United States v. Causby

• Decision Date: 27 May 1946
• Docket Number: No. 630,630
• Citation: United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 66 S.Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206, 104 Ct.Cl. 342 (1946)
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. CAUSBY et ux
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

328 U.S. 256

66 S.Ct. 1062

90 L.Ed. 1206

UNITED STATES

v CAUSBY et ux.

No. 630.

Argued May 1, 1946.

Decided May 27, 1946.

Military airplanes are subject to rules of Civil Aeronautics Board where there are no army or navy regulations to the contrary.

Mr. Walter J. Cummings, Jr., of Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Mr. William E. Comer, of Greensboro, N.C., for respondent.

[Argument of Counsel from page 257 intentionally omitted]Mr. Justice DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a case of first impression.The problem presented is whether respondents' property was taken within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment by frequent and regular flights of army and navy aircraft over respondents' land at low altitudes.The Court of Claims held that there was a taking and entered judgment for respondent, one judge dissenting.60 F.Supp. 751.The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted becuase of the importance of the question presented.

Respondents own 2.8 acres near an airport outside of Greensboro, North Carolina.It has on it a dwelling house, and also various outbuildings which were mainly used for raising chickens.The end of the airport's northwest-southeast runway is 2,220 feet from respondents' barn and 2,275 feet from their house.The path of glide to this runway passes directly over the property which is 100 feet wide and 1,200 feet long.The 30 to 1 safe glide angle¹ approved by the Civil Aeronautics Authority² passes over this property at 83 feet, which is 67 feet above the house, 63 feet above the barn and 18 feet above the highest tree.³ The use by the United States of this airport is pursuant to a lease executed in May, 1942, for a term commencing June 1, 1942 and ending June 30, 1942, with a provision for renewals until June 30, 1967, or six months after the end of the national emergency, whichever is the earlier.

Various aircraft of the United States use this airport bombers, transports and fighters.The direction of the prevailing wind determines when a particular runway is used.The north-west-southeast runway in question is used about four per cent of the time in taking off and about seven per cent of the time in landing.Since the United States began operations in May, 1942, its four-motored heavy bombers, other planes of the heavier type, and its fighter planes have frequently passed over respondents' land buildings in considerable numbers and rather close together.They come close enough at times to appear barely to miss the tops of the trees and at times so close to the tops of the trees as to blow the old leaves off.The noise is startling.And at night the glare from the planes brightly lights up the place.As a result of the noise, respondents had to give up their chicken business.As many as six to ten of their chickens were killed in one day by flying into the walls from fright.The total chickens lost in that manner was about 150.Production also fell off.The result was the destruction of the use of the property as a commercial chicken farm.Respondents are frequently deprived of their sleep and the family has become nervous and frightened.Although there have been no airplane accidents on respondents' property, there have been several accidents near the airport and close to respondents' place.These are the essential facts found by the Court of Claims.On the basis of these facts, it found that respondents' property had depreciated in value.It held that the United States had taken an easement over the property on June 1, 1942, and that the value of the property destroyed and the easement taken was $2,000.

I.The United States relies on the Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 568,49 U.S.C. § 171 et seq.,49 U.S.C.A. § 171 et seq., as amended by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 973,49 U.S.C. § 401 et seq.,49 U.S.C.A. § 401 et seq.Under those statutes the United States has 'complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the air space' over this country.49 U.S.C. § 176(a),49 U.S.C.A. § 176(a).They grant any citizen of the United States 'a public right of freedom of transit in air commerce⁴ through the navigable air space of the United States.'49 U.S.C. § 403,49 U.S.C.A. § 403.And 'navigable air space' is defined as 'airspace above the minimum safe altitudes of flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority.'49 U.S.C. § 180,49 U.S.C.A. § 180.And it is provided that 'such navigable airspace shall be subject to a public right of freedom of interstate and foreign air navigation.'Id.It is, therefore, argued that since these flights were within the minimum safe altitudes of flight which had been prescribed, they were an exercise of the declared right of travel through the airspace.The United States concludes that when flights are made within the navigable airspace without any physical invasion of the property of the landowners, there has been no taking of property.It says that at most there was merely incidental damage occurring as a consequence of authorized air navigation.It also argues that the landowner does not own superadjacent airspace which he has not subjected to possession by the erection of structures or other occupancy.Moreover, it is argued that even if the United States took airspace owned by respondents, no compensable damage was shown.Any damages are said to be merely consequential for which no compensation may be obtained under the Fifth Amendment.

