United States v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints

Decision Date21 January 1889
Citation6 Utah 9,21 P. 503
CourtUtah Supreme Court
PartiesUNITED STATES, COMPLAINANT, v. CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER DAY SAINTS AND OTHERS, RESPONDENTS

In the matter of an original application in the Supreme Court of certain school trustees in Salt Lake County, Utah Territory to be allowed to intervene in this action. The facts out of which this action arose are as follows:

Section 3, Anti-Polygamy Act of 1862, provided: "That it shall not be lawful for any corporation or association for religious or charitable purposes to acquire or hold real estate in any Territory of the United States during the existence of the Territorial Government of a greater value than fifty thousand dollars; and all real estate acquired or held by any such corporation or association contrary to the provisions of this act shall be forfeited and escheated to the United States; provided, that existing vested rights in real estate shall not be impaired by the provisions of this section."

Sec. 13 Edmunds-Tucker Law, March 3, 1887, provided: "That it shall be the duty of the Attorney General of the United States to institute and prosecute proceedings to forfeit and escheat to the United States the property of corporations obtained or held in violation" of section 3 last quoted "and all such property so forfeited and escheated to the United States shall be disposed of by the Secretary of the Interior, and the proceeds thereof applied to the use and benefit of the common schools in the Territory in which such property may be; provided, that no building or grounds appurtenant thereto, which is held and occupied exclusively for purposes of the worship of God, or parsonage connected therewith, or burial grounds, shall be forfeited."

Sec. 17 of the same act provided for the annulling of the laws incorporating the Mormon Church, dissolved the corporation and directed the Attorney General to institute proceedings to wind up the affairs of such corporation conformably to law.

Proceedings were instituted in the Supreme Court of the Territory for the purposes contemplated by the act. Arguments were had upon the constitutionality of the above laws, and they were upheld and a Receiver appointed. (See opinion, 5 Utah 361.) Subsequently Frank H. Dyer, United States Marshal of Utah Territory was appointed Receiver, from the order appointing whom Zane, C J., dissented on the grounds that he was not a proper man and his governmental office would interfere with his duties. The Receiver under the order was directed to take possession of all the property of the church. He began his work by taking possession of certain real estate in Salt Lake County, and by instituting suits for the recovery of certain real estate in Weber County, and by taking possession of about 33,000 sheep. On July 9th, 1888, the Receiver filed a petition in the Supreme Court in which he with his attorneys P. L. Williams and George S. Peters United States Attorney for Utah represented to the Court that certain real estate in Salt Lake City was the property of the church at the time the Edmunds-Tucker law was passed, and that he had instituted suits for its recovery; that the defendants therein had answered setting up a title by purchase, and had now offered to compromise by paying to the Receiver the amount they had paid for the property, and asking that such compromise be permitted. The Receiver was authorized by the Court to make such compromise. At the same time the Receiver made a compromise by which he took seventy-five thousand dollars for all the personal property of the church, and it was understood by the attorneys for the church that this amount was in final settlement of all the property of the church but this other compromise was not reported to the Court. On October 6th, 1888, the accounts of the Receiver were referred to the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Ezra T. Sprague, to audit the accounts and expenses, and to take testimony and report conclusions as to the amount to be allowed the Receiver for his expenses, and the compensation for himself and his attorneys. On October 8th, 1888, final decree was made in the original action finding certain property therein named, consisting of the real estate theretofore taken to have been the property of the church, and containing no reservation as to property not yet found or taken possession of. Subsequently the said Ezra T. Sprague took testimony in regard to the matters referred to him. Mr. LeGrand Young and Messrs. Sheeks and Rawlins appeared for the church. Mr. Peters and Mr. P. L. Williams appeared for the Receiver and examined witnesses for him. On the first day the attorneys for the church cross-examined the witnesses introduced by the Receiver. The Receiver himself testified and introduced witnesses to show that the services rendered by him were worth at least twenty-five thousand dollars and the services of his two lawyers each ten thousand dollars. The cross-examination tended to develop the fact that the Receiver had done but little work, but that it had been done by his attorneys. But on the next evening the attorneys for the church stated that they had been instructed by their client not to oppose the claims of the Receiver and his attorneys. Mr. Dyer was called and testified: "I have thought I was entitled to twenty-five thousand dollars. I gave notice to the defendants of the amount of my claim. They said they would not oppose that amount. Mr. Peters has declined to agree to that amount on behalf of the government." Mr. Rawlins then asked who represented the government in this proceeding, and whether or not the government had been notified. The Examiner said that he assumed the government had been notified, from the fact that Mr. Peters, besides being a representative of Mr. Dyer was a representative of the government. Mr. Sheeks said "the government is entitled to be here." Mr. Rawlins stated "we were instructed to-day, or given to understand, that our clients had instructed Mr. Young and Mr. Richards to notify Mr. Dyer in writing that his demand for $ 25,000 would not be objected to. Mr. Sheeks asked Mr. Peters whether he represented the government on this hearing. Mr. Peters replied: "Well, I do to a certain extent, yes." Mr. Sheeks: "To what extent, Mr. Peters?" Mr. Peters: "Well, I don't know." Mr. Sheeks repeated his question but Mr. Peters simply replied that he was here to attend this examination. Mr. Rawlins then said: "We would like to know now if it is understood that $ 25,000 was the extent of the claim for compensation of the Receiver." Mr. Peters replied: "That is what he says. He is the man that is making the claim."

