United States v. CERTAIN LANDS, ETC.

Decision Date08 June 1945
Docket Number841,777,771,875,827,987,1000,874,781,767,811,1010,835,877,817,997,797,1021.,1015,No. 765,805,791,995,985,1001,865,991,785,810,807,765
Citation61 F. Supp. 199
PartiesUNITED STATES v. CERTAIN LANDS IN ST. CHARLES COUNTY, MO., KNOWN AS WELDON SPRING AREA.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Harry C. Blanton, U. S. Atty., of Sikeston, Mo., and M. Walker Cooper, Sp. Asst. U. S. Atty., and Russell Vandivort, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of St. Louis, Mo. (J. Edward Williams, Acting Head, Lands Division, and Victor C. McCrea, Atty., Department of Justice, both of Washington, D. C., of counsel), for plaintiff.

William R. Gentry, Samuel M. Watson, William R. Gilbert, Harry Richards, William H. Allen, Igoe, Carroll, Keefe & Coburn, and Robert P. Elam, all of St. Louis, Mo., Webster Karrenbrock, B. H. Dyer, and Theodore C. Bruere, Jr., all of St. Charles, Mo., Redick O'Bryan, of St. Louis, Mo., and Caldwell, Downing, Noble & Garrity and Adams, Adams & Adams, all of Kansas City, Mo., for defendants.

MOORE, District Judge.

All of these cases, except Numbers 807 and 874, now come before this Court on motions filed in each by the plaintiff, United States of America, for entry of judgment in the amount of the compensation fixed in certain option contracts, but without interest thereon, and certain counter-motions by defendants asking for judgment with interest on the principal amounts since the date of taking. Numbers 807 and 874 (Muschany and Andrews cases) are here on motions by the plaintiff to delete interest from judgments already entered, but the issues therein presented differ only slightly. This opinion is to be considered as filed in and ruling all of the above numbered separate proceedings.

The lengthy history of this condemnation litigation is already adequately documented in the Reports and needs no further recitation. The facts of the original proceedings appear in the contrary opinions of District Court Judges Davis and Collet, United States v. Certain Land Situate in St. Charles County, Mo., et al., D. C., 46 F.Supp. 921, and United States v. 94.68 Acres of Land in St. Charles County, Mo., et al., D.C., 45 F.Supp. 1016; in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in United States v. Muschany, 139 F.2d 661; and in the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 65 S.Ct. 442. In addition, the facts surrounding the present motions are ably stated in the opinion of Judge Hulen filed in Division No. 2 of this Court on the 4th day of May, 1945, 60 F.Supp. 741, covering identical motions in companion cases to those now before this division. The issues here presented differ in no respect from those decided by Judge Hulen and, with the above references to source materials where the facts may be found, the Court will state its views and holding on the issues presented, which, I deeply regret, are not in accord with those of my learned brother Hulen.

After careful consideration of the various submitted briefs of counsel, the real issues presented for decision appear to be four in number: First, the question is raised whether there is anything in the facts of these cases that makes them a particular type of condemnation proceeding to which that part of the Statute allowing interest to landowners does not apply; second, whether if in such a condemnation proceeding interest is ever allowable, these landowners have by any contract, election, waiver, stipulation or option done anything to waive, give up, or bar themselves from, a right that they might otherwise have; third, whether, if the landowners are entitled to interest, they are entitled to it from the date of the actual taking or only from the date of the filing of the declaration of taking; and, fourth, whether the original decrees entered only in the Andrews and Muschany cases (those appealed to the Supreme Court), which expressly provide for interest, are final and binding on the interest issue in those two cases and, also, binding as precedent or through special agreement of the Government in all the other cases. The Court will discuss the above issues seriatim.

There is no dispute between the parties that the general rule is (absent a contract or statute evincing a contrary intent) that interest does not run against the United States upon claims or contracts even though there has been an unreasonable delay or default in the payment of the principal upon the part of the Government. Tillson v. United States, 100 U.S. 43, 25 L.Ed. 543; United States v. North America Transportation & Trading Co., 253 U.S. 330, 40 S.Ct. 518, 64 L.Ed. 935; United States ex rel. Angarica de la Rua v. Bayard, 127 U.S. 251, 8 S.Ct. 1156, 32 L.Ed. 159; United States v. State of North Carolina, 136 U.S. 211, 10 S.Ct. 920, 34 L. Ed. 336; Smyth v. United States, 302 U.S. 329, 58 S.Ct. 248, 82 L.Ed. 294, 114 A.L.R. 807. Likewise, there is no dispute that in ordinary condemnation proceedings an exception is made which Congress has by statute approved and codified. 40 U.S.C.A. § 258a; Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 43 S.Ct. 354, 67 L.Ed. 664; United States v. Rogers, 255 U.S. 163, 41 S.Ct. 281, 65 L.Ed. 566. The parts of said Statute material here are:

