United States v. Cooper

• Citation: 610 F.Supp.3d 184
• Decision Date: 30 June 2022
• Docket Number: Criminal Action No. 99-0266 (ABJ)
• Parties: UNITED STATES, v. Carl COOPER, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

610 F.Supp.3d 184

UNITED STATES,

v.Carl COOPER, Defendant.

Criminal Action No. 99-0266 (ABJ)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed June 30, 2022

Margaret J. Chriss, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office Special Proceedings Section, Washington, DC, Sara Guccini Vanore, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for United States.

Benjamin M. Flick, Public Defender, Federal Public Defender for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

Carl Cooper, Coleman, FL, Pro Se.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

AMY BERMAN JACKSON, United States District Judge

Pending before the Court is the motion filed by defendant Carl Cooper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He was convicted in 2000 of forty-seven counts, and he seeks to vacate the eight convictions for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 924 now that the Supreme Court has held that the residual clause of that criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague. Mot. to Vacate Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [Dkt. # 163] ("Def.’s Mot.") at 4, citing United States v. Davis , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2336, 204 L.Ed.2d 757 (2019) ; Def.’s Suppl. Mot. to Vacate J. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Based on Johnson and Davis [Dkt. # 166] ("Def.’s Suppl. Mot.") at 1. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will GRANT the motion in part as to Counts 16 and 46 and DENY it in part as to the remainder of the challenged counts: 7, 12, 25, 36, 39, and 42.

BACKGROUND

This matter arises out of a series of robberies and murders committed in the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania from 1993 to 1997, including the murder of three employees in a Washington, D.C. Starbucks coffee shop in 1997. Indictment [Dkt. # 1] at 5–10.¹ On August 4, 1999, a grand jury sitting for the U.S. District Court of District of Columbia indicted defendant on forty-eight counts related to those crimes. Indictment; Gov't’s Opp. to Def.’s Mot. [Dkt. # 170] ("Gov't Opp.") at 2. Of the forty-eight counts, eight charged violations of section 924(c) :

Count Seven: 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), Use of a Firearm during a Crime of Violence on June 4, 1996.

Count Twelve: 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), Use of a Firearm during a Crime of Violence on August 12, 1996.

Count Sixteen: 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), Use of a Firearm during a Crime of Violence on September 8, 1996.

Count Twenty-Five: 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), Use of a Firearm during a Crime of Violence on June 26, 1997.

Count Thirty-Six: 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c), (j), Murder in the Course of Using a Firearm during a Crime of Violence on July 6, 1997.

Count Thirty-Nine: 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c), (j), Murder in the Course of Using a Firearm during a Crime of Violence on July 6, 1997.

Count Forty-Two: 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c), (j), Murder in the Course of Using a Firearm during a Crime of Violence on July 6, 1997.

Count Forty-Six: 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), Use of a Firearm during a Crime of Violence in 1997.

See Indictment.

On April 25, 2000, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(1)(C), defendant pled guilty to all forty-eight counts. Plea Agreement [Dkt. # 150]; see also Def.’s Suppl. Mot. at 1. The court accepted the plea agreement on the same day and entered judgment on forty-seven counts, dismissing Count 20 on the government's motion. See J. in a Crim. Case [Dkt. # 160] ("Judgment"). Among other offenses, defendant was convicted of one count of first degree murder while armed and one count of felony murder while armed on June 10, 1993; three counts of first degree murder while armed and three counts of felony murder while armed on July 6, 1997; two counts of Hobbs Act robbery on June 14, 1997 and June 26, 1997; and four counts of conspiracy to interfere with commerce by robbery. See Judgment at 1.

The court imposed the agreed sentence that included five concurrent terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, plus an additional 107 mandatory consecutive years. Judgment at 3; see also Def.’s Suppl. Mot. at 1. Two of the five concurrent life imprisonment sentences were for Counts 1 and 2, which defendant does not challenge. See Judgement at 3. The other three sentences of life imprisonment were imposed for violations of section 924 : Counts 36, 39, and 42. See Judgment at 3. The remainder of the section 924(c) convictions resulted in a total of 107 years in addition to the five concurrent life sentences: seven years on Count 7 and twenty-five years on Counts 12, 16, 25, and 46 to be served consecutively. Id.

