United States v. Campbell, 6:06-CR-06105 EAW

• Decision Date: 23 November 2020
• Docket Number: 6:06-CR-06105 EAW
• Citation: 502 F.Supp.3d 752
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, v. Calvin CAMPBELL, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of New York

502 F.Supp.3d 752

UNITED STATES of America,

v.Calvin CAMPBELL, Defendant.

6:06-CR-06105 EAW

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

Signed November 23, 2020

Douglas E. Gregory, U.S. Attorney's Office, Rochester, NY, for United States of America.

DECISION AND ORDER

ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, United States District Judge

Pending before the Court are the motions of defendant Calvin Campbell ("Campbell") pursuant to section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018 (hereinafter "First Step Act"), Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018), to reduce the sentence imposed for violating the terms and conditions of supervised release. (Dkt. 118; Dkt. 122; Dkt. 130; Dkt. 133). For the reasons set forth below, Campbell's motions are denied.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 23, 2007, Campbell was charged by superseding indictment with four counts of distribution of cocaine and cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). (Dkt. 36). Because of Campbell's prior state court conviction for criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, the government filed an information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851. (Dkt. 38). This increased Campbell's statutory exposure from five to 40 years in prison, to 10 years to life in prison. (See Dkt. 130 at 2-3). Shortly after return of the superseding indictment, on February 12, 2007, Campbell pleaded guilty to count three charging distribution of five grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B). (Dkt. 40). This was considered a Class A felony because of the statutory maximum of life in prison. (See Dkt. 130 at 3; see also Dkt. 46 at 1).

The offense of conviction called for a mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months. (Dkt. 46 at 1). However, the government sought to depart downward from the Sentencing Guidelines and below the mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, and requested a sentence of 90 months incarceration. (Dkt. 42 at 3-4). On February 13, 2008, United States District Judge David G. Larimer sentenced Campbell to 90 months incarceration followed by an eight-year period of supervised release. (Dkt. 43; Dkt. 45).

Following his sentencing, Campbell filed various motions for sentence reductions (Dkt. 48; Dkt. 50; Dkt. 53; Dkt. 56; Dkt. 58), all of which were denied by Judge Larimer (Dkt. 49; Dkt. 52; Dkt. 54; Dkt. 57; Dkt. 59). Campbell was released to supervision on March 29, 2013. (See Dkt. 60 at 1). On March 27, 2015, a petition was filed alleging that Campbell violated certain terms and conditions of supervised release (Dkt. 65), and the case was then transferred to the undersigned (Dkt. 66).

On December 1, 2015, Campbell pleaded guilty to violating the terms and conditions of supervised release, admitting to the following:

On March 25, 2015, the defendant was arrested by the Monroe County Sheriff's Office and charged with Assault 3^rd, in violation of New York Penal Law § 120.00, Subdivision 1, a class A misdemeanor. It is alleged that on November 30, 2014, the defendant was involved in a hit and run car accident, after which he attempted to flee the scene. It is further alleged that after the accident, the defendant was involved in an altercation with the other driver where he struck the 53 year old wom[a]n, resulting in significant physical injuries that required an eleven day hospital stay.

(Dkt. 88 at 1; Dkt. 89). The undersigned revoked Campbell's supervised release and sentenced him to 12 months incarceration to be followed by 51 months of supervised release. (Dkt. 90).

Campbell commenced his 51-month supervised release term on November 4, 2016. (See Dkt. 91 at 1). Less than two years into that term, on August 3, 2018, a petition was filed alleging that Campbell violated the terms and conditions of supervised release. (Dkt. 91). The underlying charges related to an incident occurring on August 2, 2018, when Campbell was stopped by New York State Troopers in the City of Rochester for a traffic violation, and a quantity of heroin, cocaine and marijuana, all packaged for sale, were discovered in his vehicle. (Id. ). A revocation hearing was held before the undersigned on October 31, 2018 (Dkt. 98), and by Decision and Order entered November 30, 2018, this Court found that the government established by a preponderance of the evidence that Campbell was guilty of each of the charged violations as set forth in the petition. (Dkt. 101). On December 27, 2018, the Court sentenced Campbell to 54 months incarceration followed by five years supervised release. (Dkt. 106). Campbell is scheduled to be released from custody on June 8, 2022. (Dkt. 130 at 5).