Mr. Rawlins and Mr. Sheeks then disclaimed all idea of conceding that the claim of the Receiver was reasonable, but said that they acted in obedience to instructions. But they insisted that the government as the custodian of the fund ought to be represented, when it was proposed to take so large an amount from the fund. Thereupon the examination proceeded without any cross-examination or any testimony given except that of the Receiver and his witnesses.

On the 28th day of November, certain School Trustees, through Messrs. Zane and Zane, presented to the Court a petition which alleged that the petitioners were school trustees of certain common schools, authorized to receive, use, hold, and expend all moneys and proceeds to be expended for their common schools; that the Receiver had in his possession certain real estate, the proceeds of which were to be applied to the common schools; that such real estate had been rented and the proceeds thereof ought to be applied to the common schools; that the suits instituted for the recovery of certain other tracts of real estate had been compromised for the sum of $ 84,666.15, upon recommendations and representations of the Receiver and his attorneys; that such real estate was in reality worth $ 225,000, and that the Court had been misled in permitting such compromise; that the compromise should be set aside, but if allowed to stand, the proceeds should go to the common schools; that the Receiver, without authority from the Court, had compromised the claim for certain personal property estimated by the parties to be worth $ 268,982.39, for the sum of $ 75,000; that the Receiver had rented to W. L. Pickard, one of the sureties upon his bond, 30,000 sheep, at the rate of 20 cents per annum per head, when the customary rate was from 40 to 50 cents per head; that the Receiver failed to take possession of a large amount of property owned by the church corporation which he could have obtained possession of in the use of reasonable diligence, and that his failure to do so was from want of attention to his duties, or from wilful negligence, or through a combination with agents of the corporation; that the Receiver had employed as his attorneys, P. L. Williams, Territorial Commissioner of Schools, and G. S. Peters, U.S. District Attorney for Utah, and had claimed for compensation to himself for his services as Receiver, $ 25,000, for each of his said attorneys, $ 10,000, and for his expenses, $ 7,867.53, in all $ 52,865.23; that these matters had been referred to the Examiner to take testimony upon; that no one had appeared there for the United States; that the attorneys for the defendants had been instructed not to contest the claims, and that the examination was ex parte; that G. S. Peters, whose duty it was to appear for the United States, had no legal right to ask $ 10,000 or any other sum, and that the claim of P. L. Williams, if intended to cover future services, might be reasonable; that the amount of $ 25,000, claimed by the Receiver for his personal services was grossly exorbitant, excessive and unconscionable; that the Receiver should be held accountable for any...

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