United States v. Carpenter
| Decision Date | 23 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | 20 CR 376-2 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. LAUREN CARPENTER, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
When Defendant Lauren Carpenter arrived at Midway Airport on November 3, 2019, returning from a trip to Jamaica, Customs and Border Patrol stopped her. Then, Homeland Security Investigations special agents scrolled through her cell phone-looking for evidence of postal theft. After finding incriminating evidence, the agents downloaded a copy of the phone's contents. The agents had planned to search Carpenter's phone before she arrived, but they did not secure a warrant. Facing charges of conspiracy to commit mail theft and access device fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C § 371, and mail theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708, (Dkt. 55 at 1-6), Carpenter moved to suppress the evidence resulting from the warrantless searches of her phone. (Dkt. 140). Although the border-search exception to the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless searches at the border, Carpenter argues that the exception does not apply to searches for evidence of domestic crime. The Court agrees applying the border-search exception here would stretch it beyond its purposes. For the following reasons Carpenter's motion to suppress is granted.
The following facts are undisputed.[1]As Carpenter and her then-boyfriend, codefendant Stephon Johnson, returned to Midway Airport from Jamaica on November 3, 2019, Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) agents pulled the couple aside for additional screening. (Dkt. 140 at 1-2). Carpenter and Johnson were suspects in an ongoing postal-theft investigation by the USPS Office of Inspector General (OIG), the USPS Inspection Service (USPIS), and Homeland Security Investigations (HSI). (Id.; Dkt. 145 at 2). Before the couple left for Jamaica, investigators flagged Johnson for heightened screening at the airport upon his return. (Dkt. 140 at 1-2; Dkt. 140-2; Dkt. 145-3 at 8).[2]
Johnson was an early target of the investigation: pursuant to warrants, law enforcement searched Johnson's and codefendant Davey Hines's Snapchat accounts in May and June 2019, finding that Johnson had “regularly exchanged images of stolen mail associated with financial instruments and [personal identifying information] belonging to other people.” (Dkt. 145 at 3; Dkt. 145-1). After obtaining a Title III order on September 13, 2019, law enforcement “intercepted messages and images depicting stolen mail, stolen financial instruments, and victim [personal identifying information] through Johnson's Snapchat account”-including “an image of mail from zip code 60619.” (Dkt. 145 at 3-4; Dkt. 145-1). Although OIG had connected Carpenter to an August 2019 complaint by a USPS customer involving stolen mail in the 60619 zip code,[3]she became a target later, after HSI agents learned that she was traveling with Johnson, lived with him, and worked as a USPS mail carrier. (Dkt. 145 at 4-5; Dkt. 145-2; Dkt. 145-3).
At Midway, CBP officers searched Carpenter's and Johnson's belongings. (Dkt. 140 at 2; Dkt. 145 at 5). Then, HSI Special Agents Eric Bonza and Kevin Gerlock manually searched the couple's cell phones. (Dkt. 140 at 2; Dkt. 145 at 5-6).[4] The agents put the phones in Airplane mode before the search to prevent the phones from sending or receiving data, and during the search, did not download files, de-encrypt data, or recover deleted files. (Dkt. 145 at 6). The manual search of Carpenter's phone revealed “images of credit cards in other peoples' names” and “images of mail addressed to other people”-including mail and credit cards belonging to residents of the 60619 zip code. (Dkt. 140 at 2; 140-5 at 3; Dkt. 145 at 6). There were similar images on Johnson's phone. (Dkt. 140 at 2; Dkt. 140-5 at 3; Dkt. 145 at 7).
Before returning the cell phones, the HSI agents downloaded copies of the phones' contents using Cellebrite, which allowed them to extract data without altering it or disrupting the phones' function. (Dkt. 140 at 2-3; Dkt. 140-5 at 3; Dkt. 145 at 8). Later, a forensic search of the downloaded copies of Carpenter's and Johnson's phones uncovered communications between Carpenter and Johnson: they discussed stealing mail containing credit cards and opening credit cards in others' names, and they exchanged images of others' credit cards and passcodes. (Dkt. 145 at 8-9; Dkt. 1 ¶ 16). The forensic search further revealed communications in which codefendant Kyshalah Powell sent Carpenter images of others' credit cards and Carpenter told Powell to steal mail. (Dkt. 145 at 9; Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 36-37). Agents also found conversations between Johnson and Powell about stolen mail. (Dkt. 145 at 9; Dkt. 1 ¶ 40).
