United States v. Craig

• Decision Date: 11 October 1886
• Citation: 28 F. 795
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. CRAIG.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

28 F. 795

UNITED STATES v. CRAIG.

United States Circuit Court, E.D. Michigan.

October 11, 1886

C. P Black, U.S. Atty., John Atkinson, and Don M. Dickinson, for the United States.

L. T Griffin, for defendant.

BROWN J.

This demurrer raises the single question of the constitutionality of what is known as the 'Assisted Immigration Act,' of February 26, 1885, the third section of which enacts 'that, for every violation of any of the provisions of section one of this act, the person, partnership, company, or corporation violating the same, by knowingly assisting encouraging, or soliciting the migration or importation of any alien or aliens, foreigner or foreigners, into the United States,' etc., 'to perform labor or service of any kind, under contract or agreement, express or implied, parol or special, with such alien or aliens, foreigner or foreigners, previous to becoming residents or citizens of the United States, shall forfeit and pay for every such offense the sum of one thousand dollars. ' The contention of the government is that the act is a valid exercise of the power of congress 'to regulate commerce with foreign nations.'

The extent of this power, and the definition of the word 'commerce,' were at an early day made the subject of an elaborate discussion in the famous case of Gibbons v Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1. It was claimed by the strict constructionists of that period that the power of congress was limited to the regulation of traffic in goods, to buying and selling, or the interchange of commodities; but it was held by the court to comprehend the whole subject of navigation and intercourse with foreign nations and between the states, and to be subject to no limitation other than those prescribed in the constitution itself.

The same questions were again discussed in the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, in which was involved the constitutionality of certain state laws requiring the masters of vessels engaged in foreign commerce to pay a tax upon every passenger brought into the state. The case raised two questions: (1) Whether the power of congress to regulate commerce was exclusive; and (2) whether the state statutes in question were regulations of commerce. Both these questions were answered in the affirmative. The first was considered to have already been settled by prior decisions. With regard to the meaning of the word 'commerce,' the definition of the lexicographers, 'an exchange of commodities,' was rejected. It was again held to include all navigation and intercourse,-- to the transportation of passengers as well as property,-- and, as a legitimate deduction from this, that the state laws in question imposing a tax upon this intercourse were unconstitutional.

These views have been reiterated in subsequent decisions. Indeed, it is now settled that the power of congress under this clause extends, not merely to the regulation of navigation and intercourse, and to the coasting trade and fisheries, within as well as without the state, whenever connected with foreign or interstate commerce, but to the control and government of seamen of American vessels, to the nationalization of all ships, built and owned in the United States, by registries and enrollments, to the recording of the muniments of title of all American vessels, to the laws of quarantine and pilotage and wrecks of the sea. It extends to the laying of embargoes, as well as to the admission of goods free from duty; to the erection of light-houses, the location of beacons, the removal of all obstructions to navigation upon the navigable waters of the United States; to the designation of ports of entry and delivery; to the offer of bounties by discriminating duties, and by special preferences and privileges; and to the erection and control of telegraphic lines. It may encourage or it may entirely prohibit such commerce, and it may regulate in any way it may see fit between these two extremes. 2 Story, Const. Secs. 1075, 1076.

Assuming, then, that the power of regulating commerce extends to every species of intercourse with foreign nations, it is difficult to conceive why congress may not inhibit the immigration of any class of persons which may seem to it an undesirable addition to the population of the country. Repeated instances of this kind of legislation are to be found in the statutes, and, so far as we know, none of them have been challenged as beyond the constitutional power of congress. By title 29, as amended in 1875, citizens of the United States are prohibited from embarking or engaging in what is known as the 'Coolie Trade' between the United States and foreign nations, or between foreign nations. By the act of March, 1875, the importation of women for immoral purposes, and of convicts, is prohibited, and by the subsequent act of August 3, 1882, this inhibition is extended to idiots, lunatics, and paupers. By the act of May 6, 1882, the importation of Chinese was suspended for 10 years. Punishments are provided for the violation of these acts by fines and penalties upon the persons engaged in the illegal trade, by the forfeiture of their vessels, and by the return of the immigrants to their native countries. In the Head-money Case, 112 U.S. 580, S.C. 5 S.Ct. 247, many of the prior decisions are reviewed, and the power of congress held to extend to the imposition of a duty of 50 cents upon each immigrant.

It is claimed, however, that this act is not a valid exercise of the power of regulating commerce, inasmuch as it forbids the encouragement and solicitation of an act which still continues to be perfectly lawful in itself, viz., the immigration of alien laborers. We think this criticism is unfounded. The motives and history of the act are matters of common knowledge. It had become the practice for large capitalists in this country to contract with their agents abroad for the shipment of great numbers of an ignorant and servile class of foreign laborers, under contracts, by which the employer agreed, upon the one hand, to prepay their passage, while, upon the other hand, the laborers agreed to work after their arrival for a certain time at a low rate of wages. The effect of this was to break down the labor market, and to reduce other laborers engaged in like occupations to the level of the assisted immigrant. The evil finally became so flagrant that an appeal was made to congress for relief by the passage of the act in question, the design of which was to raise the standard of foreign immigrants, and to discountenance the migration of those who had not sufficient means in their own hands, or those of their friends, to pay their passage. While the act is undoubtedly, to a certain extent, a reversal of the traditional policy of the government, it does not purport to inhibit or discourage the immigration of foreign laborers in general, but only the importation of such laborers under contracts made previous to their migration or importation. It seeks to effect this by declaring (1) that the prepayment of transportation, or the assistance or encouragement of the migration, of aliens or foreigners under contracts to labor in the United States, shall be unlawful; (2) that such contracts made previous to their migration shall be void; (3) that every person or corporation guilty of unlawfully assisting or encouraging the immigration of such laborers shall be subject to a penalty; (4) that the master of any vessel knowingly bringing such laborers into the country shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.

It was undoubtedly competent for congress to have gone still further, and provided for the return of such laborers to their own country, as was done in the other acts inhibiting the entry of lunatics, paupers, and Chinese; but the act is not to be deemed unconstitutional because the legislature has not seen fit to use all the weapons it held in its hands, or apply unnecessarily harsh remedies. Indeed, except in this particular, the act does not differ materially from the other acts upon the same general subject, and is strictly in line with them. In each of them...