United States v. Cappucci, Crim. No. 72-14.
Decision Date | 19 May 1972 |
Docket Number | Crim. No. 72-14. |
Citation | 342 F. Supp. 790 |
Parties | The UNITED STATES v. Anthony John CAPPUCCI et al. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Carl J. Melone, U. S. Atty., C. Oliver Burt, III, Asst. U. S. Atty., Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.
Anthony John Cappucci, pro se, Assisted by Martin Light, Brooklyn, N. Y., for defendant.
Defendant Anthony Cappucci was arrested on the charges now pending before this Court, in New York City on October 13, 1971. At the time, he happened to be awaiting sentence on a different Federal charge. On October 15, 1971, he was sentenced on that charge by the District Court for the Eastern District of New York and was committed to the Federal Correctional Institution at Danbury, Connecticut to serve his sentence. On January 14, 1972 he was brought from Danbury to Philadelphia for arraignment on the charges now before the Court. On January 15th he was returned to Danbury.
Defendant has filed a pro se motion in this case "To Dismiss Any and All Outstanding Indictments, Information, (sic) or Complaint for Lack of Prosecution Pursuant to the `Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act', Article IV, Paragraph E.".
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (18 U.S.C. App. p. 80) was passed in 1970. This legislation was prompted by the problems which had arisen when two jurisdictions had charges outstanding against a single person. Often one jurisdiction would try, convict and incarcerate the person, and the other jurisdiction would merely lodge a detainer against the person and wait to try him until his release by the first jurisdiction. This would sometimes result in a trial many years after the crime. The Act was designed to meet these problems. It is a compact which is binding on the United States and such States as have adopted it.
Article I of the Act speaks directly to the scope and purposes of the Act thus:
.
Article II(a) of the Act makes it clear that the term "State" as used in the Act means inter alia the United States.
Insofar as relief under this section of the Act is specifically conditioned on the making of formal demand by the prisoner for speedy trial under Article III of the Act, this section of the Act is, or course, inapplicable to the present case since no such demand has ever...
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State v. Hicks
...the accused. Moreover, the only legal authority offered by the majority in support of its position is inapplicable. United States v. Cappucci, 342 F.Supp. 790 (E.D.Pa.1972), concerned time constraints under the Agreement. There the United States District Court reaffirmed the elementary prin......
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U.S. v. Mauro
...his transfer from another jurisdiction for trial and returned him without trying him to the first jurisdiction." United States v. Cappucci, 342 F.Supp. 790, 793 (E.D.Pa.1972).4 Thus that original writ served on the warden of the Auburn Correctional Facility provided:YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED......
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Cijka v. Baker
...prisoner, the IADA was not applicable because prisoner “was never imprisoned by the receiving state”); United States v. Cappucci, 342 F.Supp. 790, 793 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (“In order to claim a remedy under [the IADA], a prisoner must allege that one jurisdiction has requested his transfer from ......
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Kowalak v. United States, Crim. No. 76-80052.
...See United States v. Dowl, 394 F.Supp. 1250 (D.Minn.1975); United States v. Mason, 372 F.Supp. 651 (N.D.Ohio 1973); United States v. Cappucci, 342 F.Supp. 790 (E.D.Pa.1972). See also Annot., 98 A.L.R.3d 160 Although not framing the issue in terms of a per se rule, the court in Poe v. United......