United States v. Cnty. of Maricopa

• Decision Date: 15 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. CV–12–00981–PHX–ROS,CV–12–00981–PHX–ROS
• Citation: 151 F.Supp.3d 998
• Parties: United States of America, Plaintiff, v. Maricopa, County of, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Arizona

151 F.Supp.3d 998

United States of America, Plaintiff,
v.
Maricopa, County of, et al., Defendants.

No. CV–12–00981–PHX–ROS

United States District Court, D. Arizona.

Signed June 15, 2015

151 F.Supp.3d 1004

Edward G. Caspar, Jennifer Larissa Mondino, Jonathan M. Smith, Puneet Cheema, Brian Buehler, Paul Killebrew, Thomas Jackson Morse, Jr., U.S. Dept of Justice, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Charles W. Jirauch, Richard K. Walker, Roger Stephen Owers, Walker & Peskind PLLC, Scottsdale, AZ, Dan K. Webb, Joel E. Connolly, Winston & Strawn LLP, Chicago, IL, John T. Masterson, Joseph John Popolizio, Lori Lea Voepel, William R. Jones, Jr., Justin Michael Ackerman, Jones Skelton & Hochuli PLC, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendants.

ORDER

Honorable Roslyn O. Silver, Senior United States District Judge

Before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment (Doc. 332, 334, 345).

BACKGROUND

I. The Parties

Plaintiff the United States brought the present action alleging a pattern or practice of discrimination against Latinos in Maricopa County, Arizona by Defendants Joseph M. Arpaio (“Arpaio”) and Maricopa County in violation of the Constitution and federal statutes. Defendant Arpaio is the Sheriff of Maricopa County and heads the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office (“MCSO”). As MCSO's chief officer, Arpaio directs law enforcement throughout Maricopa County.¹ He is responsible for MCSO's policies and operations, which include all facets of policing and prison administration. MCSO is a subdivision of Maricopa County. Maricopa County's primary governing body is the Board of Supervisors (the “Board”). The Board consists of five Supervisors, each of whom is elected from one of Maricopa County's five districts. Maricopa County determines the budgets and provides the funding for its subdivisions, including municipal courts, public schools, and law enforcement (i.e.MCSO). Maricopa County receives federal financial assistance from the United States, which it distributes to various county subdivisions, including MCSO.

II. The Prior Litigation: Melendres v. Arpaio

In 2007, private individual plaintiffs initiated a class action lawsuit against Arpaio, MCSO, and Maricopa County, alleging MCSO officers engaged in racial discrimination against Latinos “under the guise of enforcing immigration law.” Ortega–Melendres v. Arpaio, 836 F.Supp.2d 959, 969 (D.Ariz.2011), aff'd sub nom. Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990 (9th Cir.2012) (hereinafter “Melendres ”). The case focused on “saturation patrols,” which were described as “crime suppression sweeps” in which officers saturate a given area and target persons who appeared to be Latino for investigation of their immigration status. (2:07–CV–02513–GMS, Doc. 26 at 10). Jose de Jesus Ortega–Melendres, the named plaintiff, was stopped in his vehicle by members of the MCSO's Human Smuggling Unit and detained without probable cause while officers investigated his immigration status, along with those of his passengers. Melendres v. Arpaio, 989 F.Supp.2d 822, 880 (D.Ariz.2013) ; (2:07–CV–02513–GMS, Doc. 26 at 17). The certified class of plaintiffs encompassed “[a]ll Latino persons who, since January 2007,

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have been or will be in the future stopped, detained, questioned or searched by [the defendants'] agents while driving or sitting in a vehicle on a public roadway or parking area in Maricopa County, Arizona.” Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir.2012). See also Ortega–Melendres v. Arpaio, 836 F.Supp.2d 959, 994 (D.Ariz.2011).

In May 2009, Maricopa County requested a stay pending the outcome of the United States' investigation of Arpaio's practices, which had begun one month earlier. The United States opposed the motion, as did Arpaio, and the court denied the stay due to the timing and uncertainty regarding the outcome of the United States' investigation. Melendres v. Maricopa Cnty., No. 07–cv–02513, 2009 WL 2515618, at *4 (D.Ariz. Aug. 13, 2009). Over the course of the Melendres litigation, the United States requested deposition transcripts and filed motions for protective orders regarding discovery. It also sought to transfer a 2010 Title VI enforcement action to the Melendres court.

In October 2009, the Melendres court granted a joint motion and stipulation to dismiss Maricopa County without prejudice. (2:07–CV–02513–GMS, Doc. 194). The stipulation stated, “Defendant Maricopa County is not a necessary party at this juncture for obtaining the complete relief sought.” (2:07–CV–02513–GMS, Doc. 178).

