United States v. Chin, Crim. A. No. 85-00268-A.
Decision Date | 24 April 1986 |
Docket Number | Crim. A. No. 85-00268-A. |
Citation | 633 F. Supp. 624 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Larry Wu-Tai CHIN, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
Joseph J. Aronica, Asst. U.S. Atty., W. Gary Kohlman, Kohlman & Fitch, Washington, D.C., for U.S.
John C. Lenahan, Fairfax, Va., Jacob A. Stein, Stein, Mitchell & Mezines, Washington, D.C., for defendant.
This matter comes before the Court on counsel for defendant's motion to abate the criminal proceedings in this case ab initio, to vacate the conviction and dismiss the indictment pursuant to Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The matter has been briefed and is now ripe for disposition.
After four (4) days of trial before a jury, Larry Wu-Tai Chin ("Chin") was found guilty of 17 separate criminal charges, including but not limited to (1) conspiracy to commit espionage in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 794(c), (2) passing classified information to a foreign government in violation of 50 U.S.C. § 783(b), and failure to report income earned from a foreign bank account in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1). Before Chin's sentencing, before judgment had been entered, and before an appeal of right had been filed with The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Chin committed suicide. Acting on the news of Chin's suicide, the Court on February 28, 1986, entered an order directing that the case be placed among ended causes. Ten days after the Court's February 28 Order, Chin's attorney filed this motion to abate the criminal proceedings.
The facts of this case present a novel issue to the court: whether the suicide of a criminal defendant subsequent to his conviction by a jury, yet before judgment has been entered, before a sentence has been imposed, and before an appeal of right has been filed, require an abatement of his criminal conviction?
In Durham v. United States, 401 U.S. 481, 91 S.Ct. 858, 28 L.Ed.2d 200 (1971), the Supreme Court was faced with a somewhat, though not precisely analogous issue involving a defendant, convicted of the possession of a counterfeit $20 bill, who died while his petition for a writ of certiorari was pending. The Court held that "death pending direct review of a criminal conviction abates not only the appeal but also all proceedings had in the prosecution from its inception." The Court drew no distinction between death pending appeal and death pending certiorari, holding that "the distinction between the two would not seem to be important for present purposes." Durham, supra at 483, 91 S.Ct. at 860.
Durham, however, has been overruled to the extent it is inconsistent with the ruling in Dove v. United States, 423 U.S. 325, 96 S.Ct. 579, 46 L.Ed.2d 531 (1976) (per curiam). In Dove, the Supreme Court was once again faced with a case in which a defendant died while his petition for writ of certiorari was pending review. Unlike Durham, the Court did not abate the criminal proceedings from their inception, but instead dismissed the petition for certiorari. Although Dove is an extremely short per curiam ruling, it does represent that the Supreme Court did not consider death pending review of a writ of certiorari sufficient justification to warrant the abatement of a defendant's conviction. Dove, therefore, is controlling law on the issue of death pending the review of a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court.
However, as movants have noted, many Circuit Court of Appeals have adopted Durham's holding for support when a criminal defendant dies pending the review of an appeal to the circuit court. Those cases hold that the defendant's death abates not only the appeal but also all proceedings in the criminal prosecution.1 The Seventh Circuit provided the following reason for the differing treatment according death pending an appeal of right and death pending a petition for certiorari:
The Supreme Court may dismiss the petition without prejudicing the rights of a deceased petitioner, for he has already had the benefit of the appellate review of his conviction to which he was entitled of right. In contrast, when an appeal has been taken from a criminal conviction to the court of appeals and death has deprived the accused of his right to our decision, the interests of justice ordinarily require that he not stand convicted without resolution of the merits of his appeal, which is an "integral part of our system for finally adjudicating his guilt or innocence."
citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18, 76 S.Ct. 585, 590, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956). Those state courts considering the effect of Durham have all, but one,2 agreed that abatement ab initio is the appropriate rule for appeals of right.3
Durham and Dove are of little guidance to this Court in deciding the instant case. Unlike Durham and Dove and their progeny, Chin had not, at the time of his suicide, filed an appeal. This fact renders the instant case one which requires a more probative analysis than that afforded in Durham and Dove.
