United States v. Chovan

• Citation: 735 F.3d 1127
• Decision Date: 18 November 2013
• Docket Number: No. 11–50107.,11–50107.
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Daniel Edward CHOVAN, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

735 F.3d 1127

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Daniel Edward CHOVAN, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 11–50107.

United States Court of Appeals,Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Feb. 15, 2012.

Filed Nov. 18, 2013.

Laura E. Duffy, United States Attorney, Bruce R. Castetter, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Section, Criminal Division, Caroline P. Han (briefed and argued), Assistant United States Attorney, and Kyle W. Hoffman (briefed), Assistant United States Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Devin Burstein, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, CA, for Defendant–Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, John A. Houston, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 3:10–cr–01805–JAH–1.

Before: HARRY PREGERSON, MICHAEL DALY HAWKINS, and CARLOS T. BEA, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:

Following the entry of a conditional guilty plea, Daniel Chovan appeals the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss an indictment against him for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). Section 922(g)(9) prohibits persons convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors from possessing firearms for life. Chovan contends that § 922(g)(9) is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to him because it violates his Second Amendment right to bear arms. In the alternative, he argues that § 922(g)(9) does not apply to him because his civil rights have been restored within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We reject Chovan's “civil rights restored” argument, hold that intermediate scrutiny applies to his Second Amendment claim, and uphold § 922(g)(9) under intermediate scrutiny.

FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1996, Daniel Chovan was convicted in California state court of the misdemeanor of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse in violation of California Penal Code § 273.5(a). The victim, Cheryl Fix,¹ was living with Chovan at the time.² Chovan was sentenced to 120 days in jail and three years of supervised release.

Because of this conviction, Chovan was prohibited from possessing firearms under both state and federal law. Under California Penal Code § 12021(c)(1), which at the time applied to misdemeanants generally, Chovan was barred from owning, purchasing, receiving, or having in his possession or under his custody or control, any firearm for a ten-year period following his conviction. But under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), a federal statute that applies only to persons convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence crimes, Chovan was barred from possessing any firearm for life.

Section 922(g)(9) establishes two exceptions under which the statute will no longer apply: (1) “if the conviction has been expunged or set aside”; or (2) if the offender “has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored (if the law of the applicable jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil rights under such an offense).” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii). These exceptions are not met if “the pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.” Id.

In 2009, Chovan applied to purchase a firearm from a San Diego area gun dealer. He completed a required application form and answered “no” to the question whether he had ever been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. His purchase application was denied after a background check revealed his 1996 misdemeanor conviction of domestic violence. At the time of his application, Chovan could legally possess a firearm under California law because ten years had passed since his 1996 conviction, but § 922(g)(9) continued to bar him from possessing a firearm.

The FBI received information about Chovan's attempted purchase and began investigating Chovan. During their investigation, FBI agents found videos on the Internet depicting Chovan and others shooting rifles and conducting “border patrols” near the U.S.-Mexico border.

The FBI also learned that in March 2010, San Diego County Sheriff deputies responded to a domestic dispute at Chovan's residence. Fix, Chovan's then-estranged wife, told the officers that Chovan had become violent, hit her with a cell phone, and threatened to hunt her down and shoot her if she ever left him. Fix said that she believed Chovan's threats because he had weapons inside his house.

On April 15, 2010, FBI and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives agents executed a search warrant of Chovan's house. In the course of their search they found and confiscated four firearms, including a High Standard .22 caliber handgun that belonged to Chovan, and 532 rounds of assorted ammunition. Federal agents arrested Chovan the day after the search. During his arrest, Chovan admitted that he had possessed and fired the firearms several times since his 1996 domestic violence conviction. A two-count indictment was brought against Chovan. Count One alleged that Chovan had knowingly possessed firearms in violation of § 922(g), and Count Two alleged that he had made a false statement in the acquisition of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A).

Chovan moved to dismiss Count One, contending that (1) § 922(g)(9) is an unconstitutional violation of the Second Amendment; (2) his civil rights were “restored” within the meaning of § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii), and therefore § 922(g)(9) did not apply to him; and (3) § 922(g)(9)'s application to him was a violation of equal protection. The district court denied Chovan's motion to dismiss, concluding that § 922(g)(9) “is a presumptively lawful prohibition and represents an exemption from the right to bear arms under the Second Amendment as articulated in [District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008) ].”

Chovan pled guilty to Count One of the indictment, pursuant to a conditional plea agreement that preserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.³ Chovan was sentenced to five years probation. Chovan timely appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo the constitutionality of a statute. United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir.2010). We also review de novo constitutional challenges to a district court's denial of a motion to dismiss. Id.

DISCUSSION

Chovan argues on appeal that § 922(g)(9) violates the Second Amendment because it is an impermissible restriction on the individual and fundamental right to bear arms. He alternatively argues that § 922(g)(9) does not apply to him because his civil rights were restored when his ten-year ban on owning firearms under California state law expired, and thus that his conviction should be vacated. We disagree with both arguments.

I. Civil Rights Restored

We start by addressing Chovan's non-constitutional argument that § 922(g)(9) does not apply to him because his civil rights have been restored. ⁴Section 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) prevents the application of § 922(g)(9) in situations where a defendant's “civil rights” have been restored. Chovan contends that his civil rights were restored within the meaning of § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) when his right to own firearms was restored under California law ten years after his 1996 conviction.

Section 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) does not define the term “civil rights.” In United States v. Brailey, however, we addressed how to interpret the term. 408 F.3d 609, 611–13 (9th Cir.2005). In 1997, James David Brailey was convicted in Utah of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. Id. at 610–11. As a result of this conviction, he was barred from possessing firearms under then-existing Utah state law. Id. at 611. In 2000, however, Utah amended its statutes such that Brailey and other misdemeanants were no longer prevented from possessing firearms. Id. at 610–11. Brailey was subsequently charged with firearm possession in violation of § 922(g)(9). Id. at 610. He appealed the § 922(g)(9) conviction, maintaining that his civil rights had been restored within the meaning of § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) because his right to possess a gun had been restored under Utah law. Id.

We rejected Brailey's argument, concluding that his civil rights had never been “lost” because his misdemeanor conviction had not taken away his “core civil rights”: the right to vote, to sit as a juror, or to hold public office. Id. at 613. Because Brailey's civil rights had never been lost, we reasoned that they could not have been restored. We noted that most other circuits had also concluded that, “where civil rights are not divested for misdemeanor convictions, a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence cannot benefit from the federal restoration exception.” Id. at 612 (citing United States v. Jennings, 323 F.3d 263 (4th Cir.2003); United States v. Barnes, 295 F.3d 1354 (D.C.Cir.2002); United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617 (8th Cir.1999)); see also Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23, 37, 128 S.Ct. 475, 169 L.Ed.2d 432 (2007) (holding that a different “civil rights restored” exception did not apply to “an offender who lost no civil rights”). Thus, we concluded that Brailey failed to meet § 922(g)(9)' s civil rights restored exception.

Chovan argues that Brailey 's reading of the civil rights restored exception is too narrow and “create[s] an equal protection problem.” According to Chovan it is unfair that under Brailey, individuals who lose the right to vote, serve on a jury, or hold public office because of their convictions but later have these rights restored can possess firearms, while individuals like Chovan who never lost these rights cannot.

Chovan's equal protection argument is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Hancock, 231 F.3d 557 (9th Cir.2000). In 1994 and 1995, Gary Hancock was convicted of four Arizona state misdemeanors involving violence or threats of violence against his wife. Id. at 560. In 1999, Hancock...