United States v. Chartis Ins. Agency, Inc.
| Decision Date | 12 October 2011 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 4:10cv109. |
| Citation | 834 F.Supp.2d 459 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. CHARTIS INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., American Home Assurance Company, and Arc of The Virginia Peninsula, Inc., Defendants. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
George M. Kelley, III, United States Attorney Office, Norfolk, VA, for Plaintiff.
Andrew Harrison Downes Wilson, Cecil Harvey Creasey, Jr., Two Rivers Law Group PC, Richmond, VA, for Defendants.
This matter is before the Court upon Defendants' Chartis Insurance Agency, Inc., American Home Assurance Company, and ARC of the Virginia Peninsula, Inc., (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint filed May 4, 2011. Defendants assert that the United States' Amended Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons stated herein, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
James E. Thompson retired from the United States Air Force in 1984, and as a benefit of his retirement is entitled to receive medical care provided either by the United States or at the United States' expense.1 ( In 2007, Thompson became employed as a janitor for ARC of the Virginia Peninsula, Inc. His duties included cleaning the Meat Department at the Langley Air Force Base Commissary. (Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. Dismiss 4.) In the early morning hours of August 26, 2007, Thompson had finished his cleaning duties and was preparing to report to a Commissary supervisor, Joseph “Jerry” Burleson for inspection of his work, when he slipped, fell, and fractured his left arm. ( Id. at 4–5.) According to an accident narrative later penned by Burleson, Thompson slipped on a wet spot near the cash registers and appeared to be in “severe pain.” ( Id. at 5 & Ex. 1) Thompson was taken by ambulance to the nearby Langley Air Force Base Hospital for treatment. Thompson received medical care at the First Medical Group Hospital from August 26, 2007, through August 30, 2007. (Pl.'s Am. Compl. ¶ 15.)
At the time of the fall, American Home Assurance Company was the contractual insurer of ARC of the Virginia Peninsula, Inc. The United States alleges that Chartis Insurance Agency succeeded American Home Assurance Company in interest. On April 10, 2008, Thompson filed a workers' compensation claim with the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission. (Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. Dismiss 5.) Thompson entered into a settlement agreement on May 7, 2009.( Id.) According to the United States, although Thompson and Defendants were aware of the United States' claim for reimbursement for medical care provided to Thompson, the United States was not made aware of any settlement negotiations. ( Id. at 5–6.)
On August 26, 2010, the United States filed a Complaint in this Court, and subsequently amended the same on April 22, 2011, with leave of the Court. The United States' Amended Complaint claims that 10 U.S.C. § 1095 entitles the United States to reimbursement in the amount of $20,354.90 plus interest for medical care furnished to Thompson which is recoverable “from said employer or said employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier.” (Pl.'s Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 20.)
Defendants collectively moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint on May 4, 2011, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), claiming that this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the Amended Complaint and that the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Once a court's subject matter jurisdiction is challenged under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the court's jurisdiction. See Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir.1991) (citing Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir.1982)). In considering a challenge to its subject matter jurisdiction, a district court may look beyond the pleadings without converting the proceeding to a motion for summary judgment. Id. “The moving party should prevail only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” Id. (citing Trentacosta v. Frontier Pac. Aircraft Indus., 813 F.2d 1553, 1558 (9th Cir.1987)).
A Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint and should be denied unless “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” De Sole v. United States, 947 F.2d 1169, 1177 (4th Cir.1991): see also Migdal v. Rowe Price–Fleming Int'l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 325 (4th Cir.2001). “The threshold to survive a motion to dismiss is a low one.” Maersk Line Ltd. v. Care, 271 F.Supp.2d 818, 823 (E.D.Va.2003).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) mandates that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” This directive has not been interpreted to require “detailed factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). It does require, however, that a plaintiff plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements” are insufficient. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Additionally, “only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief” may survive a motion to dismiss. Id. at 1950. A plausible claim for relief must allege the “grounds upon which it rests.” Kelly v. Georgia–Pacific, 671 F.Supp.2d 785, 790 (E.D.N.C.2009). Thus, “where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘shown’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).
Defendants assert as their first ground for dismissal that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the instant claim and therefore the Amended Complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). The specific basis for Defendants' jurisdictional challenge, however, is less than clear to the Court. Though Defendants allege that the Court does not have jurisdiction, Defendants' brief does not squarely address this issue. Rather, Defendants' brief immediately proceeds to a discussion of whether workers' compensation liability exists against Defendants (Defs' Br. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 4), then to a discussion of whether the United States' claim is time barred as a matter of Virginia law. ( Id. at 10.) As Defendants' support of their first contention is scant at best, the Court struggles to adequately respond to the objection.
Without delving unnecessarily deeply into the Constitutional origins of the federal judicial power, it is without question that a federal district court has original jurisdiction over a civil action “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. It is further beyond contention that where federal jurisdiction is premised on a federal question under 27 U.S.C. § 1331, a federal district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over “all other claims that are so related to the claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
The face of the United States' Amended Complaint plainly alleges entitlement to relief pursuant to federal law, to wit, 10 U.S.C. § 1095. Subsection (e)(1) of § 1095 provides that “the United States may institute and prosecute legal proceedings against a third party-payer to enforce a right of the United States under this section.” This Court's subject matter jurisdiction over this matter is thus not seriously in question. “No subject matter jurisdiction difficulties are presented with the United States is the plaintiff in an action in the federal courts unless the government lends its name to a lawsuit merely for the benefit of a private individual.” United States v. Power Eng'g Co., 125 F.Supp.2d 1050, 1056 (D.Colo.2000) (quoting 14 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward R. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3651 at 208 (3d ed. 1998)) (internal citations omitted).
Without specifically referring to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), Defendants apparently challenge this Court's jurisdiction to consider the merits of this matter on the ground that, according to Defendants, to do so would “revisit the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission's final order forever releasing and discharging any such claim of entitlement.” (Defs' Br. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 6.) Defendants argue that because Mr. Thompson waived his right to litigate by entering into a settlement, the United States “by extension” cannot “establish retroactively a ‘workers' compensation benefit liability’ on Defendants.” ( Id.) However, the sole authority which Defendants cite to support their contention that the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission (“VWCC”) has exclusive jurisdiction over such claims and that such jurisdiction bars suit by the United States for reimbursement under 10 U.S.C. § 1095 is Code of Virginia § 65.2–201. However, § 65.2–201 merely transfers jurisdiction of workers' compensation claims from the state courts to the VWCC. That statute nowhere provides any indication of why the United States should be deprived of its right to seek...
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