United States v. Centeno-González

• Decision Date: 24 February 2021
• Docket Number: No. 17-1367,17-1367
• Citation: 989 F.3d 36
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. José CENTENO-GONZÁLEZ, Defendant, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

989 F.3d 36

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,

v.José CENTENO-GONZÁLEZ, Defendant, Appellant.

No. 17-1367

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

February 24, 2021

Linda Backiel for appellant.

Alexander L. Alum, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Velez, United States Attorney, Marian E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney and Chief, Appellate Division, and Thomas F. Klumper, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief for appellee.

Before Howard, Chief Judge, and Thompson, Circuit Judge.^*

HOWARD, Chief Judge.

Although it takes many turns along the way, this case starts and ends with the firearm that was found inside a hidden compartment of a vehicle on May 6, 2015. On that day, law enforcement officers pulled over Jose Centeno-González as he drove by in a Toyota Tundra that the officers believed matched the description of a vehicle that had just been involved in a shooting. After arresting Centeno, the officers deployed a firearm-detecting dog to inspect the outside of the vehicle and used the results of the dog sniff to obtain a search warrant for the vehicle. While searching the vehicle, officers found a firearm, gloves, and paperwork inside a concealed compartment in the dashboard. Following trial, a jury convicted Centeno of unlawful possession of a firearm. Now on appeal, Centeno contends that the district court erred by refusing to suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle pursuant to the warrant. He also contends that the district court erred in multiple evidentiary decisions during his trial and that these errors infringed his right to present a complete defense. After careful consideration, we conclude that the district court did not err and affirm the conviction.

I. FACTS

Because Centeno challenges his conviction on various grounds, we will "provide a more or less neutral summary of the key relevant evidence presented at trial." See United States v. Flores-Rivera, 787 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2015). According to the testimony at trial, in the early evening hours of May 6, 2015, a dispatch officer at the municipal police department in Juncos, Puerto Rico issued a radio call alerting officers that there had just been gunfire at Tite Curet Street in Urbanization Estancias de la Ceiba ("UEC"). More specifically, the dispatch officer stated that she had received two separate civilian calls reporting the shooting and had heard detonations over the phone. The dispatch officer also communicated that a white Toyota Tundra truck with tinted windows had transferred weapons to a grey vehicle, had run over a person, and was now headed toward Road 198 and Las Piedras.

Officers Nilka Figueroa-Negron ("Figueroa") and Luis Rosa-Gonzalez ("Rosa"), who worked for the municipal police department, heard the radio transmission. In response, Figueroa and Rosa drove down Road 198 in the direction of UEC. As they were driving down Road 198, Figueroa and Rosa spotted a white Toyota Tundra with tinted windows heading towards them. Believing that this car matched the description provided in the radio call, Officer Rosa turned the police patrol car around with the intention of stopping the Toyota Tundra.

Officer Rosa turned on the lights and siren while Officer Figueroa used the loudspeaker to order the driver, who was Centeno, of the Tundra to pull over. The Tundra stopped about six seconds later. Officers Figueroa and Rosa stepped out of their police vehicle and, with their weapons drawn, approached the Tundra. By this point, two Puerto Rico Police Department ("PRPD") officers, who had also received a radio transmission reporting gunfire at UEC, had reached the scene. The PRPD officers ordered Centeno, who was alone in the vehicle, to turn off the engine and lower the window. Centeno lowered his window halfway and, approximately a minute later, stepped out of the Tundra. The officers noted that Centeno looked nervous and asked him where he was coming from; in response, Centeno stated that he was coming from UEC, where he was looking for a house to rent. The officers then placed Centeno on the ground, and Officer Rosa handcuffed him. The parties both agree that at this point, the stop had ripened into an arrest. See United States v. Centeno-Gonzalez, 177 F. Supp. 3d 721, 729 n.5 (D.P.R. 2016).

