United States v. Carter

• Citation: 583 F.Supp.3d 94
• Decision Date: 27 January 2022
• Docket Number: 19-cr-261 (DLF)
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, v. Antwann CARTER, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

583 F.Supp.3d 94

UNITED STATES of America,
v.
Antwann CARTER, Defendant.

No. 19-cr-261 (DLF)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed January 27, 2022

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Kimberly Louise Paschall, James B. Nelson, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Attorney's Office for District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for United States of America.

Eugene Ohm, Public Defender, Federal Public Defender for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH, United States District Judge

On September 1, 2021, this Court found that Antwann Carter "suffer[s] from a mental disease or defect that renders him unable to understand the nature and consequences of the [criminal] proceedings against him." Order of September 1, 2021, at 1, Dkt. 51. Consistent with the Insanity Defense Reform Act (IDRA), the Court thus ordered that Carter be committed "to the custody of the Attorney General ... to determine whether there is a substantial probability that in the foreseeable future he will attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to go forward." Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1) ). IDRA requires the Attorney General to make that determination in a "reasonable time, not to exceed four months." 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1).

Since August 30, 2021, this Court has repeatedly informed the government that it lacks the authority to extend that four-month period. See, e.g. , Hr'g Tr., Nov. 2, 2021, at 3–4, Dkt. 70, at 3; Hr'g Tr. Aug. 30, 2021, at 5, Dkt. 69. Despite the Court's warnings, the government has not complied with IDRA's deadline and represents that February 14, 2022 is the soonest that the U.S. Marshals can transfer Carter to a suitable facility. See Rough Hr'g Tr., Jan. 10, 2022, at 3. This date is well beyond the "four months" that IDRA allows, 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1). Accordingly, after briefing and oral argument, this Court held that the government's delay in transporting Carter violated IDRA's terms. See Rough Hr'g Tr., Jan. 10, 2022, at 10–13. The Court further held, consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Jackson v. Indiana , 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972), that the appropriate remedy for that violation required either the commencement of civil commitment proceedings or Carter's release. See id. at 13–16; see also Minute Order of Jan. 19, 2022. This opinion explains that Order's reasoning.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Initial Proceedings

On August 1, 2019, a federal grand jury charged Carter with one count of carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119(1) ; one count of using, carrying, and possessing a firearm in a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) ; and one count of aggravated assault while armed, in violation of D.C. Code §§ 404.01 and 4502. See Indictment, Dkt. 2. Carter was arrested several days later. See Arrest Warrant, Dkt. 5. Magistrate Judge Harvey then held a detention hearing and ordered that Carter be held without bond. See Order of Detention Pending Trial, Dkt. 8. His order reasoned that the weight of the evidence against Carter was strong, that his criminal history favored detention, and that his release would pose a danger to the community. See id. at 11–13.

B. Competency Proceedings

On November 8, 2019, this Court ordered a preliminary assessment of Carter's

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competence to stand trial. See Order of Nov. 8, 2019, Dkt. 11. The assessing psychologist, Dr. Teresa Grant, was "unable to form a definitive opinion" on that question. See Forensic Screening Report at 4, Dkt. 12. She explained that it was "unclear" whether his responses to her questioning reflected a cognitive impairment or "malingering, [ ]given the severity of his charges." Id. But she agreed to perform an additional evaluation at a later date. See Motion to Continue at 1, Dkt. 16 (describing that agreement); Order of Nov. 27, 2019, Dkt. 15 (allowing that additional evaluation).

On November 27, 2019, Dr. Elizabeth Teegarden conducted a separate assessment of Carter, in connection with his separate charges in D.C. Superior Court. See Teegarden Report, Dkt. 18. She determined that Carter was "incompetent to stand trial" because "his overall cognitive functioning was on the concrete level and he did not benefit from [her] attempts to instruct him about the relevant legal issues." Id. at 3. She accordingly recommended that Pretrial Services conduct a full competency evaluation. See id.

On January 23, 2020, Dr. Grant submitted her supplementary report on Carter's competency. See Second Grant Report, Dkt. 78. This report concluded that Carter was "competent to stand trial and likely malingering[,] possibly to avoid consequences and/or to thwart his criminal proceeding." Id. at 5. The report also represented that Dr. Teegarden, after an additional examination of Carter and in consultation with Dr. Grant, had reached the same conclusion. See id. at 3–5.

On October 6, 2020, following delays occasioned by the coronavirus pandemic, the defense informed the Court that it had retained its own expert to assess Carter's competence. See Rough Hr'g Tr., Oct. 6, 2020, at 2–3. The expert, Dr. Jonathan DeRight, was not able to examine Carter until February 5, 2021, because D.C. Jail had restricted in-person visits on account of the pandemic. See id. at 2; Joint Status Report, Dkt. 30. Dr. DeRight ultimately concluded that Carter "has significant cognitive limitations that affect his ability to understand factual and rational factors of legal proceedings and to assist in his own defense." DeRight Report at 1, Dkt. 35. He also concluded that Carter's competence was unlikely to be restorable, both because Carter's "limitations [were] cognitive in nature" and because he showed "little improvement over many years." Id.

On March 16, 2021, the defense moved for a competency hearing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). See Def.’s Mot. for a Competency Hr'g, Dkt. 32. Section 4241(a) requires such a hearing when "there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense." 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). Upon review of the record before it, the Court made that finding and granted the defense's motion. See Rough Hr'g Tr., Mar. 17, 2021, at 7–8. The Court initially scheduled that hearing for July 6, see id. at 15–16, then continued it until July 23 at the parties’ request, see Joint Status Report, Dkt. 36.

Before the competency hearing, the defense represented that it would call Dr. DeRight as an expert witness, and the government represented that it would call Drs. Grant and Teegarden. See Def.’s Notice of Expert Witness, Dkt. 42; Gov't’s Notice of Expert Witnesses, Dkt. 43-1. At the hearing, however, the government opted instead to "concede [Carter's] incompetence." Hr'g Tr., July 23, 2021, at 3, Dkt. 68. The government explained that, although

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all three experts identified some "indication of feigning or exaggerate[ing]" symptoms, they also raised "evidence of [his] intellectual deficit and create some concern with regard to his competency." Id. The government thus agreed to a "proceed to a full [competency] examination under [ 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) ]." Id. The defense, for its part, made additional representations that tended to strengthen a finding of incompetence. For example, defense counsel represented that Carter "was found incompetent in several [ ], juvenile cases," that he "consistently scored between 50 and 60 on his IQ tests," and that his "IEPs up until about a year before [his offense] had him in the first and second grade reading level."¹ Id. at 6–8.

On September 1, 2021, this Court found "by a preponderance of the evidence that [Carter] is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense." 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) ; see Order of Sept. 1, 2021, at 1. The Court accordingly "commit[ed] [him] to the custody of the Attorney General," 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) —effective the same day. See Order of Sept. 1, 2021. Under IDRA, that Order required "the Attorney General [to] hospitalize [Carter] for treatment in a suitable facility ... for such a reasonable period of time, not to exceed four months, as is necessary to determine whether" his competence may be restored. Id. § 4241(d)(1). IDRA authorizes the Attorney General to continue to hospitalize the defendant "for an additional reasonable period of time" but only if there is a "substantial probability" that is competence...