United States v. Casale, Crim. No. 14927.

Citation341 F. Supp. 374
Decision Date08 April 1972
Docket NumberCrim. No. 14927.
PartiesUNITED STATES of America v. Frank CASALE et al.
CourtUnited States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court of Middle District of Pennsylvania

Raymond E. Makowski, Philadelphia, Pa., for the United States.

Anthony Miele, Williamsport, Pa., for defendants Lloyd Bosch and William R. Becker.

Thomas J. Hanlon, Scranton, Pa., for defendant Frank Casale.

Michael Casale, Williamsport, Pa., for defendant Joseph Casale.

OPINION

MUIR, District Judge.

The question before the Court is whether wiretap evidence of telephone conversations of the Defendants should be suppressed.

The statute provides, in brief, that before a telephone may be tapped, the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General specially designated by him shall authorize an application to a federal judge for authority to make the wiretap,1 and that the application to the Court and the ensuing court order both shall identify the person who authorized the application to the Court.2

The application to this Court recited that the then Attorney General, John N. Mitchell, had specially designated the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division of the United States Department of Justice, Will Wilson, to authorize the application, that Will Wilson had authorized the application, and that attached to the application was a letter from Will Wilson containing the authority. The order of this Court issued pursuant to the application also identified Will Wilson as the officer authorizing the application.

All of the documents appeared impeccable. However, Assistant Attorney General Will Wilson never saw the file, never authorized the application, and never signed the letter. His purported signature was affixed to the letter submitted to this Court by an officer below the rank of Assistant Attorney General. The application and the Court order are both defective in identifying Will Wilson as the officer authorizing the application.

The government now claims that the Attorney General himself authorized the application. It contends that his memo to Will Wilson does not specially designate Will Wilson to authorize the application to the Court but itself authorizes the application. The memo is set out in full in the margin.3 The plain meaning of the words in the memo is that Will Wilson was specially designated in this case to exercise the power and discretion conferred by the statute upon the Attorney General, or upon an Assistant Attorney General specially designated by him, to authorize the application for an order of court. The memo, in my view, is not an authorization to anyone to apply to this Court for an order.

The government has submitted affidavits of former Attorney General Mitchell and of a subordinate which set forth departmental procedures for securing wiretap orders in this and similar cases. The affidavits unfortunately do not supply the missing link.

The procedure adopted and followed here fails for three reasons:

(1) Neither the Attorney General nor an Assistant Attorney General specially designated by him authorized the application to this Court;

(2) The application did not identify correctly the officer authorizing the application to this Court; and

(3) The Court order did not identify correctly the officer authorizing the application to this Court.

The statute provides that if wire communication is unlawfully intercepted, it may not be used in any Court proceeding.4 The evidence here was not obtained in accordance with the procedure mandated by the statute. It must therefore be suppressed.

I am mindful that all other U.S. District Judges who have faced this precise question, and to whose opinions my attention has been called by the government, have reached an opposite conclusion.5 I have given their views careful consideration and reluctantly decide otherwise.

The failure of Mr. Wilson to affix his signature to a small number...

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11 cases
  • United States v. Cox
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • June 5, 1972
    ...signed by Mr. Mitchell constituted authorizations, not designations, and as such satisfied the Act. But see United States v. Casale, 341 F.Supp. 374 (M.D. Pa., 1972). Indeed, he found that even Lindenbaum's lone actions satisfied the Act since they were taken pursuant to "`a unitary policy ......
  • United States v. Kohne
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • August 25, 1972
    ...Two district courts have recently indicated that such memoranda would be insufficient to comply with § 2516(1). See: United States v. Casale, 341 F. Supp. 374 (M.D.Pa.1972); United States v. Focarile, 340 F.Supp. 1033 (D.C.Md. 1972). But, the majority of the courts passing on the issue have......
  • United States v. Mainello
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
    • June 29, 1972
    ...United States v. Cihal, 336 F.Supp. 261 (W.D.Pa.1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-1201 (3d Cir. April 13, 1972); United States v. Casale, 341 F. Supp. 374 (M.D.Pa.1972); United States v. Focarile, 340 F.Supp. 1033 (D.Md. 1972). 54 These affidavits have been properly received by the court, espe......
  • United States v. Whitaker
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • May 31, 1972
    ...communications. We think not. Contra, United States v. Focarile, 340 F.Supp. 1033 (D.Md., 1972). See also, United States v. Casale, 341 F.Supp. 374 (M.D. Pa., 1972). We can discern no prejudice whatsoever because the person who actually authorized the application, Attorney General John M. M......
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