Movants cite United States v. Oberlin, 718 F.2d 894 (9th Cir.1983) for support in the instant case, however, this Court respectfully declines to follow it. Additionally, an argument can be made that it is distinguishable from the instant case.
The language of the aforementioned passage relating to the merits of the instant case is the following: "we see no reason to treat a criminal defendant who dies before judgment is entered any differently from one who dies after a notice of appeal has been filed." Oberlin, supra at 896. However, as the Government notes, "the Ninth Circuit's view is unsupported by any analysis," and most importantly to this Court is that it does not address whether the court assigned any weight to the fact that Oberlin's attorney did, despite Oberlin's suicide, file a notice of appeal. There is nothing in the record of the instant case that would lead to a conclusion that counsel for Chin had either been requested or authorized to note an appeal. Indeed, the record justifies a conclusion that Mr. Chin did not intend to appeal.
The Oberlin court may not have found the time of a defendant's suicide relevant in determining whether a criminal proceeding should be abated. However, upon careful analysis of Durham and its progeny this Court cannot help but conclude that a criminal proceeding will not be abated if the Court finds that the criminal defendant did not intend to file an appeal. In the past, the courts have not directly addressed the importance of determining whether the defendant intended to file an appeal: in those cases intent was not an issue to resolve. For example, the cases citing Durham for support represent criminal defendants who have already filed their appeals. Thus, the resolution of whether the defendant intended to file an appeal would have been a nonsequitur. Another example is the Oberlin case. In Oberlin, the criminal defendant committed suicide prior to filing an appeal, but his attorney filed an appeal on his behalf after judgment was entered. Once again, whether the defendant intended to file an appeal was not at issue since the defendant's counsel had already filed an appeal on his client's behalf.
In the instant case there are three (3) factors uncontested by the defense which, if considered together, convince the court that Chin did not intend to file an appeal. Without such an intent the Court has no alternative but to deny the instant motion to vacate the criminal conviction and dismiss the indictment.
In support of the Government's motion in opposition to the abatement, it has submitted a letter written by Chin to his wife approximately two weeks after his conviction. The letter expressed unequivocally that Chin had decided "not to appeal" and that his decision had made him feel "extremely tranquil." See Chin's letter (translated version). The Government argues that this letter is authoritative in that it expressly states that Chin did not want to appeal. Although the Court does not find the letter authoritative, it is helpful in that it represents to the Court that Chin, prior to his suicide, had consulted with his attorneys and decided that the appeal procedure would be agonizing and probably fruitless.
The Court also finds it important...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
U.S. v. Dwyer
...Dwyer." United States v. Dwyer, 654 F.Supp. 1254, 1255 (M.D.Pa.1987). In particular, the district court, relying on United States v. Chin, 633 F.Supp. 624 (E.D.Va.1986), crafted a suicide exception to the traditional rule that a criminal conviction abates when a defendant dies prior to the ......
-
State v. McDonald
...waiver' is without merit. The doctrine of waiver has no connection to the issue of abatement." 1 Id. at 896. In United States v. Chin, 633 F.Supp. 624, 628 (E.D.Va.1986), a district court found that a defendant's suicide after a guilty verdict and before further proceedings was a "conscious......
-
U.S. v. Chin
...is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED. 1 United States v. Chin, 633 F.Supp. 624 (E.D.Va.1986). ...
-
United States v. Fischer
...“[t]he contention that suicide is 2 the ‘ultimate waiver' is without merit.” Oberlin, 718 F.2d at 896; but see United States v. Chin, 633 F.Supp. 624, 627-28 (E.D. Va. 1986) (holding that defendant's suicide was an indication that “he chose to take his life instead of pursing the appeals pr......