United States v. City of Pittsburg, Cal., C-78-2910-WWS.

• Decision Date: 02 April 1979
• Docket Number: No. C-78-2910-WWS.,C-78-2910-WWS.
• Citation: 467 F. Supp. 1080
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America and the United States Postal Service, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF PITTSBURG, CALIFORNIA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California

467 F. Supp. 1080

UNITED STATES of America and the United States Postal Service, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF PITTSBURG, CALIFORNIA, Defendant.

No. C-78-2910-WWS.

United States District Court, N. D. California.

April 2, 1979.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

George Christopher Stoll, Asst. U. S. Atty., San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiffs.

John R. Shaw, City Atty., Pittsburg, Cal., for defendant.

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER, District Judge.

In this action, the United States and the United States Postal Service seek declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of a recent amendment to an ordinance of the City of Pittsburg, California, which purports to prohibit letter carriers from crossing private lawns without the prior consent of the owner or occupant of the property. The amendment complained of added the second paragraph to the City's general trespass ordinance, which now states:

9.64.010. Trespassing on Private Property.

It is unlawful for any person to go upon or to remain on any private property without the express consent of the owner, or lessee, or other person in charge thereof.

No United States Postal Letter Carrier shall be allowed to cross the lawns of private property owners, lessee, or persons in charge thereof, without the prior express consent of the owner, lessee, or other person in charge thereof.

Express consent by the owner, lessee or other person in charge of the premises may be satisfied either in writing or by direct verbal communication by such person.

Except as herein provided, this section does not apply to public officers or employees acting pursuant to law.

The matter is before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment.

I.

The National Association of Letter Carriers has moved to intervene on the side of defendant. It asserts that the question whether letter carriers should utilize shortcuts, including cutting across lawns, is a source of continuing disputes between itself and the Postal Service and that it therefore has an interest relating to the subject matter of the action. Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2).¹ While the Ninth Circuit has rejected the notion that Rule 24(a)(2) requires a specific legal or equitable interest, see Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947, 952 (9th Cir. 1977), it is far from clear that a labor organization's general economic interest in a restrictive regulation such as Pittsburg's trespass ordinance would qualify. The mere fact that the outcome of the controversy between the government and Pittsburg may affect the Association's bargaining position does not seem to give rise to a protectible interest in the litigation. Cf. United States v. Simmonds Precision Products, Inc., 319 F.Supp. 620, 621 (S.D.N.Y.1970). The Court doubts, moreover, that the Association can be said to be situated so that "the disposition of the action may . . . impair or impede its ability to protect that interest . . .." Rule 24(a)(2). The Association's interest is in the wages and working conditions of its employees, and the arena for the protection of that interest is the collective bargaining process, including the grievance procedure. This action does not enter into that domain.

The proper role of the Association in this proceeding should be as amicus curiae. Inasmuch as the Court previously granted the motion to intervene at oral argument, however, and no delay or prejudice will result from permitting the Association to remain as an intervenor, the prior ruling will be allowed to stand.

II.

The threshold question before the Court is whether the action is ripe for judicial relief. Federal courts should not rush to judgment where the validity of state or local laws or regulations is at issue. The continuing vitality of our federal system rests on a healthy respect for the integrity of local government.

This case, however, involves direct interference with the exercise of the powers of the federal government itself. The imminent threat of enforcement of a local criminal ordinance against employees of the federal government performing the duties of their employment is a sufficient basis for assumption of jurisdiction.

Postal services are performed by the federal government under the authority of Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution, which vests in Congress:

Power . . . To establish Post Offices and post Roads.

