United States v. Certain Land in State of New Jersey, 18987.
Decision Date | 22 March 1971 |
Docket Number | No. 18987.,18987. |
Citation | 439 F.2d 670 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. CERTAIN LAND IN the CITY OF NEWARK, COUNTY OF ESSEX, STATE OF NEW JERSEY, and the Rector, Wardens and Vestrymen of Grace Church in Newark, a Religious Corporation, et al., Harmil Holding Co., Morris and Helen C. Daniels, Mary Senick, David and Anna K. Daniels, and Krich Bros. Appeal of UNITED STATES REALTY AND INVESTMENT CO. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Morris M. Schnitzer, Kasen, Schnitzer & Kraemer, Newark, N. J. (Waldron Kraemer, Newark, N. J., on the brief) for defendant-appellant.
Glen R. Goodsell, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C. (Shiro Kashiwa, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frederick B. Lacey, U. S. Atty., Donald O'Connor, Asst. U. S. Atty., Newark, N. J., Jacques B. Gelin, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., on the brief), for appellee.
Before GANEY and ADAMS, Circuit Judges, and WEIS, District Judge.
The issue posed in this case is whether a landowner adjoining a city public street which was condemned by the United States, is entitled to compensation for the complete reduction of access to that street as a result of the taking. The district court dismissed the landowner's claim for damages.
The United States, on August 16, 1963, filed a complaint for the taking of a tract of land in the City of Newark, New Jersey, for the construction and maintenance of a building to be used, among other purposes, as a Federal courthouse. On the same day it deposited over half a million dollars — $612,301 — in the registry of the district court to cover the estimated value of the land condemned.
The tract was bounded on the west by Broad Street, on the east by Orchard Street, on the north by Walnut Street, and on the south by land owned by defendant-appellant, United States Realty and Investment Company. Approximately in the middle of this tract was a dead end public street 187½ feet long and 22 feet wide, known as Ardsley Court, which opened into Walnut Street.1 The dead end of Ardsley Court adjoined part of defendant's land.
On defendant's strip of land is a nine-story office building with a 50-foot front on Broad Street and a vacant lot of approximately fifty feet square to the rear. This lot abutted Ardsley at its southeasterly portion, and thus had access to Walnut Street over that small street. To the east of the vacant lot was a one-story brick building which in part abutted the remainder of Ardsley Court's dead end. Access to Orchard Street to the east was available from this building via a 7½ foot wide easement on private land south and east of defendant's land.2
When the time arrived for determining just compensation, if any, to be awarded it defendant waived jury trial and agreed to submit that issue to the district court on a stipulation of fact. In substance the stipulation stated that before the City of Newark had acquired it for a public street, Ardsley Court had been a private alley serving abutting landowners, including the defendant, that at the time of the filing of the declaration of taking, the defendant owned a building to the rear of its office building at 972 Broad Street, and that this building had access to Walnut Street (to the north) over Ardsley Court and to Orchard Street (to the east) over the 7½ foot wide easement, which easement is still in effect. Annexed to the stipulation is a survey or diagram of defendant's property divided into three parcels. The parcel designated as "A" represented the ground on which the office building is situated, the parcel designated as "B" represents the vacant lot, and the parcel designated as "C" represents the land on which the one-story brick building existed before it was torn down.
The district court, after deciding that defendant had sustained no compensable loss by the Government's taking of Ardsley Court, dismissed defendant's claim for compensation. In its opinion (314 F.Supp. 836, D.C.N.J. 1970) preceding the order of dismissal, the district court noted the defendant claims "that it is entitled to compensation in money damages for a diminution in value to its property due to the taking of Ardsley Court by the United States." The court found that (1) none of defendant's land was taken in the condemnation proceeding, and (2) * * *"(Emphasis supplied.) Although the district court did not specifically find that these means of access were reasonable or suitable, since no damages were awarded, we must infer that it found them to be such. Defendant did not ask for a rehearing or seek to have the order amended, but appealed to this Court.
In connection with the finding that none of defendant's land was taken, defendant in its reply brief states that
The district court noted in its opinion that the Government sought to condemn Ardsley Court, but the City agreed to "abandon" it before the proceeding as to that parcel was completed. Ordinarily, the abutting owners' title carries to the center of a right of way, and they, in common with each other, enjoy a private easement over it. When the City acquired Ardsley Court for use as a public street, it may have condemned the fee title to the street along with the private easement in the street possessed by the abutting owners, and paid the latter just compensation for the property taken. If this were the case, the abutting owners were left with nothing more than the right of ingress and egress from their land to the street, and an easement to use, along with the general public, the street for purposes not inconsistent with public use. In other words, their former rights, except ingress and egress, were extinguished. On the other hand, the City may have condemned only the private easement over the street. In this case, the abutting landowners would still own the fee to the middle line, and their private easement would become dormant, and they would obtain the right to use the street as members of the general public along with their private right of ingress and egress. See, for example, Jarman v. Freeman, 112 N.J.Eq. 308, 312-313 (Err. & App. 1912), 85 A. 184, 186. Upon the vacation of the street by the City, the private easement would be revived, Stockhold v. Jackson Tp., 136 N. J.L. 264, 55 A.2d 241 (1947), and the condemnor would be required to pay for its...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Miller v. United States
...of Eminent Domain § 14.2431 (3d rev. ed. 1969); cf. Johnson v. United States, 202 Ct.Cl. 405, 479 F.2d 1383 (1973); United States v. Certain Land, 439 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1971). (4) Incompatible As a result of the taking of the timberlands of the individual plaintiffs, a national park became ......
-
Whitman v. State Highway Commission of Missouri, 1793.
...v. United States, 124 F.2d 945 (8th Cir. 1942); Johnson v. United States, 479 F.2d 1383, 202 Ct.Cl. 405 (1973); United States v. Certain Land, 439 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1971). 16 The exact termini of the construction approval requested were U. S. Highway 54 from immediately east of State Route ......
-
Commissioner of Transportation v. Danbury Road Assoc., No. FST CV 02 0192695 S (CT 3/3/2006)
...to damages for closing of access "where reasonably suitable alternative means of access remain." United States v. Certain Land in the State of New Jersey, 439 F.2d 670, 673 (3d.Cir. 1971). Reasonable access presents a question of fact. Damages merely for circuity of access have been conside......
-
W.R. Assoc of Norwalk v. Comm'r of Transp.
...closing off of access to a highway where reasonably suitable alternative means of access remain." United States v. Certain Land in the State of New Jersey, 439 F.2d 670, 673 (3d Cir. 1971). "What constitutes reasonable access is a question of fact." Id. It is well known that damages resulti......