Once Centeno had been secured, Officers Figueroa and Rosa left to investigate the crime scene at UEC.¹ Meanwhile, the PRPD police officers remained with Centeno at the scene of his stop. Centeno watched as another officer arrived with a dog that was trained in detecting firearms. While circling and sniffing the exterior of the Toyota Tundra under the guidance of an officer, the dog sat down, according to protocol and training, that indicated that the dog had detected the scent of a firearm. The Toyota Tundra was then sealed and towed, and Centeno was taken to a detention center for processing.

The next day, officers obtained a warrant to search the interior of the Toyota Tundra. While searching the vehicle, officers found a hidden compartment in the dashboard near the radio. Inside the compartment, officers found a firearm, magazines for the weapon, a black glove, and two Ziploc bags with a cream-colored substance, among other things. Subsequent testing indicated that the cream-colored substance contained cocaine. DNA samples collected from the firearm and the glove were tested and found to be consistent with Centeno's DNA.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 6, 2015, Centeno was indicted for possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 ; possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) ; and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In advance of trial, Centeno moved to suppress all physical evidence seized from the vehicle and any statements attributed to him after the stop because they constituted the fruits of an unlawful arrest. He also contended that the affidavit submitted in support of the warrant to search his car contained false information and requested an evidentiary hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). Because the motion did not make a substantial preliminary showing that the statements made in support of the warrant application were knowingly or recklessly false, the district court denied Centeno's request for a Franks hearing. United States v. Centeno-Gonzalez, No. 15-346 (FAB), 2015 WL 13729918 at *3 (D.P.R. Dec. 31, 2015).

A hearing was held, however, before a magistrate judge on the question of the validity of Centeno's arrest. Id. at *1-3 . In his report and recommendations, the magistrate judge reasoned that Centeno's arrest was unlawful and recommended the suppression of "all tangible evidence gained following the unlawful arrest." Id. at *17. The government timely objected. Upon review, the district court denied the motion to suppress in full, and the evidence obtained from the search was admitted at trial.

During trial, the government also introduced a stipulation and officer testimony regarding Centeno's prior firearm conviction, including evidence that his prior conviction was based on evidence that a firearm had been recovered from a hidden compartment in the dashboard of Centeno's car. For his part, Centeno called a witness who testified that the Toyota Tundra was registered to her and had been purchased by her brother, who had a prior drug conviction. Ultimately, the jury found Centeno guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm but could not reach a unanimous verdict with respect to the drug possession charge and the firearm possession in furtherance of drug trafficking charge.

Centeno timely appealed.

III. THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS

In his primary challenge, Centeno contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence found in the Toyota Tundra after law enforcement officers arrested him, used a firearm-detecting dog to inspect the exterior of the vehicle, and obtained a warrant to search the interior. Centeno challenges the validity of each of these actions.²

When evaluating a motion to suppress, we review de novo all legal conclusions, "including the district court's probable cause and reasonable suspicion determinations, as well as its ultimate decision to grant or deny the motion to suppress." United States v. Tiru-Plaza, 766 F.3d 111, 115 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing, among other authority, United States v. Crespo–Ríos, 645 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 2011) ). The district court's factual determinations are reviewed for clear error. Id. at 114-15. Throughout, we "give appropriate weight to the inferences drawn by the district court and the on-scene officers, recognizing that they possess the advantage of immediacy and familiarity with the witnesses and events." Id. at 115. Consequently, we "will affirm the district court's decision if any reasonable view of the evidence supports it." United States v. McFarlane, 491 F.3d 53, 56 (1st Cir. 2007).

A. The Arrest

Centeno argues first that the district court improperly concluded that his arrest was supported by probable cause and, therefore, was lawful. According to Centeno, the district court relied on only the Toyota Tundra's proximity to the events and a "generic" vehicle description while disregarding factors that cut against probable cause. Under the weight of both the record below and the pertinent case law, this argument crumbles.

As a preliminary matter, Centeno does not argue that it would have been unreasonable for law enforcement officers to stop his car and ask him a few questions. Indeed, the magistrate judge found, and Centeno did not dispute, that the radio transmissions, combined with the officers' observation that Centeno's car seemed to match the description given to the dispatch officer, was enough to provide reasonable suspicion to pull the car over and briefly detain it. Centeno-Gonz...