United States v. Canty
Decision Date | 19 April 2021 |
Docket Number | Case No.: 3:94-cr-169-HLA-MCR |
Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JERRY LAYNE CANTY |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Before the Court is Defendant Jerry Layne Canty's Motion for Compassionate Release (Doc. 265, Motion). In 1995, when Canty was 44 years old, he was convicted and sentenced for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, aiding and abetting the possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute, and the possession with intent to distribute cocaine base. (Doc. 125, Judgment). Because the United States filed an information under 21 U.S.C. § 851 charging that Canty had two or more prior convictions for a felony drug offense, he was subject to a mandatory term of life imprisonment. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (1995); (see also Doc. 250, First Step Act Memorandum and PSR at ¶¶ 2, 99).1
Canty is now a 70-year-old inmate imprisoned at Springfield MCFP. He has been incarcerated for more than 26 years. He seeks release from prison under the compassionate release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), because he is an elderly inmate in declining health and, in part, because of the Covid-19 pandemic. Canty contracted Covid-19 in December 2020 and eventually recovered. However, he suffers from several serious health issues, including end-stage renal disease, HIV, type 2 diabetes, heart disease, hypertension, and chronic hepatitis C. Due to a hip fracture suffered in May 2020, Canty ambulates with the assistance of a walker.
The United States opposes the Motion because it argues that Canty recovered from Covid-19, that Canty's medical conditions are well-managed at Springfield MCFP, and that Canty has not demonstrated that he has a viable release plan. (Doc. 269, Response). The United States also argues that Canty is a danger to the community and that the § 3553(a) factors do not support a reduction in sentence. In his Reply brief (Doc. 272) and Supplement (Doc. 273), Canty explains that he has developed a solidified release plan, which is to reside with a family friend who has agreed to assist Canty with his medical needs.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Canty's request for compassionate release is due to be granted.
Generally speaking, a district court "may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). "The authority of a district court to modify an imprisonment sentence is narrowly limited by statute." United States v. Phillips, 597 F.3d 1190, 1194-95 (11th Cir. 2010). The compassionate release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), provides one avenue for reducing an otherwise final sentence.
Before passage of the First Step Act of 2018, section 3582(c)(1)(A) left it to the sole discretion of the BOP Director whether to move for compassionate release, and the Director's refusal to do so was judicially unreviewable. See Cruz-Pagan v. Warden, FCC Coleman Low, 486 F. App'x 77, 79 (11th Cir. 2012). But in 2013, the Office of Inspector General for the Department of Justice reported that "[t]he BOP does not properly manage the compassionate release program, resulting in inmates who may be eligible candidates for release not being considered." Dep't of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, The Federal Bureau of Prisons' Compassionate Release Program (April 2013), at 11, available at https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2013/e1306.pdf.
Perhaps in response to the BOP's failure to properly manage the compassionate release program, Congress devoted part of the First Step Act to "increasing the use and transparency of compassionate release." First Step Act, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018), § 603(b). As a result of the new law,defendants may now move for compassionate release on their own behalf provided that they first satisfy an exhaustion requirement. Section 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by the First Step Act, now provides:
(A) the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that ... extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction ... and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
Pursuant to its authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 994, the United States Sentencing Commission promulgated a policy statement governing the circumstances when compassionate release is appropriate. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. The policy statement provides:
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. The Sentencing Commission has not updated the policy statement since the First Step Act became law.
The commentary accompanying the policy statement instructs that "extraordinary and compelling reasons" exist under certain enumerated circumstances. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. 1. As relevant here, these circumstances include:
When a defendant moves for compassionate release on his own behalf, the compassionate release statute contains an exhaustion requirement. A district court can reduce the term of imprisonment "upon motion of the defendant" only "after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added). As the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has held, "[p]risoners who seek compassionate release have the option to take their claim to federal court within 30 days [of submitting a request to the warden], no matter the appeals available to them." United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 834 (6th Cir. 2020); accord United States v. Smith, 482 F. Supp. 3d 1218, 1222-24 (M.D. Fla. 2020).
The United States concedes that Canty has satisfied the statutory exhaustion requirement, Response at 5, and the Court agrees. Canty submitted a request for compassionate release to the warden of his facility on May 8, 2019, and the warden denied the request on June 3, 2019. (See id.). Because more than 30 days passed between when Canty submitted the request and when he filed the Motion, he has satisfied § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s 30-day exhaustion alternative.
The United States also concedes that Canty has demonstrated extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release, Response at 5-8, and the Court agrees as well. Specifically, the Court finds that Canty has demonstrated extraordinary and compelling circumstances on two separate bases: (1) his medical condition, per U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. 1(A), and (2) his advanced age, deteriorating health, and time served, per § 1B1.13, cmt. 1(B).
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. 1(A)(i) (emphasis added). The medical records reflect that Canty has been diagnosed with end-stage renal disease and that he undergoes dialysis several times a week. (Doc. 265-1, Exhibit A at 3, 11; Doc. 265-4, Exhibit D at 1, 5). Although Canty has fortunately outlived a 2013 prognosis of 12 to 24 months left to live (Doc. 265-6, Exhibit F at 2), his renal disease has an end-of-life trajectory. Accordingly, Canty has demonstrated...
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