United States v. Cornell, 2818

• Decision Date: 21 December 1940
• Docket Number: No. 2818,2819.,2818
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. CORNELL (two cases).
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Idaho

36 F. Supp. 81

UNITED STATES v. CORNELL (two cases).

Nos. 2818, 2819.

District Court, D. Idaho, S. D.

December 21, 1940.

John A. Carver, U. S. Dist. Atty., and E. H. Casterlin and Paul S. Boyd, Asst. U. S. Dist. Attys., all of Boise, Idaho, for plaintiff.

Vernon K. Smith, of Boise, Idaho, for defendants.

CAVANAH, District Judge.

The two defendants were indicted in separate indictments which are identical and are based upon the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix, § 301 et seq.

The indictment in each case charges the defendant with evading the requirement of the act in refusing to register in the land and naval forces of the United States at the time and in the manner prescribed in the act, and the rules and regulations made pursuant thereto.

Identical motions to quash the indictments were made in each case, and the primary ground thereof is that Congress had no power or authority under the Constitution to compel peacetime military registration, training and service and therefore the act, being violative of certain provisions of the Constitution, is unconstitutional. It is urged that the act violated the 4th, 5th, and 13th amendments of the Constitution, reserving in times of peace, the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures; and deprives a person of his liberty without due process of law; compels involuntary servitude, and delegates legislative and judicial powers to the Executive Department.

We find that the Constitution grants to Congress power to provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; to raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years; to provide and maintain a navy; to make rules for the government and regulation of land and naval forces; and to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers and all other powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or office thereof.

The inquiry then is, are these provisions of the Constitution broad enough to grant to Congress the power to enact the Selective Service Training Act of 1940?

As to their scope and meaning, we find numerous views expressed at the time of the adoption of the Constitution by the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, and thereafter by the courts when in interpreting them, and after all said by the delegates who seriously considered these plain provisions of the Constitution which do not contain any qualifications or limitations as to whether powers so granted should be only exercised during war time and not during peace time, except the limitation respecting the appropriation of money for that purpose.

Often we consider what was said by those who took part in enacting a constitutional or statutory provision so as to give aid to us in knowing what was their intent. Among those who took part in the adoption of the Constitution different views were expressed upon this question and therefore we have to look to the plain language used in the Constitution and give it such interpretation as is practical and efficient.

Our national history and court decisions uniformly have recognized the existence of the power of Congress under the Constitution to compel military service of a citizen in case of need, when it so declares, whether in peace time or war time, and to make preparation, if Congress declares that it is imperative or necessary, or that an emergency exists requiring the raising and support of an army. It would not have to wait to prepare for defense until the nation was actually invaded, and under such a situation a formal declaration of war would not have to be made before Congress would have power to "raise and support an army", as the power is impliedly given to Congress under the provision of the Constitution "To raise and support Armies", art. 1, § 8, cl. 12, and such power is not prohibited by the provision of the Constitution granting Congress the power to "declare war". Prior to the middle of the eighteenth century a declaration of war was necessary but since then formal declarations have fallen into disuse, as declarations are merely a mode of notification, the fact of war may speak louder than words, and as war has existed for some time between certain powerful nations and open threats are made to carry it to our shores, it would seem logical to say that before Congress enacted the Selective Training Service Act of 1940, it had before it, and in mind, a situation which caused it to believe that an emergency existed and it was imperative for the nation to increase its armed forces, as they realized that it was greatly needed and necessary in the defense of our national existence.

This fundamental principle as to the power of Congress was observed by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 38 S.Ct. 159, 161, 62 L.Ed. 349, L.R.A.1918C, 361, Ann.Cas.1918B, 856, where Mr. Chief...