OIG and USPIS agents interviewed Carpenter on June 22, 2022. (Dkt. 145 at 9). After Carpenter waived her Miranda and Garrity rights, law enforcement confronted her with images of others' mail found on her phone. (Id.; Dkt. 140-7 at 1). Carpenter admitted that she had stolen mail containing credit cards and helped Johnson apply for credit accounts in others' names. (Dkt. 145 at 9; Dkt. 140-7 at 2). Law enforcement interviewed Powell on the same day. (Dkt. 145 at 9-10; 140-12 at 1-3). After seeing evidence from Carpenter's phone, Powell admitted to stealing mail at Carpenter's direction. (Dkt. 145 at 9-10; 140-12 at 1-3). Powell then consented to a search of her cell phone. (Dkt. 140 at 20 n.5; Dkt. 140-12 at 6).
Law enforcement arrested Carpenter and her codefendants on July 22, 2020. (Dkt. 145 at 10). Law enforcement also obtained a warrant to search Carpenter's phone, relying on the records from the complaint to OIG by a USPS customer on Carpenter's mail route and images and communications from Carpenter's and Johnson's phones. (Dkt. 140 at 3; Dkt. 140-8 ¶¶ 11-15; Dkt. 145 at 10). A grand jury indicted Carpenter on August 11, 2020, charging her with conspiracy to commit mail theft and access device fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and mail theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708. (Dkt. 140 at 4-5; Dkt. 145 at 10; Dkt. 55 at 1-6).
Carpenter moved to suppress the evidence from her cell phone and the fruits of that evidence. (Dkt. 140). In response, the Government contends that the search was lawful under the border-search exception to the Fourth Amendment. (Dkt. 145).
Carpenter argues: (1) that the border-search exception to the Fourth Amendment does not permit warrantless cell phone searches for evidence of domestic crime; (2) that even if the manual search of her cell phone fell within the border-search exception, the warrantless forensic search went too far; and (3) that suppression is appropriate for the evidentiary fruits that resulted from searching her phone. (Dkt. 140 at 6, 10, 14). The Government responds that the searches were lawful under the border-search exception and falls back on exceptions to the exclusionary rule. (Dkt. 145 at 11, 19-21). The Court holds that the border-search exception does not apply and suppression is appropriate.
The Fourth Amendment protects “against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “In the absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the warrant requirement.” Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014). There is an exception for searches at the borders,[5]where the “Government's interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith.” United States v. Wanjiku, 919 F.3d 472, 480 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004)).[6]The bordersearch exception permits “routine searches and seizures at the border, without probable cause or a warrant.” Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 153 (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985)); see also United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977). The border-search exception serves “two main purposes: to allow the regulation of the collection of duties, and ‘to prevent the introduction of contraband into this country.'” Wanjiku, 919 F.3d at 480 (quoting Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537); see also United States v. 12 200-Foot Reels of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S. 123, 125 (1973).
Routine border searches for contraband require no suspicion. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 155. And there is growing consensus that manual border searches of cell phones are routine. Alasaad v. Mayorkas, 988 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 2021); United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1016 (9th Cir. 2019); United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2018). Here, the Government concedes that Special Agents Bonza and Gerlock were investigating domestic crime when they searched Carpenter's cell phone. Nonetheless, the Government maintains the searches fall within the exception because: (1) there is a reduced expectation of privacy at the border; and (2) irrespective of the agents' motivations, the incriminating images on Carpenter's phone were digital contraband. The question then before this Court is whether the border-search exception applies when agents search for evidence of domestic crime. It does not.
Applying the border-search exception to searches with the sole aim of investigating domestic crime would “untether” the exception from its purposes. United States v Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d 713, 721 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at 386); see Riley, 573 U.S. at 383, 38687, 38991 (); Collins v....
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