Since the adoption of the Constitution, Congress has from time to time adopted legislation in the exercise of its postal power, beginning with the creation of the office of postmaster general in 1789.² On July 1, 1863, Congress first established free letter carrier service in 49 cities in the northeastern United States, and this soon became the principal mode of mail delivery.³ And in 1970, in an effort to modernize the postal system, Congress adopted the Postal Reorganization Act. Pub.L. No. 91-375, 84 Stat. 719 (codified at 39 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.). That act contains a statement of postal policy which declares, among other things, that:

The Postal Service shall have as its basic function the obligation to provide postal services to bind the Nation together through the personal, educational, literary, and business correspondence of the people. It shall provide prompt, reliable, and efficient services to patrons in all areas and shall render postal services to all communities.

. . . . .

In determining all policies for postal services, the Postal Service shall give the highest consideration to the requirement for the most expeditious collection, transportation, and delivery of important letter mail. (39 U.S.C. § 101(a), (e))

To promote expedition as well as economy, officials of the Postal Service periodically observe, measure and evaluate the routes of letter carriers to assure that a carrier's daily work load approximates eight hours. In recent years, the Postal Service has made a particular effort to have letter carriers utilize available shortcuts to promote efficiency. One important type of shortcut is for the carrier to walk across lawns rather than confine himself to side-walks and walkways.

Since at least 1962, postal regulations have authorized carriers to cross lawns. A regional manual issued that year by the Post Office Department (the predecessor of the present United States Postal Service) stated:

Carriers may cross lawns while making deliveries if patrons do not object and there are no particular hazards to the carrier.

That regulation was subsequently reissued and is now incorporated by reference in the published regulations of the Postal Service. 39 C.F.R. § 211.2(a)(3).

Although the regulation is phrased in permissive terms, the Postal Service has consistently taken the position that it is authorized to require letter carriers to cross lawns where appropriate in the absence of objections by the owner or occupant of the residence. It has taken that position in the exercise of its management authority to require carriers to deliver their routes as efficiently as possible by, among other things, taking all safe and available shortcuts, including crossing lawns. And it has insisted on retaining that authority throughout its collective bargaining relationship with the Association, in contract negotiations as well as arbitration.

These conclusions are confirmed by an arbitration award, issued December 23, 1976, by Paul J. Fasser, Jr. All parties rely on this award in this action and none questions its findings or conclusions. The award was made upon the grievance of a letter carrier who, after having complained that his route was too long, had been ordered by his supervisor to cross all lawns that he considered safe.

In the award the arbitrator reviewed at length the relevant practices of the Service and the negotiations between the Service and the Association bearing on the issue. He first summarized the negotiations leading to the 1975 National Agreement covering the letter carriers which reflect the Service's rejection of Association proposals that letter carriers shall not cross, or shall at least not be required to cross, lawns. The agreement as finally adopted incorporated the permissive language of the regulation quoted above.⁴

The arbitrator then analyzed the significance of the language that carriers "may cross lawns" in the absence of hazards and objections. He found that Postal Service management under the collective bargaining agreement had reserved the right to direct the work force, including the right to establish routes and to require carriers to use a travel pattern which would result in the most efficient delivery of the mail. And he concluded that, although discretion whether to cross a lawn rests in the first instance with the individual carrier, this discretion must be exercised with a view not only to conditions on the route but also to the carrier's obligation "to deliver his route in the most efficient manner reasonably possible." Thus, while a blanket requirement that all carriers must cross all lawns could not be imposed, management was found to have reserved authority to direct an inefficient carrier to adopt a different travel pattern which may include appropriate shortcuts such as crossing a lawn in the absence of hazards and objections.⁵

Following that award, the Service issued a statement of its official position and instructions as follows:

A letter carrier must perform his duties and travel his route in precisely the same manner on inspection day as he does throughout the year. Therefore, if a letter carrier normally crosses a particular lawn, or normally uses any other available shortcut, in the course of delivering his route, management may adjust his route on the assumption that the carrier will normally cross that lawn or take that shortcut, and may require and order such carrier normally to cross that lawn or use that shortcut.

In the circumstances where the carrier has not normally crossed all or some lawns or used all or some shortcuts during the previous year, management may, in

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