United States v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 27 November 1906
• Citation: 149 F. 486
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

149 F. 486

UNITED STATES v. CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. CO.

United States District Court, S.D. Iowa, Central Division.

November 27, 1906

Syllabus by the Court

All commerce in the United States is under control of either a state or of the nation, and it cannot be justly claimed that any of such commerce falls within the power of neither; and when merchandise is carried from one state into another, no system or scheme can be devised to make it intrastate traffic.

The undoubted purpose of Congress in enacting the safety appliance laws was humanitarian, and such statute should not be frittered away by judicial construction.

Two of the purposes for which the safety appliance act of 1893 (Act March 2, 1893, c. 196, Sec. 1, 27 Stat. 531 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3174)) was amended by the act of 1903 (Act March 2 1903, c. 976, Sec. 1, 32 Stat. 943 (U.S. Comp. St. Supp. 1905, p. 603)) were: (1) To include certain vehicles omitted by the former statute; and (2) to include cars 'used' by an interstate carrier on any part of its line. The original statute was broadened, and not restricted, by substitution of the word 'use' for the words 'haul and use.'

Where an interstate carrier hauls cars considerably damaged by derailment, so that the coupling devices are gone, 379 miles past three or more places where repairing is done, in order to make the repairs at larger and better equipped shops, it violates the safety appliance law.

Where a coupler couples by impact, but cannot be uncoupled, unless the brakeman or switchman goes between, or over, or under the cars, or around the end of the train, in order to reach the appliance on the connecting car, such a coupling is defective, and prohibited by law.

A carrier operating its own construction train, which hauls its own rails and products from a point in one state to a point in another state, is engaged in interstate commerce.

If an interstate carrier receives and hauls a defectively equipped foreign car, which it cannot be required to do, it violates the federal safety appliance acts.

Lewis Miles, U.S. Atty., and Luther M. Walter, special counsel, for the United States.

J. C Cook and George H. Carr, for defendant.

SMITH McPHERSON, District Judge (charging jury):

This case has been fully heard by the court and jury on oral testimony, at the close of which each party moved for a peremptory direction for a verdict under every one of the four counts of the petition. It is my custom, and, as I think, my duty, when taking a case from the jury, to explain why that body can have nothing further to do in the case, I assuming all responsibility. This is an action by petition under direction of the Attorney General, on information of the interstate commerce commission, against the defendant company for four alleged violations of the acts of Congress of 1893 (Act March 2, 1893, c. 196, Sec. 1, 27 Stat. 531 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3174)), amended in 1896, and act of 1903 (Act March 2, 1903, c. 976, Sec. 1, 32 Stat. 943 (U.S Comp. St. Supp. 1905, p. 603)), relating to coupling and uncoupling devices.

The act of 1893 makes it unlawful for a company to do certain things: First. To haul a car. Second. To permit the car to be hauled. Third. To use or permit a car to be used. All three of these prohibitions are with reference to cars on the lines of the company within this judicial district. And the prohibitions are with reference to cars used only in interstate traffic, and which cars are not equipped with couplers coupling automatically by impact, and which cars can be uncoupled without the necessity of men going between the ends of the cars. It is contended with much earnestness that as this is a penal statute the statute must be strictly construed. This point need be elaborated but little. It is an elementary rule of construction, that the statute cannot be broadened by construction, so as to cover acts or omissions not clearly within the spirit and language of the statute. But while this is conceded, another rule equally important and as clearly established is that statutes are not to be frittered away by courts by construction. A statute, like a contract, must be held up by the four corners and examined, and when remedial in its nature, it must be examined in the light of its history and its purposes, and the then existing evils, which were to be corrected, remedied, and prevented. The statutes, and particularly that of 1903, are assailed as being beyond the power of Congress.

I shall devote but little time to argument as to this. I shall state my views, and then leave that phase of the case. As every one knows, it at times is difficult to state whether certain traffic is within the power of a state or that of Congress. But we all agree that, generally speaking, when the traffic starts from, is carried, and ends within the one state, Congress cannot regulate it, and that the state only can do so. And, generally speaking, we all agree that when the traffic starts from within one state and is carried to a point within another state, the state cannot regulate it, and Congress alone can do so; and particularly is this so when Congress has legislated with reference thereto. The only dissent that can be urged against the foregoing is one phase of the question not covered by the facts of this case, and not necessary to now state. In so far as commerce can be regulated or controlled, it falls within the power of a state, or of Congress. To say that it falls within the power of neither is to argue an absurdity, and to say that up in the air somewhere is a subject-matter not grappled with by either the state or nation. I do not for one moment believe in that kind of talk. It is due to counsel to say that no such argument was made in this case, but it is often made. It is enough to know and state that, in the case now for decision, questions of interstate traffic alone are presented, which will be noticed later on, connected with which were the evils to be remedied, corrected, or prevented. It is within the knowledge of most men that back of a few years ago, when the pin and link couplers were in use, it was of almost daily occurrence for a heavy freight train to break into two parts. This was unavoidable because of the weakness of the couplers and the great amount of slack. The results were injuries to and deaths of employes and passengers in the way car or caboose, as well as the damage to property, and particularly live stock. But the greater evil to be corrected was the injuries to and deaths of those required to couple and uncouple cars. Ten and more years ago every day we read of men killed in making and unmaking couplings. Seldom did we then meet a brakeman or switchman but who had been injured while at work. The court dockets, state and federal, were in part made up of such personal injury cases. The plaintiff charged negligence, generally, against the engineer, and the company denied that, and pleaded contributory negligence on the part of the injured man, and that he assumed all such risks. Some of them recovered large judgments, and others were defeated. I do not know whether statistics are obtainable as to whether the judgments obtained against and expense incurred by the companies were greater than those incurred in putting on the automatic coupler. But aside from all that, an undoubted purpose of Congress was humanitarian. The purpose was to end the maiming and killing of the vast army of men engaged in railroad work. And that the results have been good one now needs but look at the court dockets and the men newer in the railroad service and read the statistics of the past few years.

But it is contended that one or more of the cars in question was not in use in interstate traffic, and therefore not covered by the act of 1893, and that such car or cars were not in 'use,' and therefore not covered by the act of 1903. And this argument was made before me, because, under the act of 1893, the car must have been 'hauled or used' in interstate traffic. Why was the statute of 1903 passed as an amendment to the prior act? Was there an evil still existing under the former statute? If so, what was it? Was there a difficulty in enforcing the older statute? If so, what? The older statute was with reference only to cars used in moving interstate traffic, regardless of...