United States v. Chapman
| Decision Date | 31 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. CR 14-1065 JB,CR 14-1065 JB |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. LESLIE CHAPMAN, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
THIS MATTER comes before Court on Mr. Chapman's Sentencing Memorandum and Objections to the Presentence Report, filed February 17, 2014 (Doc. 103)("Memo."). The Court held a sentencing hearing on March 4, 2015. The primary issues are: (i) whether the Court has the authority to sentence Defendant Leslie Chapman to a conditional discharge; and (ii) if the Court may impose a conditional discharge, whether it should do so in this case. Because a conditional discharge is a like punishment to which L. Chapman could be sentenced in state court, the Court has the authority to impose a conditional discharge. The Court will not, however, sentence L. Chapman to a conditional discharge, because it would be contrary to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)'s factors. Accordingly, the Court will grant in part and deny in part L. Chapman's requests in the Memo.
The Court takes its facts from the Presentence Investigation Report, disclosed January 22, 2015 ("PSR"), that the United States Probation Office ("USPO") prepared. The PSR's factualsection states the version of events that the victim -- Dana Chapman1 -- told the investigating officer and the version that L. Chapman told the officer. See PSR ¶ 7-10, at 4-6. Because a jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that L. Chapman is guilty, despite him testifying to his version of events at trial, the Court will repeat only D. Chapman's version of events, which is what the jury likely found to be true.
L. Chapman and D. Chapman were staying at an apartment in the Veterans Affairs Hospital in Albuquerque, New Mexico, on January 26, 2014, where L. Chapman was recovering from surgery. See PSR ¶¶ 6-7, at 4-5. D. Chapman left their room around 6:30 p.m. to go to the store while L. Chapman stayed in the room to sleep. See PSR ¶ 7, at 5. When D. Chapman returned, an hour later, L. Chapman began yelling at her, asking her where she had been. See PSR ¶ 7, at 5. D. Chapman told L. Chapman that she ran errands, rented a movie, and talked to her mother on the telephone. See PSR ¶ 7, at 5. L. Chapman did not believe her, so D. Chapman dialed her mother's number and put the telephone on speaker to verify her story. See PSR ¶ 7, at 5. L. Chapman grabbed the telephone and smashed it against the bed post. See PSR ¶ 7, at 5. He then picked up D. Chapman's purse and emptied its contents on the floor. See PSR ¶ 7, at 5. With his right hand, L. Chapman grabbed D. Chapman near her neck. See PSR ¶ 7, at 5. D. Chapman pushed him off of her, and he continued to grab her arms and to push her. See PSR ¶ 7, at 5. L. Chapman scratched D. Chapman as she tried to get away and hit her in the temple with his left hand. See PSR ¶ 7, at 5. D. Chapman urinated in her pants because she was afraid of what L. Chapman might do to her. See PSR ¶ 7, at 5. D. Chapman attempted to hit L. Chapman in the face, but missed. See PSR ¶ 7, at 5. L. Chapman moved to the side, whichallowed D. Chapman to get past him. See PSR ¶ 7, at 5. L. Chapman hit D. Chapman in the back of the head with something hard and continued to hit her on both sides of her lower back, near her hips. See PSR ¶ 7, at 5. D. Chapman was finally able to get out of the room, and she began to run down the hall while yelling for help and knocking on doors until a couple opened the door to another room, let D. Chapman inside, and called the police. See PSR ¶ 7, at 5.
L. Chapman was charged, under Count 1, with "unlawfully touch[ing] and apply[ing] force to a person of a household member with intent to injure that person, and in doing so caus[ing] painful temporary disfigurement and temporary loss and impairment of the function of any member of the body," in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 13 and N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 30-3-16(B) and 31-19-1(A). Amended Information, filed April 4, 2014 (Doc. 12)("Information"). He was charged, under Count 2, with "prevent[ing], obstruct[ing], and delay[ing] the sending, transmitting, conveying and delivering of any message, communication and report by and through telephone," in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 13 and N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 30-12-1(D) and 31-19-1(A). Information at 2.2 L. Chapman was arrested on January 26, 2014, and served three days in jail before being released. See PSR at 1. After a three-day trial, the jury convicted L. Chapman on Count 1 and acquitted him on Count 2. See Verdict, filed October 31, 2014 (Doc. 95).
