United States v. Carter
| Decision Date | 02 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL 1:20-CR-00066 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ARCHIE LOUIS CARTER, ET AL. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Co-defendants Archie Louis Carter (“Carter”) and Isiah Charles Jones (“Jones”) filed several Motions to Suppress Evidence. ECF Nos. 65, 66, 67. Because the evidence at issue in each motion was lawfully seized, Defendants' Motions to Suppress (ECF Nos. 65, 66, 67) should be DENIED.
Carter and Jones are charged in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana with possession of methamphetamine, heroin, ecstasy, and cocaine with intent to distribute. ECF No. 113. Additionally, Carter is charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and there is a forfeiture allegation as to that firearm. ECF No. 13.
Jones filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence and Requesting an Evidentiary Hearing, contesting the stop and search of the vehicle in which he was a passenger on February 15, 2020. ECF No. 65. Carter filed two Motions to Suppress and Requesting an Evidentiary Hearing, contending the warrantless stops and searches of his vehicle that took place on October 29, 2019 and February 15, 2020, and the search of his vehicle pursuant to a warrant on February 17 2020, were all unlawful and the evidence seized should be suppressed. ECF Nos. 66, 67, 68, 80.
The Government opposes those motions. ECF No. 78.
The Court has repeatedly offered dates for potential evidentiary hearings. None were accepted or pursued by Defendants. Moreover, the issues presented in the motions are primarily issues of law. Meanwhile trial is rapidly approaching. And a hearing is neither required nor warranted here.[1] Additional delay is unnecessary. Defendants' Motions for an Evidentiary Hearing are denied. ECF Nos. 65, 66, 67.
The Fourth Amendment provides that “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const., amend. IV. Defendant has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the evidence in question was obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. See United States v. Kelly, 981 F.2d 1464, 1467 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. den., 508 U.S. 944 (1993). However, the Government bears the ultimate burden of proving the search was valid when the search was conducted without a warrant. See United States v. Waldrop, 404 F.3d 365, 368 (5th Cir. 2005). Generally, “[t]he government may not use evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures to prove a defendant's guilt at trial.” United States v. Breland, 53 F.3d 100, 102 (5th Cir. 1995).
Carter contends his vehicle was unlawfully stopped and searched without a warrant on October 29, 2019. ECF No. 67. Carter argues: (1) the officer did not have a legal reason to initiate a traffic stop; (2) the officer did not have a legal reason for a warrantless search of his vehicle; and (3) the length of Carter's detention between the initial stop and the search was illegal and voided the search.
For the reasons given below, Carter's Motion to Suppress the evidence obtained from the October 2019 stop should be denied.
Carter contends the officer's allegations that Carter's vehicle “drifted over the center line on at least 2 occasions” and “was following too closely to the vehicle in front of him” were pretextual. Carter further argues the officer used “cookie cutter” reasons for suspecting illegal activity that formed the basis of the warrantless search. ECF No. 67 at 1.
The Government contends Carter's vehicle was stopped because he changed lanes twice without signaling, and was following an 18-wheel truck too closely for safety. ECF No. 78 at 2.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that the Federal Government shall not violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fourteenth Amendment extends this constitutional guarantee to searches and seizures by state officers. See Vernonia SchoolDist. 47Jv. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995) (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (i960)).
“The reasonableness of traffic stops and investigative detentions of motorists who are suspected of criminal activity is analyzed under the framework established in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).” See United States v. Rosales-Giron, 592 Fed.Appx. 246, at *4 (5th Cir. 2014). Under Terry, a court determines the reasonableness of an investigative stop by examining: (1) whether the officer's action of stopping the vehicle was justified at its inception; and (2) whether the officer's actions were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop. See id.
For a traffic stop to be justified at its inception, an officer need only have reasonable suspicion that “some sort of illegal activity, such as a traffic violation, occurred, or is about to occur, before stopping the vehicle.” United States v. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 430 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. den., 546 U.S. 1222 (2006). The Supreme Court stated in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996): “As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 575 (5th Cir. 2008).
“Probable cause exists when the totality of facts and circumstances within a police officer's knowledge at the moment of arrest are sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had committed, or was in the process of committing, an offense.” Zavala, 541 F.3d at 575. Therefore, probable cause to make a traffic stop exists when a defendant commits a traffic violation and a lawenforcement officer observes the violation. See United States v. Khanalizadeh, 493 F.3d 479, 482 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. den., 552 U.S. 1051 (2007). “The rule established by the Supreme Court in Whren allows officers to justify a stop by the occurrence of a traffic violation even though this is not the real reason for the stop.” United States v. Cole, 444 F.3d 688, 689 (5th Cir. 2006); see Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 ().
According to Carter, the officer observed Carter's vehicle drifting over the center line twice, and following the vehicle on front of him too closely. Both are traffic offenses in Louisiana. See La. R.S. 32:79 (driving on roadway laned for traffic); La. R.S. 32:81 (Following vehicles); La. R.S. 32:82 (driving on divided highways). Because the officer had probable cause to believe Carter had committed traffic offenses, the traffic stop was reasonable. Compare United State v. Garcia, 2015 WL 8660838, at *4 (W.D. La. 2015), report and recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 8675937 (W.D. La. 2015) ().
Carter also argues the length of his detention between the initial stop and the search exceeded the time necessary to complete the traffic stop.
For the second prong of the Terry inquiry, generally, the detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, unless further reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, emerges. See United States v. Johns, 2013 WL 4587744, at *3 (W.D. La. 2013), appeal dismissed, 586 Fed.Appx. 163 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. den., 576 U.S. 1042 (2015) (citing United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 507 (5th Cir. 2004). In the course of effectuating a stop, an officer may permissibly examine the driver's license and registration and run a computer check to investigate whether the driver has any outstanding warrants or if the vehicle is stolen. See Brigham, 382 F.3d at 507. An officer may also ask the driver about the purpose and itinerary of his trip. See idlndeed, the officer's questions need not even be related to the purpose of the traffic stop, since “[d]etention, not questioning, is the evil at which Terry's second prong is aimed.” See id.[2]
Although an officer's inquiry may be wide-ranging, once all relevant computer checks have come back clean, there is no more reasonable suspicion, and, as a general matter continued questioning thereafter unconstitutionally prolongs the detention. See Johns, 2013 WL 4587744, at *3 (citingBrigham, 382 F.3d at 510; Santiago, 310 F.3d 336, 341-42 (5th Cir. 2002)). A recognized exception to this rule is that, if additional reasonable suspicion arises in the course of the stop and before the initial purpose of the stop has been fulfilled, then the detention may continue until the new reasonable suspicion has been dispelled or confirmed. See Johns, 2013 WL 4587744, at *3 (citing Brigham, 382 F.3d at 507; United States v. Grant, 349 F.3d 192, 196 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Jenson, 462 F.3d 399, 404 (5th Cir. 2006)). But “[o]nce the purpose of a valid traffic stop has been completed and an officer's initial suspicions have been verified or dispelled, the detention must end unless there is additional reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts.” United States v. Gonzalez, 328 F.3d 755, 758 (5th Cir. 200...
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