United States v. Collins
| Decision Date | 07 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | 1:19-cr-251-3 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF, v. MALCOLM COLLINS, DEFENDANT. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
Before the Court is the pro se motion of defendant Malcolm Collins (“Collins”) to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc No. 630 [“Mot.”].) Plaintiff United States of America (the “government”) opposes the motion (Doc. No. 637 [“Opp'n”]), and Collins has filed a reply. (Doc. No. 643 ().) In connection with his motion to vacate, Collins seeks the appointment of counsel. (Mot. at 4279[1].) For the reasons that follow, the Court determines that the appointment of counsel is not appropriate and that Collins is not entitled to relief under § 2255.
Collins was one of twenty-one (21) individuals charged in a drug trafficking conspiracy that distributed fentanyl and fentanyl analogues throughout Cleveland between 2017 and 2018. (Doc. No. 510 (Final Presentence Investigation Report [“PSR”]) at 3535-39.) Specifically, the indictment, returned April 24, 2019, charged Collins with drug-related crimes, including conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin, fentanyl, and fentanyl analogues (Count 1); possession with intent to distribute heroin, fentanyl, and carfentanil (Count 5); and use of a communications facility to facilitate a felony drug offense (Count 12). (Doc. No. 13 (Indictment [“Ind.”]).) Relevant to the present motion to vacate, Count 6 charged Collins with being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (Id. at 290.) With respect to Count 6, the indictment specifically charged that Collins was in possession of a firearm and ammunition having been previously convicted of a 2004 felony drug trafficking crime. (Id.)
On October 18, 2019, pursuant to a plea agreement, Collins entered a plea of guilty to Counts 1, 5, and 6 of the indictment. (10/18/2019 Minutes of Proceedings; Doc. No. 368 (Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending acceptance of guilty pleas); Doc. No. 402 (Order Adopting R&R); Doc. No. 403 (Plea Agreement [“PA”]).) Pertinent to the felon in possession charge, the plea agreement contained the following stipulation:
On or about April 3, 2019, in the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, Defendant MALCOLM COLLINS, having been previously convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, those [sic] being: Trafficking Drugs, Case Number CR-04-44820, in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, on or about May 18, 2004, did knowingly possess in and affecting interstate commerce, a firearm, to wit Diamondback, Model DB380, .380, serial number ZB1061, and ammunition, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 922(g)(1).
(PA ¶ 25.) Collins signed the plea agreement and initialed each page. (See generally id)
During the change of plea hearing on October 18, 2019, in which Collins appeared with his counsel, the magistrate judge conducted a standard colloquy with Collins in compliance with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The magistrate judge reviewed with Collins the terms of the plea agreement and specifically addressed the constitutional rights Collins was forfeiting by entering guilty pleas, the charges to which he was pleading guilty, the statutory penalties associated with those charges, the application of the sentencing guidelines and possible enhancements, and the elements of the charged offenses. In response, Collins stated he understood and was prepared to enter a plea of guilty to Counts 1, 5, and 6. The magistrate judge also reviewed with Collins the statement of facts set forth in the plea agreement, including the facts relating to the felon in possession charge, and Collins indicated that he understood and that he was guilty of those offenses. (See generally Doc. No. 385 (Transcript from Change of Plea Hearing [“COP TR”]).) At the conclusion of the plea colloquy, the magistrate judge accepted Collins's plea, subject to approval by the Court, as having been made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily with the advice of counsel. (COP TR at 2108.) On November 27, 2019, the Court adopted the magistrate judge's R&R recommending that Collins' guilty plea be accepted. (See Doc. No. 402.) On February 11, 2020, the Court sentenced Collins to a term of imprisonment of 60 months for each count, with the terms to run concurrently. Collins was also sentenced to a term of supervised release of five years. (2/11/2019 Minutes of Proceedings; Doc. No. 532 (Judgement).)
Collins did not take a direct appeal. Instead, on November 30, 2020, Collins filed the present § 2255 motion. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Rehaif v. United States, ___U.S.___, 139 S.Ct. 2191, 204 L.Ed.2d 594 (2019), Collins attacks his conviction under § 922(g)(1), insisting that he “was not aware that he could not own [or] possess a firearm and/or weapon.” (Mot. at 4275, capitalization omitted).
In Rehaif, the Supreme Court held that “in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the Government must prove both that the defendant knew that he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” 139 S.Ct. at 2200. Collins insists that his § 922(g)(1) is deficient because the government failed to establish both prongs. (Mot. at 4276.)
Collins also challenges his felon in possession conviction on the grounds that the predicate offense was more than 10 years old, that the weapon was not in his physical possession, and that as a result of his conviction under § 922(g)(1), he is precluded from benefitting from the Residential Drug Abuse Program (“RDAP”) and other rehabilitative credits and/or sentence reductions otherwise available in prison. (Id. at 4275.)
The government argues that Collins' claims are procedurally defaulted, barred by his plea agreement, and untimely. (Opp'n at 4304.) Because the Court finds that the present motion is barred-and the issues contained therein either procedurally defaulted or improperly raised in the context of a motion to vacate-the Court need not reach the issue of timeliness.
A federal prisoner may attack the validity of his sentence by filing a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the district court where he was sentenced. Section 2255 sets forth four grounds upon which a federal prisoner may state a claim for relief: “[1] the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or [2] that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or [3] that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or [4] [the sentence] is otherwise subject to collateral attack[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
A criminal defendant may not utilize a § 2255 motion as a substitute for a direct appeal. Regalado v. United States, 334 F.3d 520, 528 (6th Cir. 2003); Capaldi v. Pontesso, 135 F.3d 1122, 1124 (6th Cir. 1998) (“An application under § 2255 . . . should not be considered a substitute for direct appeal.”); see Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993); Watson v. United States, 165 F.3d 486, 488 (6th Cir. 1999). To assert a claim not raised on direct appeal, a petitioner ordinarily must show cause for the default and prejudice. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622, 118 S.Ct. 1064, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 1584, 1603-04, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1998).
A petitioner who entered a guilty plea must show an error of constitutional magnitude that had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the proceedings. Griffin v. United States, 330 F.3d 733, 736 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Abrahamson, 507 U.S. at 637). Therefore, a court may only grant relief under § 2255 if the petitioner demonstrates “‘a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.'” Id. at 736 (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346, 94 S.Ct. 2298, 41 L.Ed.2d 109 (1974)). A petitioner further bears the burden of articulating sufficient facts to state a viable claim for relief under § 2255. Vague and conclusory claims which are not substantiated by allegations of specific facts with some probability of verity are not enough to warrant relief. A § 2255 motion may be dismissed if it only makes conclusory statements without substantiating allegations of specific facts and fails to state a claim cognizable under § 2255. Green v. Wingo, 454 F.2d 52, 53 (6th Cir. 1972); O'Malley v. United States, 285 F.2d 733, 735 (6th Cir. 1961).
When a petitioner challenges the validity of a plea, the representations of the petitioner, his lawyer, the prosecutor, and the judge “constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977). Such “[s]olemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.” Id. Subsequently-presented conclusory allegations that fly in the face of the record are subject to summary dismissal. Id.
A court should hold an evidentiary hearing “[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief[.]” 28 U.S.C § 2255(b). Thus, “no hearing is required if the petitioner's allegations ‘cannot be accepted as true because they are contradicted by the record, inherently incredible, or conclusions rather than statements of...
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