United States v. Chaplin

• Decision Date: 14 April 1944
• Docket Number: Criminal No. 16616,16618 O'C.
• Citation: 54 F. Supp. 926
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. CHAPLIN et al. (two cases).
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of California

54 F. Supp. 926

UNITED STATES v. CHAPLIN et al. (two cases).

Criminal Nos. 16616, 16618 O'C.

District Court, S. D. California, Central Division.

April 14, 1944.

Charles H. Carr, U.S. Atty., of Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff.

Hazard & Reina, of Beverly Hills, Cal., and J. E. Simpson, of Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant Charles H. Griffin.

J. F. T. O'CONNOR, District Judge.

An indictment was returned and filed on February 10, 1944, action number 16,616, against the defendants named, alleging a violation of section 88, Title 18 U.S.C.A. (the conspiracy statute). An indictment was returned and filed on February 10, 1944, in action number 16,618 against the defendants named, alleging a violation of section 52, Title 18 U.S.C.A. (depriving citizens of civil rights under color of state laws).

The defendant, Charles H. Griffin, interposed a plea in bar to each indictment.

A plea, to be good as a bar to the whole indictment, must meet the whole case, and if it does not, it will be held bad upon demurrer. Moore v. State of Mississippi, 21 Wall. 636, 88 U.S. 636, 22 L.Ed. 653.

A plea in bar to indictment raises an issue and affords prosecution an opportunity to meet it. Capone v. Aderhold, 5 Cir., 65 F.2d 130.

On determination of sufficiency of defendant's plea in bar, indictment was to be considered part of the record. United States v. Noble, D.C., 19 F.Supp. 527.

Judge James, in United States v. Schouwiler, D.C., 19 F.2d 387, held plea in bar following Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 47 S.Ct. 531, 535, 71 L.Ed. 793. In that case the court said:

"The issue whether the ship was seized within the prescribed limit did not affect the question of the defendants' guilt or innocence. It only affected the right of the court to hold their persons for trial. It was necessarily preliminary to that trial. The proper way of raising the issue of fact of the place of seizure was by a plea to the jurisdiction".

Also, United States v. Ferris, D.C., 19 F.2d 925, is authority for this contention. United States v. Mason, 213 U.S. 115, 29 S.Ct. 480, 53 L.Ed. 725.

The subject, "Special Pleas in Bar", is discussed fully in 22 Corpus Juris Secundum, Criminal Law, page 682, § 436, a, b. For a more recent discussion of pleas in bar, see opinion by Mr. Justice Reed in Edwards v. United States, 312 U.S. 473, 61 S.Ct. 669, 85 L.Ed. 957.

This court takes judicial notice of the statutes and judicial decisions of the State of California. Pennington v. Gibson, 16 How. 65, 57 U.S. 65, 14 L.Ed. 847; Factor v. Laubenheimer, 289 U.S. 713, 53 S.Ct. 523, 77 L.Ed. 1467, affirmed 290 U.S. 276, 54 S.Ct. 191, 78 L.Ed. 315; Flanigan v. Security-First National Bank of Los Angeles, D.C., 41 F.Supp. 77.

The city court of Beverly Hills was established under the Municipal Corporation Act. Deerings General Laws, Act 5233, §§ 882 to 884. Under the Act the judge of the city court of Beverly Hills is appointed by the City Council under the provisions of sec. 851 et seq., and holds office "during the pleasure of said city council".

The indictments allege:

"that prior to and on December 30, 1942 and at all times mentioned herein, Charles H. Griffin was the duly appointed judge of the city court of Beverly Hills and was acting in that capacity under and pursuant to the laws of the State of California and ordinances and regulations of the municipality of Beverly Hills, California, creating the office of judge of the city court and prescribing the duties thereof."

Judge Griffin, in urging upon this court his plea in bar, contends that he is immune from indictment and prosecution for judicial acts performed by him in judicial proceedings pending in his court and within the jurisdiction thereof, and that for such acts and conduct he is amenable only to the people of the City of Beverly Hills, California and the duly constituted officials thereof, and that for any alleged misconduct in office, judges of such courts are subject only to removal from office, as prescribed by the laws of the State of California, and he then sets forth in detail the record of proceedings in his court in connection with the sentence imposed upon Joan Berry.

The statutes of California vest in the city court of the City of Beverly Hills jurisdiction over certain crimes and misdemeanors committed within the territorial limits of said City of Beverly Hills, California, and offenses under and against the laws of the State of California, and said jurisdiction includes the offense of vagrancy defined and punished by sec. 647 of the Penal Code of the state.

