United States v. Charnizon

• Decision Date: 22 August 1967
• Docket Number: No. 4273.,No. 4274.,4273.,4274.
• Citation: 232 A.2d 586
• Parties: UNITED STATES, Appellant, v. Morris CHARNIZON, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

232 A.2d 586

UNITED STATES, Appellant, v. Morris CHARNIZON, Appellee.

No. 4273.

No. 4274.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued July 10, 1967.

Decided August 22, 1967.

Thomas Lumbard, Asst. U. S. Atty. for appellant. David G. Bress, U. S. Atty., Frank Q. Nebeker and Charles R. Work, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellant.

Frederick C. Timberlake, Washington, D.C., for appellee.

Before HOOD, Chief Judge, and MYERS and KELLY, Associate Judges.

MYERS, Associate Judge.

On October 23, 1962, appellee was charged in the trial court with two counts of false pretenses, D.C.Code § 24-301 (1961), in that he allegedly cashed checks for which there were insufficient funds on deposit. On the same date he was committed to the District of Columbia General Hospital for mental observation under D.C. Code § 24-301(a) (1961). On November 21, 1962, the hospital reported him competent to stand trial and that the crimes with which he was charged were the product of a mental illness. On November 23, 1962, appellee interposed the defense of insanity to both charges and was found not guilty for that reason, resulting in his automatic commitment to Saint Elizabeths Hospital in accordance with the provisions of D.C. Code § 24-301(d) (1961). On April 27, 1964, the superintendent of that hospital certified that appellee was sufficiently recovered to be conditionally released. Thereafter, on May 20, 1964, pursuant to court order, appellee was released upon the following conditions: that he reside at the home of his mother in New York; that he seek employment there; that he establish contact with a specified psychiatric clinic in New York; that he remain on the rolls of the hospital and maintain contact with the hospital; and that he be returned to Saint Elizabeths if, in the opinion of the doctors, he did not demonstrate a suitable adjustment to the community.

On January 20, 1966, appellee voluntarily returned to the hospital here. Some months later he filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia a petition for release on a writ of habeas corpus. Following a hearing on November 14, 1966, the District Court judge concluded that appellee's detention was illegal and not authorized by the original order of November 23, 1962, inasmuch as he had been conditionally released from that commitment, and that although appellee might have been detained a reasonable time for observation to determine whether his conditional release should be revoked, "the period of almost eight months

[exceeded] the reasonable limits of such detention." Appellee was ordered released from custody, but execution of the order was stayed to December 5, 1966, to allow the institution of appropriate proceedings in the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions for revocation of appellee's conditional release.

On November 21, 1966, the superintendent of the hospital reported to the United States Attorney in this jurisdiction that if appellee were released he would be a danger to himself or others and requested that steps be taken to revoke his conditional release. A motion for that purpose was then filed. At a hearing upon this motion on December 16, 1966, in the Court of General Sessions, a hospital psychiatrist testified that appellee had not complied with the terms of his conditional release and had gone to Miami where he ran up a hotel bill of $2,701.00, for which he gave a bad check. He stated appellee was still suffering from a mental illness and expressed the opinion that if appellee were allowed to remain at liberty he would be a danger to himself or to others "in the sense of writing bad checks." Appellee offered no evidence on his own behalf. The trial judge denied the motion to revoke the conditional release from Saint Elizabeths Hospital and sua sponte directed that appellee be unconditionally released. In so ruling, the trial judge stated:

Here is a man * * * he has been locked up for nine months already * * This case arose out of a sum of money less than $100.00. In November of [1962] he was found to be of unsound mind. * * * there are dangers and dangers. I have a respect for money, but it is only money. We have to weigh the absolute fact of the man continuing to be incarcerated against the calculated risk of his stealing some more money. Now, I don't want to get into a professional discussion with [the hospital psychiatrist], but I sense a lurking desire to enforce discipline rather than to give this man treatment. * * * I am going to release him, unconditionally.

The sections of our Code here involved apply to an exceptional class of persons who have committed acts forbidden by law, have been found not guilty by reason of insanity, and, in accordance with § 24-301(d), have been committed to a hospital for the mentally ill. Section 24-301(e) specifies the procedure for the release, conditionally or unconditionally, of a person so committed upon certification by the superintendent of the hospital that, in his opinion, the patient has sufficiently recovered his sanity as not to be dangerous to himself or others in the reasonable future.

Under standards established in a series of cases interpreting paragraphs (b), (d) and (e) of § 24-301,¹ one who seeks release without the statutory certification must show (1) that he has recovered his sanity and (2) that such recovery has reached the point where he has no abnormal mental condition which in the reasonably foreseeable future would give rise to danger to the patient or to the public in the event of his release. It was emphasized in Ragsdale v. Overholser, and reaffirmed in Overholser v. O'Beirne,² that a patient "may have improved materially and appear to be a...