Defendant did not file any direct appeals. Def.’s Suppl. Mot. at 2; Gov't Opp. at 7.

Section 924(c) provides for enhanced punishment of those defendants convicted of the use of a firearm during the commission of a "crime of violence," which is defined by the statute to "mean[ ] an offense that is a felony and – (A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or (B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense. " 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3) (emphasis added). On June 25, 2019, the Supreme Court held that what has been referred to as the "residual clause" of the provision was unconstitutionally vague. United States v. Davis , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2326, 204 L.Ed.2d 757 (2019), citing Sessions v. Dimaya , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1216, 200 L.Ed.2d 549 (2018).

On June 8, 2020, defendant filed a pro se section 2255 motion to vacate his eight convictions under section 924(c) – counts 7, 12, 16, 25, 36, 39, 42, and 46 – given the Davis ruling. Def.’s Mot. at 4.² On October 20, 2020, the Federal Public Defender filed a supplement to defendant's pro se motion, arguing that two of the eight convictions – 16 and 46 – are invalid. See Def.’s Suppl. Mot. The government opposed the motion, Gov't Opp., and defendant replied. Reply in Support of Motion to Vacate Judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [Dkt. # 171]. On June 15, 2021, defendant filed a second supplement to his submission. Second Suppl. Mot. to Vacate [Dkt. # 172].

LEGAL STANDARD

Section 2255 requires a court to vacate a defendant's sentence if it finds "that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). The court must "set the judgment aside" and "discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate." Id.

To prevail on a motion to vacate a sentence under this provision, defendant must show that his "sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). A defendant bears the burden of proving his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Simpson , 475 F.2d 934, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1973). "Relief under § 2255 is an extraordinary remedy in light of society's legitimate interest in the finality of judgments." United States v. Zakas , 793 F. Supp. 2d 77, 80 (D.D.C. 2011). So the defendant in a section 2255 proceeding "must clear a significantly higher hurdle than would exist on direct appeal." United States v. Frady , 456 U.S. 152, 166, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982).

When considering a section 2255 motion, the decision to hold a hearing "is committed to the district court's discretion." United States v. Pollard , 959 F.2d 1011, 1030–31 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The statute provides that the court must hear the matter "[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). The rules governing section 2255 proceedings add that "[i]f it plainly appears from the motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings that the moving party is not entitled to relief, the judge must dismiss the motion." R. Governing § 2255 Proceedings in U.S. District Courts 4(b). "[S]ummary denial of a § 2255 motion is appropriate ... when the [claims do] not necessitate the consideration of any information not within the record or within the memory of the judge ruling on the motion." United States v. Morrison , 98 F.3d 619, 626 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

ANALYSIS

When defendant was sentenced in 2000, section 924(c)(3) defined a "crime of violence" as a felony offense that either:

(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or

(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). Defendant's motion seeks to invalidate his convictions under subpart (B), referred to as the residual clause, because the Supreme Court in Davis held that the residual clause was constitutionally vague. Def.’s Mot. at 4, citing Davis , 139 S. Ct. at 2319 (challenging all eight convictions under subpart B); Def.’s Suppl. Mot. (addressing only challenges to Counts 16 and 46). The government argues that defendant has failed to satisfy the procedural requirements for filing a section 2255 motion, and that Davis does not invalidate the challenged convictions in any event. See Gov't Opp.

I. The Supreme Court's Residual Clause Rulings

In 2015, the Supreme Court ruled that the "residual clause" of the Armed Career Criminal Act's ("ACCA") was unconstitutionally vague. Johnson v. United States , 576 U.S. 591, 597, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015). Under the ACCA, a defendant convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm faces a more severe punishment if he has three or more previous convictions for a "violent...