United States v. Chan Nom Gee
| Decision Date | 06 March 1931 |
| Docket Number | No. 8187.,8187. |
| Citation | 47 F.2d 758 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES v. CHAN NOM GEE. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington |
Anthony Savage, U. S. Dist. Atty., of Seattle, Wash., and John T. McCutcheon, Asst. U. S. Dist. Atty., of Tacoma, Wash.
Hugh C. Todd, of Seattle, Wash., for defendant.
CUSHMAN, District Judge (after stating the facts as above).
It has been contended that because of the right of appeal from the judgment of Judge Neterer that this proceeding is unauthorized. In the opinion of Judge Neterer (part of Defendant's Exhibit 1) he states:
* * *"
Therefore appellant's contention now made is groundless.
But one other question argued upon the appeal will be considered. The appellant is twenty-seven years old. He was taken into custody or arrested by Inspector Voligny, and later questioned by Immigration Inspector Sanderson, after which the complaint for his deportation was filed with United States Commissioner Bowman.
A transcript of the examination of appellant by Inspector Sanderson was admitted upon the trial had in this court. Upon the part of appellant it is contended that statements made by the defendant in response to questions directed to him by the immigration inspector at a time when the defendant was under illegal arrest cannot lawfully be considered. Objection has been made throughout the proceedings before the commissioner and before this court to the consideration of such statements.
If the statements made to the inspector upon such examination are admissible, they show the appellant to be a full-blooded Chinese person born in China. If such be the fact, appellant has not maintained the burden that the law puts upon him of establishing his right to be in the United States.
The question therefore for consideration is whether evidence as to the statements so made by the appellant is admissible. The exhibit referred to, and admitted in evidence, recites:
In view of the foregoing and the examination as a whole, there is nothing to indicate that the statements made by the appellant to the inspector upon such examination were other than voluntary. There has been no contention made on behalf of appellant that he is an American citizen or that he was born in the United States. He did not testify in this case and the court has had no view of his person.
The appellant relies upon the dissenting opinion of Judge Anderson in Charley Hee v. United States (C. C. A.) 19 F.(2d) 335, 338, and the fact that the case was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States (Charley Hee v. United States, 276 U. S. 638, 48 S. Ct. 300, 72 L. Ed. 745), from which it is argued that the Supreme Court approves the reasons given by Judge Anderson for his dissent. Such deduction is unwarranted, for the case was reversed and remanded upon stipulation of counsel on motion of the Solicitor General. It likewise is to be noted that in that case there was credible evidence that the defendant had been in Boston twenty-two or twenty-three years. he was arrested and the examination of which complaint was made immediately had. It was also shown that he registered for the draft in 1918; that he claimed to be a native-born citizen of the United States and that he contended upon the trial in the District Court that the answers given by him upon the examination by the inspector were made while the defendant was scared; that he was afraid; that he was "up-set and kind of dizzy." No such contention was made in this case.
In the present proceeding the statements made in answer to the inspector's questions were admissible in evidence. Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U. S. 460, 469-470, 32 S. Ct. 734, 56 L. Ed. 1165; Ng Kai Ben v. Weedin (C. C. A.) 44 F.(2d) 315; Ex parte Keizo Kamiyama (C. C. A.) 44 F.(2d) 503; Ex part Ematsu Kishimoto (C. C. A.) 32 F.(2d) 991; Chan Wong v. Nagle (C. C. A.) 17 F.(2d) 987; Seif v. Nagle (C. C. A.) 14 F.(2d) 416; Mok Nuey Tau v. White (C. C. A.) 244 F. 742; Ah Lin v. United States (C. C. A.) 20 F.(2d) 107; United States v. Hung Chang (C. C. A.) 134 F. 19; Bak Kun v. United States (C. C. A.) 195 F. 53; Toy Dip v. United States (C. C. A.) 198 F. 603; Guiney v. Bonham (C. C. A.) 261 F. 582, 8 A. L. R. 1282; Ex part Ah Sue (D. C.) 270 F. 356; Ex parte Cahan (D. C.) 42 F.(2d) 664.
Many of the above-cited cases were habeas corpus proceedings brought following executive orders of deportation. While it is true that executive hearings for deportation are more summary in their nature than judicial proceedings and that in some respects there may be lawfully considered on such executive hearings evidence that would not be admitted in a judicial proceeding, yet in so far as the admissibility of evidence depends upon whether the statement of the party defendant is voluntary, there is no such distinction.
It will be further noted that the appellant, in so far as any right of his to be or remain in the United States is concerned, other than stated above, remained mute.
In Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U. S. 149, 44 S. Ct. 54, 68 L. Ed. 221, a case in some respects analogous, in which the deportation of an alien, not Chinese, was ordered and it was contended by such alien that his statement that he was an alien was inadmissible because made while he was in custody, the Supreme Court said (at page 153 of 263 U. S....
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