United States v. Chung Shee

• Decision Date: 12 October 1896
• Docket Number: 291.
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. CHUNG SHEE.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

76 F. 951

UNITED STATES v. CHUNG SHEE.

No. 291.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

October 12, 1896

George J. Denis and Frank G. Finlayson, for plaintiffs in error.

George P. Phibbs, for defendant in error.

Before GILBERT and ROSS, Circuit Judges, and HAWLEY, District Judge.

GILBERT Circuit Judge.

In June, 1893, the defendant in error, a Chinese woman, arrived at the port of San Francisco, by steamer, from China, and under the name of Chung Shee, sought admission to the United States on the ground that she was the wife of a Chinese merchant then living in San Francisco. She was examined by the collector of that port, and was refused permission to land. On July 21, 1893, a writ of habeas corpus was issued in her behalf from the district court of the Northern district of California; and, upon the hearing had thereon concerning the right of the said Chung Shee to land, it was the decision of the court that she was not the wife of the said merchant and an order was made directing her deportation to China. Accordingly, on August 10, 1893, she was placed on board a steamship bound for the port of Hong Kong. In the following January she arrived at the port of Portland, in Oregon, by the steamer Signal, from the port of Victoria, in British Columbia, and, under the name of Lum Lin Ying, sought admission at said port upon the ground that she was the wife of a Chinese merchant of the city of Portland named Chung Chew. She was examined by the collector of the port of Portland, and was by him denied permission to land. On January 30, 1894, her petition was presented before the judge of the district court of the United States for Oregon for a writ of habeas corpus, setting forth that she was unlawfully detained in custody on board the steamship Signal by the master thereof, in accordance with the decision of said collector, and alleging that she was the wife of one Chung Chew, a Chinese merchant doing business in said city of Portland. A writ was issued on the said petition, and on February 2, 1894, said writ and return were heard upon the single issue of the alleged marriage of the petitioner to the Portland merchant, Chung Chew. The court found that she was not the lawful wife of said Chung Chew, inasmuch as there had been no marriage ceremony, but she was ordered to be discharged from custody, and to be permitted to enter the United States, upon the ground that she had come to this country with the bona fide belief that the betrothal had between her and Chung Chew amounted to a marriage ceremony and that she was his lawfully wedded wife. Thereafter the said Chung Chew and the defendant in error removed to Los Angeles, Cal., where the latter has since resided. On July 31, 1895, a complaint was filed with a United States commissioner at Los Angeles, alleging that the defendant in error was at the date of filing said complaint unlawfully within the United States, and that from the time of her coming to the United States to the present time she had been and was a Chinese laborer. Upon the hearing on said complaint, the commissioner made findings and entered judgment finding that the defendant in error was a Chinese laborer, unlawfully within the United States, and adjudging that she be removed to China. An appeal was taken from said findings and judgment to the district court of the United States for the Southern district of California. Thereafter, on December 2, 1895, the judge of said court filed with the clerk thereof his written opinion, and ordered that the judgment and order of said commissioner be reversed and that the defendant be discharged; holding that the judgment and order of the district court for the district of Oregon, whereby it had been adjudged that the defendant in error should be discharged from the custody in which she was then held, was res adjudicata, and was a final determination of her right to enter the United States, and could not be collaterally assailed in the present proceeding, and must be held to establish the lawfulness of her residence here. 71 F. 277. It is the object of the present writ of error to review the said decision of the district court of the Southern district of California, and the sole question presented for our consideration is whether or not the prior judgment of the district court of Oregon is such a determination of the right of the defendant in error to be and remain within the United States as to preclude inquiry into the facts presented on the complaint.

It is contended on the part of the plaintiff in error that the jurisdiction of the judge of the district court of Oregon in the habeas corpus proceedings before him was limited to an inquiry concerning the jurisdiction of the collector of the port of Portland to decide against the right of the defendant in error to land at that port; in other words, that the Oregon court was empowered to consider but two questions-- First, whether there was any legal and competent evidence before the collector of that port from which the ultimate facts that sustained his judgment could be deduced; and second, were those ultimate facts, as found by him, sufficient in law to justify his judgment? To support this contention, reference is made to the construction placed by the courts upon similar provisions in the acts of congress for the regulation of immigration. Section 2 of the act of August 3, 1882 (22 Stat. 214), provides that the commissioners of immigration 'shall examine into the condition of passengers arriving in any ship or vessel, and for that purpose they are authorized to go on board and through any such ship or vessel; and if on such examination there shall be found among such passengers any convict, lunatic, idiot, or any person unable to take care of himself or herself without becoming a public charge, they shall report the same in writing to the collector of such port, and such person shall not be permitted to land. ' Section 6 of the act of February 23, 1887 (24 Stat. 415), provides that it shall be the duty of the commissioners, etc., 'to examine into the condition of passengers arriving at the ports * * * and if in such examination there shall be found among such passengers any person included in the prohibition in this act they shall report the same in writing to the collector of such port and such persons shall not be permitted to land. ' In a series of decisions construing the provisions of the immigration acts above quoted, the courts have held the boards of commissioners to be tribunals of a quasi judicial character, constituted by law for the purpose of inquiring into the facts relative to the immigrants' right to land in the United States. In Re. Day, 27 F. 678, certain immigrants had been denied the right to land after an examination by the commissioners, and had applied for a writ of habeas corpus to review the commissioners'...