On May 24, 2013, the Melendres court issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Melendres v. Arpaio, 989 F.Supp.2d 822 (D.Ariz.2013) ( “Melendres Order”). The court held MCSO's “saturation patrols all involved using traffic stops as a pretext to detect those occupants of automobiles who may be in this country without authorization,” id. at 826, and “MCSO's use of Hispanic ancestry or race as a factor in forming reasonable suspicion that persons have violated state laws relating to immigration status violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 899. The court also found MCSO conducted discriminatory traffic stops outside of saturation patrols. Id. at 844–845, 889–890. The Melendres Order enjoined MCSO from “using Hispanic ancestry or race as [a] factor in making law enforcement decisions pertaining to whether a person is authorized to be in the country, and [ ] unconstitutionally lengthening [vehicle] stops.” Id. at 827.

After the ruling, the United States filed a statement of interest concerning potential forms of relief.² On October 2, 2013, the court issued its Supplemental Permanent Injunction/Judgment Order. Melendres v. Arpaio, No. CV–07–02513–PHX–GMS, 2013 WL 5498218, at *1 (D.Ariz. Oct. 2, 2013) (“Supplemental Order”). The order permanently enjoined Defendants from: 1) “[d]etaining, holding or arresting Latino occupants of vehicles in Maricopa County based on a reasonable belief, without more, that such persons are in the country without authorization”; 2) “[u]sing race or Latino ancestry as a factor in deciding whether to stop any vehicle” or in deciding whether a vehicle occupant was in the United States without authorization; (3) “[d]etaining Latino occupants of vehicles stopped for traffic violations for a period longer than reasonably necessary to resolve the traffic violation in the absence of reasonable suspicion that any of the

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vehicle's occupants have committed or are committing a violation of federal or state criminal law”; (4) “[d]etaining, holding or arresting Latino occupants of a vehicle ... for violations of the Arizona Human Smuggling Act without a reasonable basis for believing the necessary elements of the crime are present”; and (5) “[d]etaining, arresting or holding persons based on a reasonable suspicion that they are conspiring with their employer to violate the Arizona Employer Sanctions Act.” Id. The Supplemental Order also contained numerous provisions regarding the implementation of bias-free policing, including standards for bias-free detention and arrest policies and training, as well as detailed policies and procedures for ensuring and reviewing MCSO's compliance with the Melendres Order. The procedures included the appointment of an independent monitor to report on Arpaio and MCSO's compliance and collection of traffic stop data. Id.

Arpaio and MCSO appealed the Melendres Order and the Supplemental Order (collectively, the “Melendres injunction”), challenging provisions which addressed non-saturation patrol activities and arguing the evidence was insufficient to sustain the district court's conclusion that Arpaio and MCSO's unconstitutional policies extended beyond the context of saturation patrols. Melendres v. Apraio, No. 13–16285, Opening Brief of Defendant/Appellant Arpaio, Doc. 32–1, at 2, 13–15, 17–18 (March 17, 2014). MCSO also argued it was not a proper party in the case. Id.

On April 15, 2015, the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion holding MCSO was not a proper party because it is a non-jural entity lacking separate legal status from Maricopa County. Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir.2015). The Ninth Circuit ordered Maricopa County substituted as a party in lieu of MCSO. Id. at 1260. But the court also stated, “[o]n remand, the district court may consider dismissal of Sheriff Arpaio in his official capacity because ‘an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.’ ” Id.³ In addition, the court held the Melendres injunction was not overbroad because it applied to activities beyond saturation patrols: “Although the evidence largely addressed [the] use of race during saturation patrols, the district court did not clearly err in finding [Arpaio's] policy applied across-the-board to all law enforcement decisions—not just those made during saturation patrols.”⁴ Id. However, the court found the requirements for the independent monitor “to consider the ‘disciplinary outcomes for any violations of departmental policy’ and to assess whether Deputies are subject to ‘civil suits or criminal charges ... for off-duty conduct” were not narrowly tailored and ordered the district court “to tailor [these provisions] to address only the constitutional violations at issue.” Id. at 1267.

III. The Litigation Before This Court: U.S. v. Maricopa County

On March 10, 2009, the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) sent Arpaio a letter notifying him it was commencing an investigation of his office. (Doc. 333–3 at 6). Over a year later, on August 3, 2010, DOJ issued a “Notice of noncompliance with the obligation to cooperate with the Department of Justice investigation

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pursuant to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” (Doc. 333–3 at 9) (“Notice Letter”). Although the Notice Letter appears to have been mailed only to counsel for MCSO, counsel for Maricopa County responded to it. (Doc. 333–3 at 9). On August 12, 2010,...