Campbell filed a notice of appeal (Dkt. 107), but he subsequently moved to withdraw that appeal and the motion was granted by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. (Dkt. 128). While that appeal was still pending, Campbell filed several pro se motions before the undersigned. Specifically, on July 29, 2019, Campbell filed a motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to section 404 of the First Step Act. (Dkt. 118).¹ Then, on March 13, 2020, Campbell filed a motion asking that the undersigned render a decision with respect to his previously-filed motion under the First Step Act. (Dkt. 122). On April 6, 2020, Campbell filed a motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), asking to be released from custody because of the COVID-19 pandemic (Dkt. 123), and he filed a similar motion a few days later, on April 9, 2020 (Dkt. 125).

On April 21, 2020, this Court issued a Decision and Order denying Campbell's motions for compassionate release pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(a), and deferring consideration of his motions made under section 404 of the First Step Act until such time that the Second Circuit remanded the case to this Court. (Dkt. 127).

After Campbell withdrew his appeal, the Federal Public Defender's Office appeared in this case on his behalf and filed a supplemental motion under the First Step Act. (Dkt. 130). In accordance with the schedule set by the Court, the government filed a response in opposition to Campbell's requests for relief under the First Step Act. (Dkt. 132). Campbell then filed a pro se supplement to the pending motions on August 20, 2020. (Dkt. 133).

On September 9, 2020, the Court held a remote oral argument on the pending motions. (Dkt. 136). That same day, after oral argument, the government filed a letter clarifying that it was withdrawing its opposition in another case to application of the First Step Act to a supervised release violation. (Dkt. 135). Thereafter, the Court received several letters from Campbell and family members of his fiancée. (Dkt. 137; Dkt. 138; Dkt. 139; Dkt. 140).

ANALYSIS

In 2010, the Fair Sentencing Act was enacted in an attempt to address the "crack-to-powder cocaine disparity." Dorsey v. United States , 567 U.S. 260, 264, 132 S.Ct. 2321, 183 L.Ed.2d 250 (2012) ; see Pub. L. No. 111-220, §§ 2–3, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (amending 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) ). However, the Fair Sentencing Act was not retroactive to defendants who, like Campbell, had been sentenced before its passage. United States v. Davis , 961 F.3d 181, 183 (2d Cir. 2020). In 2018, Congress passed the First Step Act, promulgating various criminal justice reforms, including allowing for the Fair Sentencing Act to be applied retroactively under certain circumstances.

Specifically, section 404(b) of the First Step Act permits a district court to "impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act ... were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed." United States v. Martin , 974 F.3d 124, 131 (2d Cir. 2020). In order to be eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act, a defendant: (1) must have previously been sentenced on a "covered offense," which is defined as "a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act ... that was committed before August 3, 2010," Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404(a); and (2) cannot have had his sentence previously reduced in accordance with the amendments of the Fair Sentencing Act or previously had a motion under section 404 denied after a complete review of the motion on the merits, id. at § 404(c).

Here, the parties agree that Campbell was previously sentenced on a "covered offense," he has not previously received a sentence reduction under the Fair Sentencing Act, and he has not previously had a motion denied under section 404 of the First Step Act. (Dkt. 130 at 8-9; Dkt. 132 at ¶ 10). Moreover, although the Second Circuit has not ruled on the issue, the parties agree that sentences for supervised release violations are eligible for sentence reductions, where the underlying offense that ultimately led to the supervised release term is a "covered offense" under the First Step Act. (Dkt. 130 at 9-10; Dkt. 132 at ¶ 10). See United States v. Woods , 949 F.3d 934, 937 (6th Cir. 2020) (explaining that post-revocation penalties relate to the original offense, and therefore a defendant is eligible for resentencing under the First Step Act on a violation of supervised release); United States v. Venable , 943 F.3d 187, 194 (4th Cir. 2019) ("And given that [the defendant's] revocation sentence is part of the penalty for his initial offense, he is still serving his sentence for a ‘covered offense’ for purposes of the First Step Act. Thus, the district court had the authority to consider his motion for a sentence reduction, just as if he were still serving the original custodial sentence.").

However, Campbell's eligibility for relief under the First Step Act is where the parties’ agreements end. The parties disagree whether the Court should exercise its discretion and grant Campbell a sentence reduction. A defendant's eligibility for relief under the First Step Act does not necessarily entitle him to relief. Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404(c) ("Nothing in...