United States v. Coulter
| Decision Date | 18 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | 21-6118 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. GERMAINE COULTER, SR., a/k/a Slim, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma (D.C. No. 5:18-CR-00156-D-1)
Bill Zuhdi, The Zuhdi Law Firm, Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendant-Appellant.
Tiffany Noble, Assistant United States Attorney (Robert J Troester, United States Attorney, with her on the brief) Oklahoma City, OK, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before MATHESON, CARSON, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Germaine Coulter, Sr., appeals his convictions for child sex trafficking and conspiracy to commit child sex trafficking. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
For many years, Mr. Coulter was a pimp in the Oklahoma City area. Upon release from a five-year state prison term in 2017, he conscripted an underage girl, "Doe 2," to recruit a schoolmate, "Doe 1," to perform sex work for him. He gave Doe 1 a ride home from school, proposed that she work for him, and promised her money and gifts in return. After Doe 1 expressed interest, Elizabeth Andrade, one of Mr. Coulter's longtime sex workers, took pictures of Doe 1 in various stages of undress and sent them to Mr. Coulter. He forwarded the photos to potential clients with messages suggesting that Doe 1 would perform sex acts for money. Ms. Andrade also sent the photos to potential clients and used one of the photos to advertise Doe 1's services online.
Doe 1 had sexual encounters with clients for money. Mr. Coulter gave her detailed instructions about how much she should charge and when to collect the money. He also told Ms. Andrade to teach Doe 1 how to perform various sex acts. Ms. Andrade took Doe 1 on a "call" with her, and both of them had sex with the client.
Around the same time, Mr. Coulter attempted to recruit another underage girl, "Doe 3." He gave Doe 3 a ride home from school and asked whether she wanted to earn money by "prostitut[ing] [her]self with the other girls." ROA, Vol. III at 864. Doe 3 told Mr. Coulter she would "think about it," but she had no interest in working for him and never did. Id. at 867.
A grand jury indicted Mr. Coulter and later issued a superseding indictment charging him with (1) conspiring with Ms. Andrade to commit child sex trafficking, (2) child sex trafficking with respect to Doe 1, and (3) child sex trafficking with respect to Doe 3. The grand jury also indicted Ms. Andrade for conspiracy to commit child sex trafficking. She pled guilty.
The case against Mr. Coulter proceeded to a jury trial. The Government introduced testimony from (1) law enforcement agents who investigated Mr. Coulter; (2) Ms. Andrade and other women who had worked for Mr. Coulter; (3) Does 1, 2, and 3; and (4) the client who had the sexual encounter with Ms. Andrade and Doe 1. The Government also introduced into evidence Mr. Coulter's cell phone records, which corroborated these witnesses' testimony.
We note three occurrences during trial that are relevant to this appeal. First, the Government elicited testimony from two witnesses about the deaths of two women associated with Mr. Coulter-Elizabeth Diaz and Jamie Biggers. Defense counsel objected to some questions about Ms. Diaz's death, arguing they implied that Mr. Coulter was responsible.[2] The district court sustained the objection and forbade the Government from "rais[ing] an inference that [Mr. Coulter is] responsible for th[e] girl's death." ROA, Vol. III at 427. During closing arguments, the Government briefly mentioned Ms. Diaz, but did not suggest that Mr. Coulter had killed her.
Second, the district court appointed a guardian ad litem for each of the minors involved in the case. At one point during Doe 1's testimony, defense counsel requested a bench conference and asserted that Doe 1's guardian ad litem had mouthed "[y]ou're doing a good job" to Doe 1 while she was on the stand. ROA, Vol. III at 690. The district court had not observed this conduct, but at defense counsel's request, the court told the guardian ad litem to avoid signaling Doe 1 during her testimony. The court also delivered a curative instruction to the jury.
Third, the jury deliberated for about six hours before reporting it had reached a verdict. It filled out verdict forms finding Mr. Coulter guilty on Counts 1 and 2-the conspiracy charge and the child sex trafficking charge related to Doe 1-but said it was deadlocked on Count 3-the child sex trafficking charge related to Doe 3. When the district court polled the jury, one juror, Ms. Noland, said the verdict did not reflect her opinion and expressed that she did not want to return to the deliberations.
The district court recessed for the weekend. On Monday morning, Mr. Coulter moved for a mistrial based on these events with the jury. The district court denied the motion.
The judge then spoke with Ms. Noland in chambers. She said that she was willing to continue deliberating. The court next convened the jury and delivered an Allen instruction encouraging the jury to try to reach unanimity.[3] After several more hours of deliberation, the jury again returned a guilty verdict on Counts 1 and 2 but reported it could not reach agreement on Count 3.[4] All jurors confirmed their assent to the published verdict.
Mr. Coulter later moved for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a), asserting that (1) the evidence against him was insufficient to support the jury verdict and (2) the district court erred in admitting testimony about the deaths of Ms. Diaz and Ms. Biggers. The court denied the motion. It sentenced Mr. Coulter to 360 months in prison. This appeal followed.
We set out additional facts and procedural history as needed in reviewing the issues Mr. Coulter raises.
On appeal, Mr. Coulter argues:
As discussed below, Mr. Coulter failed to raise a contemporaneous objection to preserve several of these issues. When a party fails to preserve an issue, we review only for plain error. United States v. Mullins, 613 F.3d 1273, 1283 (10th Cir. 2010). "A plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the court's attention." Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). We provide a brief overview of plain error here.
Under plain error review, the appellant bears the burden to "show the district court committed (1) error (2) that is clear or obvious under current law, and which both (3) affected [his] substantial rights and (4) undermined the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Mullins, 613 F.3d at 1283.
"In general, for an error to be [clear or obvious and] contrary to well-settled law"-the second prong of plain error-"either the Supreme Court or this court must have addressed the issue." United States v. DeChristopher, 695 F.3d 1082, 1091 (10th Cir. 2012) (quotations omitted).
To establish that an error affects a defendant's "substantial rights"-the third prong-the appellant must show "there is a reasonable probability that, but for the error claimed, the result of the proceeding would have been different." United States v. Bustamante-Conchas, 850 F.3d 1130, 1138 (10th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (quotations omitted). An appellant facing "overwhelming evidence of his guilt" usually "cannot establish a reasonable probability" that an alleged error "affected the outcome of the trial." See United States v. Ibarra-Diaz, 805 F.3d 908, 926 (10th Cir. 2015).
Finally, the fourth prong of plain error review-whether an error "seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings"-is a inquiry. Bustamante-Conchas, 750 F.3d at 1141 (quotations omitted). Generally, "the seriousness of the error must be examined in the context of the case as a whole," and the error must be "the kind [] that undermines the fairness of the judicial process." Id. at 1141-42 (quotations omitted).
Mr. Coulter argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. In particular, he contends that Ms. Andrade and Doe 1 were not credible witnesses. Aplt. Br. at 38-39. We reject his argument and affirm.
"We review [an] insufficiency-of-the-evidence claim de novo." United States v. Benford, 875 F.3d 1007, 1014 (10th Cir. 2017) (quotations omitted). "Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if, viewing the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. "In reviewing the evidence, we do not weigh conflicting evidence or consider witness credibility, as these duties are delegated exclusively to the jury." United States v. Evans, 318 F.3d 1011, 1018 (10th Cir. 2003).
The Government presented more than sufficient evidence to support Mr. Coulter's two convictions.
To convict Mr. Coulter of child sex trafficking, the jury had to find that Mr. Coulter:
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