United States v. Canadian Vinyl Industries
Decision Date | 12 May 1977 |
Docket Number | Customs Appeal No. 76-11. |
Citation | 555 F.2d 806 |
Parties | The UNITED STATES, Appellant, v. CANADIAN VINYL INDUSTRIES, INC., Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) |
Rex E. Lee, Asst. Atty. Gen., Washington, D. C., David M. Cohen, Chief, Customs Section, John J. Mahon, New York City, attorneys of record, for appellant.
Barnes, Richardson & Colburn, New York City, attorneys of record, for appellee, Michael Stramiello, Jr., James S. O'Kelly, New York City, of counsel.
Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN and MILLER, Judges, PHILIP NICHOLS, Judge, United States Court of Claims.
This appeal is from the judgment of the United States Customs Court, C.D. 4626, 408 F.Supp. 1377, 76 Cust.Ct. 1, sustaining appellee's claim that its imported merchandise is entitled to classification under item 771.40, Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS), instead of under item 355.82, TSUS, as classified. Appellee alternatively claimed classification under items 771.42, 774.60 and 355.85. We affirm.
The pertinent statutory provisions involved in this appeal, with rates of duty in effect at time of importation, are as follows:
Subpart C headnotes:
The legislation under which this interrelated maze of provisions was devised was known, somewhat ironically, as the Customs Simplification Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 1136, Pub.L. 768, 83rd Cong. 2d Sess. Emphasis supplied.
The merchandise, invoiced as "Polyurethane 305," consists of flexible sheets of a laminated material imported in rolls. The material has a glossy polyurethane "skin" on one side and a nylon fabric on the reverse side. The evidence of record (four exhibits and the testimony of three witnesses) unequivocally establishes that the principal and only use of the merchandise is as a substitute for patent leather in the construction of footwear, the polyurethane skin being always outside. Similar material is sometimes used in ladies handbags.
The Customs Court read General Headnote 9(f)(i) in conjunction with the language "of textile materials" in the superior heading to item 355.82 to require that the merchandise be wholly or in chief value of the nylon fabric as a prerequisite for proper classification under item 355.82. General Headnote 10 of the TSUS defines chief value as follows:
(f) an article is in chief value of a material if such material exceeds in value each other single component material of the article.
Since the testimony established the costs of the components of the nylon fabric and polyurethane coating as 51 cents and $1.13, respectively, the court held that the merchandise did not meet the chief value test and was, therefore, improperly classified. The court then turned to appellee's proposed classification of the merchandise under item 771.40. It held that the merchandise was "almost wholly of" plastics, as the quoted term is defined in General Headnote 9(f)(iii), because the essential character thereof was imparted by the polyurethane "skin." The court also noted the unrebutted testimony of record which established that the merchandise was made in imitation of selected varieties of patent leather in holding that classification under item 771.40 was proper.
Appellant contends that the court erred in applying the chief value test of General Headnote 9(f)(i) to the whole (as opposed to the nylon portion) of the merchandise. It argues that the language of the superior heading to items 355.65-.85, headnotes 2(a)(iv) and 4(b) to schedule 3, headnote 2(c) to part 4C of schedule 3, and amendments to schedules 3 and 7 of the TSUS by the Tariff Schedules Technical Amendments Act of 1965 (TSTAA)2 and related legislative history, all specifically provide for the classification of the merchandise under item 355.82.
Appellant also contends that classification under item 771.40 is improper because the polyurethane "skin" does not impart the essential character to the merchandise. Thus, it is not "almost wholly of" plastics within the meaning of General Headnote 9(f)(iii). Alternatively, appellant contends that if the merchandise is described under both items 355.82 and 771.40, then the rule of relative specificity requires classification under item 355.82. Finally, appellant argues that if this court finds both provisions equally applicable, even under the rule of relative specificity, item 355.82 must prevail by virtue of General Interpretative Rule 10(d), which provides:
(d) if two or more tariff descriptions are equally applicable to an article, such article shall be subject to duty under the description for which the original statutory rate is highest * * *.
Appellee contends that the Customs Court properly applied a chief value test in holding the merchandise improperly classified under item 355.82. It also contends that the evidence of record supports the court's finding that the merchandise is "almost wholly of" plastics and made in imitation of patent leather. Thus it argues that classification under item 771.40 was proper. It also contends that if classification under item 771.40 is proper, then headnote 1(vii) to part...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Criminal Investigation No. 1-162, In re
...to change the meaning of that statute. 1A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 22.30 (1985); see also United States v. Canadian Vinyl Industries, 555 F.2d 806, 810 (C.C.P.A.1977); Stiftel v. Malarkey, 384 A.2d 9, 13 (Del.1977). The legislature is presumed to know of and disagree with prior c......
-
Citizens to Save Spencer County v. U.S. E.P.A.
...process,' " Quoting with approval Schmid v. United States, 436 F.2d 987, 992, 193 Ct.Cl. 780 (1971) ); United States v. Canadian Vinyl Industries, 555 F.2d 806, 811 (Cust. & Pat.App.1977).127 Problems of construction of inconsistent statutory provisions drawn up in haste have arisen before.......
-
Amchem Products, Inc. v. GAF Corp.
...re Reilly, 442 F.2d 26, 28 (7th Cir.), Cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854, 92 S.Ct. 96, 30 L.Ed.2d 95 (1971); United States v. Canadian Vinyl Industries, Inc., 555 F.2d 806, 810 (C.C.P.A.1977). By contrast, the clarification of the effective date of the section simply confirmed the existing law. We......
-
Glaxo Operations UK Ltd. v. Quigg
...Commissioner misconstrues this history.10 At best, the history is ambiguous, in which case, as noted in United States v. Canadian Vinyl Indus., Inc., 555 F.2d 806, 811 (C.C.P.A. 1977), this Court should not "alter the clear meaning of the statute because of ambiguous legislative history."11......