"In any proceeding in any court of the United States outside of the District of Columbia which has been or may be instituted by and in the name of and under the authority of the United States for the acquisition of any land or easement or right of way in land for the public use, the petitioner may file in the cause, with the petition or at any time before judgment, a declaration of taking signed by the authority empowered by law to acquire the lands described in the petition, declaring that said lands are thereby taken for the use of the United States. * * *

"Upon the filing said declaration of taking and of the deposit in the court, to the use of the persons entitled thereto, of the amount of the estimated compensation stated in said declaration, title to the said lands in fee simple absolute, or such less estate or interest therein as is specified in said declaration, shall vest in the United States of America, and said lands shall be deemed to be condemned and taken for the use of the United States, and the right to just compensation for the same shall vest in the persons entitled thereto; and said compensation shall be ascertained and awarded in said proceeding and established by judgment therein, and the said judgment shall include, as part of the just compensation awarded, interest at the rate of 6 per centum per annum on the amount finally awarded as the value of the property as of the date of taking, from said date to the date of payment; but interest shall not be allowed on so much thereof as shall have been paid into the court. No sum so paid into the court shall be charged with commissions or poundage.

"Upon the application of the parties in interest, the court may order that the money deposited in the court, or any part thereof, be paid forthwith for or on account of the just compensation to be awarded in said proceeding. If the compensation finally awarded in respect of said lands, or any parcel thereof, shall exceed the amount of the money so received by any person entitled, the court shall enter judgment against the United States for the amount of the deficiency." (Emphasis the Court's)

The difference of opinion between the parties first arises on the question of whether the particular facts here cause these proceedings to be a type of condemnation proceeding to which that part of the statute relating to interest is inapplicable.

The Court is of the opinion that under the policy of Congress, as expressed by the above statute, and under the facts, there is no valid reason why these landowners should not receive the benefit of the statutory exception. It is true that the negotiations between the Government and the landowners originally resulted in option contracts. It is also true that those contracts provided for condemnation proceedings under certain restricted circumstances. Those facts, however, do not change the circumstance that there are now before this Court condemnation proceedings brought under the general condemnation statute and in no respect different from any other like proceedings except in the method of ascertaining the value of the land. These are not friendly condemnation proceedings for the purpose of clearing title but, as the long history of litigation prior to these motions will readily prove, they are as completely antagonistic and adversary actions as this Court has ever seen. These proceedings for condemnation were certainly not brought within the terms of the option contracts, since those options provide only for friendly proceedings "if for any reason the title to the land is not approved by the Attorney General." It is certain that no other type of condemnation proceeding was within the contemplation of the parties when the option contracts were entered into. The history of these cases shows that the Government brought these actions as straight adversary condemnation proceedings, in complete disregard of the option contracts, and that the entrance of those contracts into the issues was by way of equitable defense on the part of the landowners. Those option contracts have played a part, therefore, in these proceedings to the extent of fixing the worth of the land, but it would be completely erroneous to say that they in any way make these a different type of condemnation proceeding, or that those options have been specifically enforced in their entirety.

Such being the facts, no reason appears on the face of the Statute why these landowners, different from any other landowners, should be divested of the right to interest on the deficiencies of their awards. The statute merely provides that "said compensation shall be ascertained and awarded in said proceeding and...

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6 cases
  • Dresser v. United States, Civ. No. 2332.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Oklahoma
    • April 23, 1949
    ...91 L.Ed. 532; United States v. New York Rayon Importing Co., Inc., 329 U.S. 654, 660, 67 S.Ct. 601, 91 L. Ed. 577; United States v. Certain Lands, D.C.E.D.Mo., 61 F.Supp. 199, affirmed 329 U.S. 599, 67 S.Ct. 606, 91 L.Ed. 532; Busser v. United States, supra; Huntley v Southern Oregon Sales,......
  • Albrecht v. United States Linnenbringer v. Same Pitman v. Same Oliver v. Same Realty Investment Co v. Same 151 155
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • February 3, 1947
    ...did not provide for it. One District Court decided this question in favor of the Government, 60 F.Supp. 741, but two decided against it. 61 F.Supp. 199.3 The Circuit Court of Ap- peals held for the Government. 8 Cir., 155 F.2d 73, 77. In a case involving somewhat similar facts, United State......
  • United States v. Muschany, 13234
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • June 10, 1946
    ...filed motions to modify the judgments by deleting the provisions with reference to the payment of interest on the awards. The court, 61 F.Supp. 199, denied the motions to modify, mainly upon the ground that the opinion and mandates of the Supreme Court precluded any modification of the judg......
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    • United States
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    • April 14, 1947
    ...Realty & Investment Company v. United States; Linnenbringer, et al. v. United States, Pitman, et al. v. United States) 155 F.2d 77; 61 F.Supp. 199, and Oliver v. United States, 155 F.2d 73, 60 F.Supp. 741, holding that the landowners were not entitled to interest in addition to amount under......
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