United States v. Coles
| Decision Date | 16 January 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 10-4373,No. 09-2323,No. 10-4393,09-2323,10-4373,10-4393 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ALTON COLES a/k/a Naseem Coles Alton Coles, Appellant UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. TIMOTHY BAUKMAN a/k/a Tauheed Baukman a/k/a Tim Gotti a/k/a T Dog Timothy Baukman, Appellant UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JAMES MORRIS a/k/a "J" James Morris, Appellant |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
Nos. 2-05-cr-00440-001, 2-05-cr-00440-008 & 2-05-cr-00440-013
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 7, 2014
Before: SMITH, SHWARTZ, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
Alton Coles, Timothy Baukman, and James Morris appeal their convictions and sentences arising from their participation in a large cocaine and crack distribution conspiracy. For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the judgments on all contested counts.1
As we write primarily for the parties, we recite only the essential facts and procedural history. Coles, Baukman, and Morris were tried jointly in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania along with three other co-defendants. The evidence showed that Coles was the leader of an organization that processed, packaged, and distributed cocaine and cocaine base (crack), and Baukman was his right-hand man. Morris supplied Coles and Baukman with a significant amount of the cocaine that they distributed.
All three individuals were convicted on multiple counts.2 The District Court sentenced Coles to life imprisonment plus a consecutive sentence of 55 years, Baukman to 360 months' imprisonment, and Morris to life imprisonment. All three appealed.3
Baukman challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions for participating in a CCE, possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking conspiracy, money laundering, maintaining a storage facility for a controlled substance, and conspiracy. He also argues that his sentencing was improper because the jury did not find the amount of drugs attributable to him personally.
Baukman argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for engaging in a CCE in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848(a). To obtain a conviction for this offense, the Government was required to prove: (1) a felony violation of the federal narcotics law; (2) as part of a continuing series of violations; (3) in concert with five or more persons; (4) with respect to whom the defendant occupies a position of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management; (5) from which he derives substantial income or resources. United States v. Grayson, 795 F.2d 278, 283-84 (3d Cir. 1986).
We apply a "particularly deferential standard of review when deciding whether a jury verdict rests on legally sufficient evidence." United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and we "will sustain the verdict if 'any rational trier of fact could have found the essentialelements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1080 (3d Cir. 1996)).
Baukman contends that the Government did not prove the third and fourth elements: that he was an organizer or supervisor of five or more individuals. The so-called "organizer or supervisor" and "numerosity" requirements are "obvious manifestation[s] of Congress's concern to fight the growth of large-scale profit-making drug enterprises." United States v. Aguilar, 843 F.2d 155, 157 (3d Cir. 1988) (quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted). These requirements thus "distinguish minor enterprise employees from those who conceive and coordinate enterprise activities." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). The five individuals need not be "under the direct and immediate control or supervision of [the] defendant." United States v. Ricks, 882 F.2d 885, 891 (4th Cir. 1989). Moreover, the defendant "need not have had personal contact with each of the five persons involved," and "the delegation of managerial and supervisory duties will not defeat an individual's ultimate status as organizer, supervisor, or manager." United States v. Apodaca, 843 F.2d 421, 426 (10th Cir. 1986).
Baukman argues that the government failed to prove that he was an organizer or supervisor because the evidence consisted only of testimony of co-conspirators that Baukman was Coles's trusted associate and that Baukman merely engaged in some drug transactions with the other individuals. While a mere buyer-seller relationship is insufficient to support a CCE conviction, see id., the evidence here, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, supports the conclusion that he was a manager of at least five individuals.
Kristina Latney, Coles's paramour, testified that Baukman was Coles's "right hand man," Supp. App. 333, in the drug organization. Moreover, the evidence showed that Baukman: (1) leased the Essex Avenue apartment, which was used to store, process, and package cocaine, in the name of his four-year-old son, and paid the rent and utilities from an account in his son's name; (2) consulted with Coles about the pricing of drugs, and work conditions, including the fact that one conspirator had not worn gloves or a mask while preparing the cocaine and subsequently tested positive for drug use; (3) was contacted to secure a lawyer when a conspirator needed one; and (4) supervised at least two street-level managers, Custis and "Bub," in part by providing cocaine on a consignment basis; see United States v. Becker, 892 F.2d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 1989) (). These managers, Custis and "Bub," in turn supervised numerous street-level sellers, including Troy Wilson, Leroy Perkins, Barry White, Alfonso Kearny, as well as two others referred to as "Ezz," and "Seneca." In short, there was considerable evidence from which the jury could conclude that Baukman was a manager or supervisor of at least five people involved in this drug enterprise. Accordingly, we will affirm the conviction on the CCE count.
Baukman also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction on Count 63 for possession of firearms in furtherance of the drug trafficking conspiracy charged in Count 1. Baukman contends that there is an insufficient nexus between the guns, which were found during a search of Baukman's personal residence on SchoolHouse Lane in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and the drug trafficking conspiracy, because no controlled substances were found in the residence with the guns and no direct evidence links the residence to drug trafficking.
We apply a non-exclusive list of eight factors to determine if there is a sufficient nexus between the possession of guns and the predicate crime to warrant a conviction under § 924(c). United States v. Sparrow, 371 F.3d 851, 853 (3d Cir. 2004). Those are:
the type of drug activity that is being conducted, accessibility of the firearm, the type of the weapon, whether the weapon is stolen, the status of the possession (legitimate or illegal), whether the gun is loaded, proximity to drugs or drug profits, and the time and circumstances under which the gun is found.
Id. (citation omitted).
Applying these factors, there was sufficient evidence linking the guns to the drug trafficking. The guns were found near bundles of cash and a money counting machine. See United States v. Reyes, 930 F.2d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 1991) (). Moreover, the guns were accessibly located in closets in the entryway and living room, the guns included a fully automatic machine gun and a semi-automatic pistol, the serial number on one gun had been removed, and, while the guns were not loaded, they were stored with fully-loaded magazines. On these facts, together with evidence that Baukman delivered drug money to Coles, the jury had sufficient evidence to conclude that the money found was from drug sales and his "possession of the firearm[s] advanced or helped forward [Baukman's] drug trafficking crime." Sparrow, 371 F.3d at 853.
Baukman's assertion that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for thirty-two counts of money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) (promotion money laundering) involving the lease payments for the Essex Avenue apartment (Counts 89-120), and fifty-five counts of money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (concealment money laundering) involving the lease payments for his residence on School House Lane and his car (Counts 121-175) also fails.
The elements of promotion money laundering are: (1) the defendant knowingly conducted or attempted to conduct a financial transaction; (2) the defendant knew that the funds or property involved in the financial transaction involved the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity; (3) the transaction in fact involved the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; and (4) the defendant engaged in the financial transaction with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i); United States v. Omoruyi, 260 F.3d 291, 294 (3d Cir. 2001). The elements of concealment money laundering are identical as to the first three elements but the fourth element requires instead that the defendant knew "that the transactions were designed in whole or in part to conceal the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity." Id. at 294-95 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)).
On appeal, Baukman argues that the Government failed to...
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