United States v. Capital Transit Co., Civ. A. No. 2019-52.

• Decision Date: 04 November 1952
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 2019-52.
• Citation: 108 F. Supp. 348
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. CAPITAL TRANSIT CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

108 F. Supp. 348

UNITED STATES v. CAPITAL TRANSIT CO.

Civ. A. No. 2019-52.

United States District Court District of Columbia.

November 4, 1952.

Ross O'Donoghue, Asst. U. S. Atty. in Charge of Civil Division, Washington, D. C., and Vincent C. Burke, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.

William E. Stewart, Jr., Washington, D. C., for defendant.

YOUNGDAHL, District Judge.

The United States of America brings this action for damages to a governmentowned vehicle. More than two years have elapsed since the date of the accident. The Federal Tort Claims Act, Title 28 U.S.C.A. § 2401(b), provides:

"A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless action is begun within two years after such claim accrues or within one year after the date of enactment of this amendatory sentence, whichever is later, * * *."

Defendant answered and also filed a counterclaim for damages claimed to have been sustained to its vehicle in the same accident. Plaintiff has brought a motion to dismiss the counterclaim contending that the Statute of Limitations prescribed in § 2401(b) bars the claim.

Although the counterclaim alleges two separate counts for damages, the motion to dismiss is directed against the entire counterclaim. In view of the Court's conclusion that count one should not be dismissed, it is unnecessary for the purposes of this motion to consider count two.

The damages sought under the counterclaim arise out of the same automobile collision as a result of which plaintiff seeks damages. Plaintiff contends that any claim against the United States arising out of a tort must be based upon the Tort Act in order for one to recover since without said Act a suit against the United States would not lie in tort due to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. It is further suggested that since the liability and the remedy are created by the same statute, that the limitations of the remedy are to be treated as limitations of the right. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 7 S.Ct. 140, 30 L.Ed. 358; Matheny v. Porter, 10 Cir., 158 F.2d 478. Therefore, plaintiff asserts that since the two year statutory period for the bringing of the action has expired, defendant cannot assert a claim for damages under the counterclaim. Defendant, on the contrary, contends that plaintiff has waived this limitation of time by bringing an action for damages against the defendant.

No case has been cited in the points and authorities or in the oral argument of either party, nor has the Court in its research found such a case, where the precise point is raised as is involved in the instant case.

It should be borne in mind that the Federal Tort Claims Act should be liberally construed. The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Yellow Cab Company, 340 U.S. 543, 71 S.Ct. 399, 402, 95 L.Ed. 523, in discussing this Act said:

"The Federal Tort Claims Act waives the Government's immunity from suit in sweeping language. * * Recognizing such a clearly defined breadth of purpose for the bill as a whole, and the general trend toward increasing the scope of the waiver by the United States of its sovereign immunity from suit, it is inconsistent to whittle it down by refinements."

In U. S. v. Schlitz, D.C.V.A.-'49, 9 F. R.D. 259, 260, although the Statute of Limitations was not involved, it was held that the...