It is ancient doctrine that at common law ownership of the land extended to the periphery of the universe—Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum.⁵But that doctrine has no place in the modern world.The ai is a public highway, as Congress has declared.Were that not true, every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless trespass suits.Common sense revolts at the idea.To recognize such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways, seriously interfere with their control and development in the public interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only the public has a just claim.

But that general principle does not control the present case.For the United States conceded on oral argument that if the flights over respondents' property rendered it uninhabitable, there would be a taking compensable under the Fifth Amendment.It is the owner's loss, not the taker's gain, which is the measure of the value of the property taken.United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 63 S.Ct. 276, 87 L.Ed. 336, 147 A.L.R. 55.Market value fairly determined is the normal measure of the recovery.Id.And that value may reflect the use to which the land could readily be converted, as well as the existing use.United States v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 275, 63 S.Ct. 1047, 1053, 87 L.Ed. 1390, and cases cited.If, by reason of the frequency and altitude of the flights, respondents could not use this land for any purpose, their loss would be complete.⁶It would be as complete as if the United States had entered upon the surface of the land and taken exclusive possession of it.

We agree that in those circumstances there would be a taking.Though it would be only an easement of flight which was taken, that easement, if permanent and not merely temporary, normally would be the equivalent of a fee interest.It would be a definite exercise of complete dominion and control over the surface of the land.The fact that the planes never touched the surface would be as irrelevant as the absence in this day of the feudal livery of seisin on the transfer of real estate.The owner's right to possess and exploit the land—that is to say, his beneficial ownership of it—would be destroyed.It would not be a case of incidental damages arising from a legalized nuisance such as was involved in Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 34 S.Ct. 654, 58 L.Ed. 1088, L.R.A.1915A, 887.In that case property owners whose lands adjoined a railroad line were denied recovery for damages resulting from the noise, vibrations, smoke and the like, incidental to the operations of the trains.In the supposed case the line of flight is over the land.And the land is appropriated as directly and completely as if it were used for the runways themselves.

There is no material difference between the supposed case and the present one, except that here enjoyment and use of the land are not completely destroyed.But that does not seem to us to be controlling.The path of glide for airplanes might reduce a valuable factory site to grazing land, an orchard to a vegetable patch, a residential section to a wheat field.Some value would remain.But the use of the airspace immediately above the land would limit the utility of the land and cause a diminution in its value.⁷That was the philosophy of Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v United States, 260 U.S. 327, 43 S.Ct. 135, 67 L.Ed. 287.In that case the petition alleged that the United States erected a fort on nearby land, established a battery and a fire control station there, and fired guns over petitioner's land.The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, reversed the Court of Claims which dismissed the petition on a demurrer, olding that 'the specific facts set forth would warrant a finding that a servitude has been imposed.'⁸260 U.S. at page 330, 43 S.Ct. at page 137, 67 L.Ed. 287.And seeDelta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E.2d 245, 140 A.L.R. 1352.Cf.United States v. 357.25 Acres of Land, D.C., 55 F.Supp. 461.

The fact that the path of glide taken by the planes was that approved by the Civil Aeronautics Authority does not change the result.The navigable airspace which Congress has placed in the public domain is 'airspace above the minimum safe altitudes of flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority.'49 U.S.C. § 180,49 U.S.C.A. § 180.If that agency prescribed 83 feet as the minimum safe altitude, then we would have presented the question of the validity of the regulation....