a conspiracy). For an examination of a defendant's cognitive abilities at the time of the alleged offense, the governing statute is 18 U.S.C. § 4242.

266 F.Supp.3d 628

Assuming that Williams intended to move under the applicable statute, the language of the operative law and rule is clear and unambiguous: the examination pertains to a defendant challenging his or her own mental capacity at the time the offense was committed. The Court so noted this at the August 11, 2016 conference. See Aug. 11, 2016 Tr. at 17–18 (finding that § 4242 and Rule 12.2 clearly are intended to apply to the defendant raising the defense). In the interest of justice and due process, the Court nonetheless granted Williams the opportunity to analyze the issue and present his arguments by written motion. As discussed more fully below, the Court remains unpersuaded that § 4242 permits the examination of a codefendant, as requested by Williams, for the purpose of determining whether that codefendant had the ability to enter into a criminal conspiracy.

First, in order to invoke an examination under § 4242, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.2(c)(1)(B) provides:

If the defendant provides notice under Rule 12.2(a), the court must, upon the government's motion, order the defendant to be examined under 18 U.S.C. § 4242.

Williams recognizes the applicability of Rule 12.2(c)(1)(B), as he asserts that his memorandum of law constitutes the "formal notice" required by Rule 12.2(a).⁵ Williams Mot. at 2. Incorporating the condition precedent of proper notice under Rule 12.2, § 4242(a) states:

Upon the filing of a notice, as provided in Rule 12.2 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, that the defendant intends to rely on the defense of insanity, the court, upon motion of the attorney for the Government, shall order that a psychiatric or psychological examination of the defendant be conducted, and that a psychiatric or psychological report be filed with the court, pursuant to the provisions of section 4247(b) and (c).

These twin provisions lead the Court to a fundamental analysis of textual interpretation.

When analyzing a statute, the Court looks to "the statute's plain meaning, if it has one." United States v. Dauray , 215 F.3d 257, 260 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Piervinanzi , 23 F.3d 670, 677 (2d Cir. 1994) ). With laws, the "inquiry begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous." BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States , 541 U.S. 176, 183, 124 S.Ct. 1587, 158 L.Ed.2d 338 (2004) (internal citations omitted). Similarly, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 2 explains, in pertinent part, that those rules are "to be interpreted to provide for the just determination of every criminal proceeding, to secure simplicity in procedure and fairness in administration...."

Applying these principles, the language of both provisions is clear that "the defendant" to be examined is the same individual who gave notice under Rule 12.2. Indeed, Williams concedes this very point.⁶ Williams Mot. at 2–3. Without any

266 F.Supp.3d 629

ambiguity in the rule or statute, as Williams notes, there is no reasonable debate about what those provisions actually "contemplate."

Finally, even if the Court were to assume that Williams moved under the proper statute and that § 4242 and Rule 12.2 do not clearly restrict compulsory examinations to the defendant providing notice, Williams' argument about vindicating "the purpose" of each provision would still fail. Under either Rule 12.2(c)(1)(B) or § 4242, the text is clear that, before a court may order the examination of a defendant, the Government must move for the examination. The Government has not done so.

While Williams acknowledges that the purpose of § 4242 and Rule 12.2 is to permit the Government to rebut a defendant's mental capacity defense, he maintains that "[t]he same logic applies in the...