On January 22, 2015, the USPO disclosed the PSR. See PSR at 1. The PSR notes that L. Chapman's offense level is 6. See PSR ¶ 24, at 8. The PSR does not state any reductions or enhancements to L. Chapman's offense level, making his total offense level 6. See PSR ¶ 32,at 8. The PSR does not note any prior convictions, and states that L. Chapman's criminal history is 0 putting him in criminal history category I. See PSR ¶¶ 34-37, at 8-9. The PSR states that the maximum term of imprisonment is 1 year and that, for an offense level of 6 and a criminal history category I, the Guidelines imprisonment range is 0 to 6 months. See PSR ¶ 61, at 13. The PSR notes that L. Chapman is eligible for up to 5-years probation and that, if probation is imposed, the Guidelines provide that the probationary term should be more than 1 year, but not more than 5 years. See PSR ¶¶ 65-66, at 13.
The PSR states that, a few months after the incident, D. Chapman discovered that she had two broken ribs from the attack. See PSR ¶ 21, at 7. According to the PSR, D. Chapman is requesting $894.25 in restitution for expenses concerning the broken ribs and the incident, including the cost for a hotel room and plane ticket after the incident. See PSR ¶ 21, at 7.
L. Chapman filed the Memo. on February 17, 2015. See Memo. at 1. He argues that, because he was convicted of a New Mexico state offense under the Assimilated Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13, ("ACA"), he should be sentenced under to New Mexico law. Memo. ¶ 6, at 3. He objects to the PSR's failure to include available state sentencing options, which he asserts include a conditional discharge.3 See Memo. ¶ 8, at 4. L. Chapman also contends that the PSR inaccurately reflects his financial condition. See Memo. ¶ 9, at 4. He argues that the Courtshould deny D. Chapman's restitution requests, because he already paid for the expenses she incurred after the incident -- the hotel and plane ticket -- when D. Chapman paid for those expenses with L. Chapman's credit card. See Memo. ¶ 12, at 4-6. L. Chapman states that he is willing to pay restitution for medical expenses following the incident if D. Chapman can provide proper documentation for those expenses. See Memo. ¶ 12, 6.
According to L. Chapman, the ACA's goal is to promote intrastate sentencing uniformity, and the Court should use New Mexico law to sentence him. See Memo. ¶¶ 12-14, at 7. L. Chapman argues that, because he was convicted of a misdemeanor, and because he has never been convicted or charged with any other offense in the past, he qualifies for a conditional discharge under New Mexico law. See Memo. ¶ 14, at 7-8. He contends that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)'s factors support the Court imposing a conditional discharge. See Memo. ¶¶ 16-17, at 8-10. L. Chapman asserts that the nature and circumstances of the case and his history and characteristics support a conditional discharge. See Memo. ¶¶ 18-28, at 10-14.
On February 25, 2015, the Plaintiff United States of America responded to the Memo. See United States' Response to Defendant's Sentencing Memorandum and the Request for Conditional Discharge (Dkt. 103), filed February 25, 2015 (Doc. 104)("Response"). The United States opposes L. Chapman's request for a conditional discharge and asks the Court to sentence him to 4-years probation. See Response at 4. It asserts that the Court may not impose a conditional discharge, because, while the Court "assimilated the state statute to meet a federal purpose and fill an[] enforcement gap, the offense of conviction was a misdemeanor under Federal law." Response at 5 (emphasis in original). According to the United States, under the ACA, the assimilated state statute becomes a federal statute, meaning that federal courts are free to construe it and that state interpretation is purely advisory. See Response at 5-6. The UnitedStates contends that the ACA requires only like punishment for like offenses, which does not mean identical punishment. See Response at 6. It states that courts decline to assimilate or adopt state sentencing provisions if they conflict with federal law or with federal sentencing policies. See Response at 6 (citing United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 291-93 (1958); United States v. Wood, 386 F.3d 961, 963 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. Pate, 321 F.3d 1373, 1376 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Ross, 487 F.3d 1120, 1124 (8th Cir. 2007)). The United States argues that the ACA requires sentencing to fall within the maximum and minimum terms of imprisonment which state law establishes, but that all other sentencing considerations are derived from federal law and policies. See Response at 7 (citing United States v. Garcia, 893 F.2d 250, 254 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. Norquay, 905 F.2d 1157, 1161 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Martinez, 274 F.3d 897, 906 (5th Cir. 2001)).
The United States asserts that a conditional discharge is contrary to federal sentencing policies, because it allows the Court to place L. Chapman on probation without entering an adjudication of guilt. See Response at 7. It states that diversionary dispositions result from a finding of guilt and is counted as a sentence under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(c), even if a conviction is not formally entered. See Response at 8 (citing U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(f); United States v. Dell, 359 F.3d 1347, 1349-50 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. Cox, 934 F.2d 1114, 1124 (10th Cir. 1990))....
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