United States v. Chadwick, 8468.

• Decision Date: 18 April 1940
• Docket Number: No. 8468.,8468.
• Citation: 39 F. Supp. 204
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. CHADWICK.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

39 F. Supp. 204

UNITED STATES v. CHADWICK.

No. 8468.

District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania.

April 18, 1940.

J. Cullen Ganey, U. S. Atty., and Edw. A. Kallick, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

John J. Gain and Robert C. Duffy, both of Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.

KALODNER, District Judge.

Counts 1 to 7 of the information under review charge the defendant with engaging in interstate operation on the public highways as a common carrier of property by motor vehicle without a certificate of public convenience and necessity, in violation of Sections 306(a), as amended, and 322(a), of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, as amended, 49 U.S.C.A.

Counts 8 to 14, inclusive, charge defendant with engaging in the transportation of property in interstate commerce as a common carrier by motor vehicle without having on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission the rate or charge for such transportation, in violation of Sections 317(d) and 322(a) of the Motor Carrier Act, supra.

Count 15 charges the defendant with engaging in the transportation of property in interstate commerce as a common carrier and failing and refusing to issue a receipt or bill of lading for such property, in violation of Sections 319 and 322(a) of the Motor Carrier Act, supra.

The motion to quash asserts that the information is "uncertain, vague and indefinite, etc." Additionally, counsel for the defendant advances the novel contention that even though he violated the law in operating without a certificate from Chester, Penna., to various points in the State of Delaware, he is not subject to the criminal penalty provisions of Section 322(a) because he is a certificated carrier elsewhere in the United States, and therefore is subject only to disciplinary action by the Interstate Commerce Commission, under Section 312(a). The latter section provides that the Commission may, upon complaint or on its own initiative, after notice and hearing, suspend, change or revoke any certificate where the holder violates its terms or the provisions of the Motor Carrier Act. Still a third contention advanced in support of the motion to quash is that Section 303(b) (6) specifically exempts from the operation of the Act motor vehicles used in carrying agricultural commodities, and that poultry feed, sauer kraut, and peas, which the information charges to have been hauled by the defendant, are agricultural commodities.

As to the defendant's first contention —that the information is "uncertain, vague and indefinite, and does not with sufficient particularity and accuracy set out any offense known to the law":

There is no substance to that contention. All that is required of the information is that it must charge every element of the crime in order that the accused and the court may know the exact offense intended to be charged and the record be sufficient to support an appeal of formal acquittal or conviction. Nelson F. Evans v. United States, 153 U.S. 584, 14 S.Ct. 934, 38 L.Ed. 830; Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 5 Cir., 88 F.2d 31.

The information under review not only contains all of the elements of the offenses charged but gives dates and names of consignor and consignee; complete description of the property transported; the points between...