Judge Griffin offered to prove that: On January 2, 1943, a complaint was sworn to before him as judge by C. C. Garrison, charging one Joan Berry with the crime of violating sec. 647, subdivision 3, of the California Penal Code, to-wit, the crime of vagrancy, alleged to have been committed by said Joan Berry in Beverly Hills, California, on January 1, 1943, and attaching a correct copy of the complaint to his plea; also that on January 2, 1943, Joan Berry was arraigned in the said city court upon said criminal complaint, Judge Griffin presiding; that Joan Berry was personally present and that she was informed of the charge against her contained in said complaint; that she was advised of her legal rights as follows:

"The court advises you that you have a right to a speedy and public trial and hearing. You are entitled to process of the court to compel attendance of witnesses on your behalf and to be confronted by witnesses against you. You are entitled to the aid of counsel at all stages of the proceedings. You are entitled to be admitted to bail."

That said Joan Berry pleaded guilty; that she was sentenced to serve 90 days in the Los Angeles County Jail; execution was suspended and she was placed on probation; that as a condition of probation she was to keep out of the City of Beverly Hills, California, and to pay certain hotel bills owing by her; that the said Judge Griffin offered a true and correct copy of the city court proceedings held on January 2, 1943 and attached the same to his plea; that thereafter a nunc pro tunc order was made and entered by said court correcting the Minutes of January 2, 1943, to fix the probation period as one year; that thereafter the said city court found Joan Berry guilty of violating the probation granted to her and she was required to serve 30 days in the county jail, suspending 60 days. That thereafter on May 12, 1943, the court further modified the sentence by suspending the execution of 85 instead of 60 days and ordered said Joan Berry released from jail and permitted Joan Berry to come to Beverly Hills for the purpose of consulting her attorney; that thereafter on June 11, 1943, Joan Berry was permitted to withdraw her plea of guilty and enter a plea of not guilty and the action was dismissed.

The remainder of the plea is a denial of the charges made against him in the indictments.

This brings us to the question of the immunity of a judge acting in his judicial capacity and within his jurisdiction in imposing sentence and probation upon a person charged with an offense in his court to which the defendant has pleaded guilty.

The attention of this court has not been called to any decision directly in point, and the court has not found such a decision.

In action No. 16,618, the indictment of the Grand Jury was found under sec. 52, Title 18 U.S.C.A., which provides as follows:

"Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, wilfully subjects, or causes to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. (R.S. § 5510; Mar. 4, 1909, c. 321, § 20, 35 Stat. 1092.)"

This statute is known as the Act of May 31, 1870, c. 116, 16 Stat. 144, which was repealed by sec. 341 of the Act of March 4, 1909, c. 321, 35 Stat. 1153. The only change in substance in the amended law above was the insertion of the words, "or District" after the word, "Territory".

It is worthy of note that in nearly three-quarters of a century no similar action has been passed upon by a court of record. The court is assisted in its decision by the decisions of our courts where judges have been sued by disappointed litigants in their courts. A long line of decisions over a period of years which marks the span of our national existence, has held the judges immune in such instances.

As far back as the case of Fray v. Blackburn, 3 Best & S. 576, 122 Eng. Reprint, 217, "a judge of the Court of Queen's Bench was sued for a judicial act, and on a demurrer the point was taken that there was no allegation of malice. The plaintiff thereupon moved to amend by introducing an allegation of malice and corruption. The application to amend was denied, and, in denying it, the court said: `It is a principle of our law that no action will lie against a judge of one of our superior courts for a judicial act though it be alleged to have been done maliciously and corruptly; therefore the proposed allegation would not make the declaration good. The public are deeply interested in this rule, which indeed exists for their benefit, and was established in order to secure the independence of the judges, and prevent their being harassed by vexatious actions.'"

This principle is firmly established by many English authorities. Mostyn v. Fabrigas, Cowp. pt. 1, p. 161, 98 Eng. Reprint, 1021; Lowther v. Radnor, 8 East, 113, 103 English Reprint, 287; Holroyd v. Breare, 2 Barn. & Ald. 773, 106 Eng. Reprint, 439; Fawcett v. Fowlis, 7 Barn. & C. 394, 108 Eng. Reprint, 770; Mills v. Collett, 6 Bing. 85, 130 Eng. Reprint,...