United States v. Cassidy

• Decision Date: 01 April 1895
• Docket Number: 3059.
• Citation: 67 F. 698
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. CASSIDY et al.

67 F. 698

UNITED STATES v. CASSIDY et al.

No. 3059.

United States District Court, N.D. California.

April 1, 1895

April 2, 1895. [Copyrighted Material Omitted] [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

H. S Foote, Special Asst. U.S. Atty., and Samuel Knight, Asst. U.S. Dist. Atty.

Geo. W. Monteith, for defendants.

MORROW District Judge (charging jury).

Gentlemen of the Jury: I congratulate you on the approaching termination of this case. For five months you have been required to give your constant, and, I might say, exclusive, attention to the daily proceedings in this court. The trial of the case has been protracted, but I am not prepared to say that any greater time has been occupied than was necessary, under the circumstances, to secure the testimony of the 216 witnesses who have appeared before you upon the stand. The nature of the charges against the defendants now on trial, covering, as they do, the whole field of the railroad strike of last summer in this district, necessarily involves the closest scrutiny into every feature of that affair. In this examination you have displayed a patient interest of such a commendable character as to call for the special acknowledgment of the court. You are, indeed, entitled to the gratitude of every good citizen of the community for the sacrifices you are making, and for the service you are rendering in the faithful performance of a public duty.

In submitting the case to your consideration, it becomes my duty to call your attention to the character of the charges against the defendants, and the provisions of law under which the prosecution is being conducted. It is the duty of the court to declare the law; it is your exclusive province and responsibility to apply the law so declared to the facts as you, upon your conscience, believe them to be established.

The indictment contains two counts, which, in general terms, charge that the defendants conspired, combined, and agreed together, and with divers other persons, to obstruct and retard the passage of the United States mails, and the carrier carrying the same, and also that they engaged in a combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade and commerce among the several states of the United States, and with foreign countries. The crime of conspiracy is based upon section 5440 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which provides as follows:

'If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States or to defraud the United States in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such parties do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy all the parties to such conspiracy shall be liable to a penalty of not more than ten thousand dollars, or to imprisonment for not more than two years or to both fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.'

To make this statute as clear to you as possible, I will call your attention to its three essential provisions. The first element is the act of two or more persons conspiring together; the second is to commit any offense against the United States; and the third is what is termed the 'overt act,' or the element of one or more of such parties doing any act to effect the object of the conspiracy. With respect to the first element, we find that a conspiracy has been described as a combination of two or more persons, by concerted action, to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or some purpose not in itself unlawful or criminal, by criminal or unlawful means. Pettibone v. U.S., 148 U.S. 203, 13 Sup.Ct. 542. The common design is the essence of the charge, and while it is necessary, in order to establish a conspiracy, to prove a combination of two or more persons, by concerted action, to accomplish the criminal or unlawful purpose, it is not necessary to constitute a conspiracy that two or more persons should meet together, and enter into an explicit or formal agreement for an unlawful scheme, or that they should directly, by words or in writing, state what the unlawful scheme was to be, and the details of the plan or means by which the unlawful combination was to be made effective. It is sufficient if two or more persons, in any manner, or through any contrivance, positively or tacitly come to a mutual understanding to accomplish a common and unlawful design. In other words, where an unlawful end is sought to be effected, and two or more persons, actuated by the common purpose of accomplishing that end, work together, in any way, in furtherance of the unlawful scheme, every one of said persons becomes a member of the conspiracy, although the part he was to take therein was a subordinate one, or was to be executed at a remote distance from the other conspirators. A combination formed by two or more persons, to effect an unlawful end, is a conspiracy, said persons acting under a common purpose to accomplish the end designed. Any one who, after a conspiracy is formed, and who knows of its existence, joins therein, becomes as much a party thereto, from that time, as if he had originally conspired. U.S. v. Babcock, 3 Dill. 586, Fed. Cas. No. 14,487. Furthermore, where several persons are proved to have combined together for the same illegal purpose, any act done by one of the parties in pursuance of the original concerted plan, and with reference to the common object, is, in the contemplation of the law, the act of the whole party, and therefore the proof of such act will be evidence against any of the others who were engaged in the same conspiracy. It is also true that any declaration made by one of the parties during the pendency of the illegal enterprise is not only evidence against himself, but is evidence against the other parties, who, when the combination is proved, are as much responsible for such declarations and the acts to which they relate as if made and committed by themselves. This rule, you will understand, applies to the declaration of a co-conspirator, although he may not be under prosecution, his declaration being equally admissible with those of one under indictment and prosecution.

The confederacy to commit an offense is the gist of the criminality under the law. The law regards the act of unlawful combination and confederacy as dangerous to the peace of society, and declares that such combination and confederacy of two or more persons, to commit crime, requires an additional restraint to those provided for the commission of the crime, and makes criminal the conspiracy, with penalties and punishments distinctive from those prescribed for the crime which may be the object of the conspiracy. You will readily understand why this is true. A conspiracy becomes powerful and effective in the accomplishment of its illegal purpose in proportion to the numbers, power, and strength of the combination to effect it. It is also true that, as it involves a number in a lawless enterprise, it is proportionately demoralizing to the well-being and character of the men engaged in it, and, as a consequence, to the safety of the community to which they belong.

The second essential element in the offense described by the statute is the purpose of the conspirators to commit an offense against the United States. The indictment charges that the defendants conspired with others to commit two offenses against the United States,-- one to obstruct and retard the passage of the United States mail and the carrier carrying the same; and the other, that they engaged in a combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade and commerce among the several states of the United States and with foreign countries. The first charge is based upon the provisions of section 3995 of the Revised Statutes, which provides as follows:

'Any person who shall knowingly and willfully obstruct and retard the passage of the mail, or any carriage, horse, driver, or carrier carrying the same, shall, for every such offense, be punishable by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars.'

This section of the Revised Statutes was originally section 9 of the act of March 3, 1825 (4 Stat. 104), and, having been passed prior to the introduction into the United States of the method of transporting mail by railroads, the phraseology of the law conformed to the conditions prevailing at that time, but it is equally applicable to the modern system of conveyance, and protects alike the transportation of the mail by the 'limited express,' as it does the carriage by the old-fashioned stagecoach. There are, however, certain provisions of law directed specifically to the transportation of the mail by railroad trains, to which I desire to call your attention.

Section 3964 of the Revised Statutes provides as follows:

'The following are established post-roads: * * * All railroads or parts of railroads which are now or hereafter may be in operation.'

Section 3, Act March 3, 1879 (20 Stat. 358), provides 'that the postmaster general shall, in all cases, decide upon what trains and in what manner the mails shall be conveyed. ' Section 4000 of the Revised Statutes provides that:

'Every railway company carrying the mail shall carry on any train which may run over its road, and without extra charge therefor, all mailable matter directed to be carried thereon, with the person in charge of the same.'

There is still another provision of law applicable to the transportation of mails on the Pacific railroads, which is as follows:

'That the grants aforesaid are made upon the condition that said company shall * * * transport mails * * * upon said railroad for the government, whenever required to do so by any department thereof, and that the government shall at all times have the preference in the use of the same for all the purposes aforesaid (at fair and reasonable rates of compensation, not to

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