United States v. Cowart, Cr. No. 1648-53.

• Decision Date: 08 February 1954
• Docket Number: Cr. No. 1648-53.
• Citation: 118 F. Supp. 903
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. COWART.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

118 F. Supp. 903

UNITED STATES v. COWART.

Cr. No. 1648-53.

United States District Court District of Columbia, Criminal Division.

February 8, 1954.

Joseph A. Lowther, Attorney, Dept. of Justice, Leo A. Rover, U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.

Emory W. Reisinger, II, Washington, D. C., Lester L. May, Howard Dailey, Dallas, Tex., for defendant.

MORRIS, District Judge.

The present indictment, which is attacked by several motions of the defendant, upon which hearing was had and memorandum briefs submitted, charges in substance that the defendant, who was an employee of the Department of Agriculture of the United States, did knowingly and wilfully make false and fraudulent statements of representations in a matter within the jurisdiction of said Department of Agriculture, said matter being an investigation of whether or not the defendant held a financial interest in the Baton Rouge Warehouses, Inc., of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and was rendering and was about to render services for said warehouse corporation, which said investigation was being conducted under the supervision of William H. Duggan, Chief of Compliance and Investigation Production and Marketing Administration, Department of Agriculture. The alleged false statement, made on or about October 17, 1950, within the District of Columbia, is set forth in the indictment, and in substance denies that the defendant owned any part of said "warehouse," which statement of the defendant is alleged to be false and fraudulent in that the defendant was then and there the owner of capital stock of Baton Rouge Warehouses, Inc., Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and later received the proceeds of the sale of said stock, all of which was well known to the defendant at the time he wrote the letter containing the statement referred to.

The motion of the defendant to quash and dismiss the indictment asserts that the same does not charge an offense against the laws of the United States, and that the indictment is ambiguous and uncertain, merely stating the conclusions of the pleader. These grounds were not seriously urged in argument in support of motion, and I cannot agree that the indictment is defective in these respects.

In paragraphs 3 and 4, it is asserted that the indictment does not state that the alleged false and fraudulent statements and representations were of a material nature, and neither does it state in what respect said alleged false statements of the defendant were pertinent or material. These grounds were argued very thoroughly, and much reliance was placed upon the case of Rolland v. United States, 5 Cir., 200 F.2d 678. The holding in that case is that, with respect to an indictment for the violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which is the same section involved in the instant case, it is necessary to the validity of the indictment that the alleged false statements be stated in haec verba to be material, or that facts be stated which show them to be material. It, of course, also holds that the proof must sustain such allegations in order to justify a conviction. I have no quarrel with this principle, but I am satisfied that the allegations of the indictment here show that the alleged false statements are material to a proper exercise of the jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the choice of personnel with which to administer and exercise such jurisdiction. I, therefore, cannot sustain the motion in respect of the two grounds last stated.

Paragraph 5 insists that, by the present indictment, the defendant is being put in jeopardy for the second time in connection with the same offense. It is asserted that the defendant was tried and acquitted on the same offense in the United States District Court at Alexandria, Virginia, before the Honorable Albert B. Bryan, Judge thereof; that the same alleged false and fraudulent statement was offered in evidence at that trial, and the same William H. Duggan testified at said trial, and the facts in the instant case are founded and built upon the facts in the case which was tried in said court in Alexandria, Virginia, and the defendant having been acquitted therein cannot be put upon trial again upon the indictment here under consideration. This is clearly an assertion of a plea of autrefois acquit, or double jeopardy, prohibited by the Constitution, Amend. 5. Obviously there is no double jeopardy here involved, as the charge upon which the defendant was tried, and which resulted in a judgment of acquittal by Judge Bryan, was a violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 281, in that the defendant received compensation from the said Baton Rouge Warehouses, Inc., for services rendered by the defendant before the Department of Agriculture, while here the charge is for a different offense, namely, the making of a false...