United States v. Craig

• Citation: 279 F. 900
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. CRAIG.
• Decision Date: 14 February 1921
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

279 F. 900

UNITED STATES v. CRAIG.

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

February 14, 1921

Francis G. Caffey, U.S. Atty., and Ben A. Matthews, Asst. U.S. Atty both of New York City.

John P O'Brien, Corp. Counsel, of New York City (Edmund L Mooney, Charles T. B. Rowe, Alfred B. Cruikshank, Russell Lord Tarbox, and Eli S. Wolbarst, all of New York City, of counsel), for defendant

MAYER District Judge.

On October 1, 1919, Lewis Nixon, then Public Service Commissioner, addressed identical letters to the members of the board of estimate and apportionment of the city of New York, to receivers appointed by this court, to transit officials, and to representatives of security holders inviting them to attend a conference to be held at the office of the Public Service Commission at 10:30 of the morning of October 6, 1919.

Defendant received one of these letters, a copy of which is annexed as Appendix A.

On October 6, 1919 at 10:40 a.m., as appears from the minutes of the Public Service Commission, the conference began, but defendant was not among those present. After some discussion it was concluded by the Public Service Commissioner, in response to views expressed by the transit construction commissioner, that a full and free consideration of the subject-matter and the questions involved could more effectively be undertaken in a closed conference, and thereupon, as the minutes state, 'various spectators and newspaper men left the room. ' After this had occurred, further discussion took place, and then the Public Service Commissioner said:

'I have received a letter from Mr. Craig, the comptroller, and I think I will read it as explaining his reasons for not meeting here with us.'

The letter referred to was thereupon read by the Public Service Commissioner. A copy is hereto attached as Appendix B.

Thereafter, and on the same day, October 6, 1919, the court filed the following order:

'It is hereby ordered that the United States attorney advise the court by formal information concerning the conduct of one Charles L. Craig on October 6, 1919, at which time he is reported to have published or caused to be published a written communication addressed to Hon. Lewis Nixon, Public Service Commissioner, No. 49 Lafayette street, New York City, concerning the orders and action of this court in a pending cause or causes.'

On November 3, 1919, the United States attorney filed an information charging defendant with contempt of court. After a recital of the facts, the information alleged, among other things, the following:

'(1) In said letter it was stated that this court in the said suits and proceeding was responsible for a policy of denying to the defendant and to other members of the board of estimate and apportionment of the city of New York any access to original sources of information concerning the property and affairs of the various public utility corporations in the hands of receivers appointed by this court and holding franchises to operate in the streets of New York; whereas in truth and in fact this court never adopted such a policy, but, on the contrary, afforded to the defendant and to all members of the board of estimate and apportionment of the city of New York access to the said original sources of information and every facility for obtaining information concerning the property and affairs of the said corporations, and expressly directed that the city of New York and its officials should have access to such information, and in truth and in fact at no time since this court assumed jurisdiction of any of said corporations as aforesaid has this court or any one acting under its authority ever denied to the defendant or to any member of the board of estimate and apportionment, or to any authorized representative of the city of New York or of any of its officials, access to original or to any other sources of information concerning the property or affairs of any of said corporations.

'(2) In said letter it was stated that this court made orders which precluded any application being made by the authorities of the city of New York to any other court or judge for any right of examination into the affairs or conditions of the said public utility corporations; whereas in truth and in fact this court has never made any such order, and, on the contrary, prior to the writing of said letter, this court expressly ordered and directed that there should be given to the authorities of the city of New York every opportunity and facility for making such examination.

'(3) In said letter it was stated that the orders of this court denied to the authorities of the city of New York the opportunity to ascertain the truth; whereas in truth and in fact this court has never made any such order and has never made any order that has, has had, or could have such effect, but, on the contrary prior to the writing of said letter this court ordered and directed that there should be afforded to the authorities of the city of New York every opportunity and facility for ascertaining the truth.

'(4) In said letter it was stated that an order of this court stands between the public and the truth; whereas in truth and in fact no order that this court has made has, has had, or could have such effect, but, on the contrary, every order in the above-mentioned suits and proceeding tended and was designed to place the public in possession of the truth and prior to the writing of said letter this court expressly ordered and directed that every facility in respect of the financial and other conditions existing in relation to the corporations in charge of said receivers.'

It was then alleged that--

'All of the foregoing statements in said letter, numbered from 1 to 4, inclusive, and each of them, are and were false and were known by the defendant to be false when made and were made in reckless disregard of the truth.'

Thereafter an order to show cause was signed by the court requiring defendant to show cause on December 2, 1919, 'why he should not be declared and adjudged in contempt of this court by reason of the facts set forth in the said information.'

Counsel for defendant appeared specially and raised certain questions as to the jurisdiction of the court, which were decided adversely to defendant. The opinion of the court in this regard was dated December 23, 1919. The court then set December 29, 1919, as the date for the appearance of defendant.

Defendant's next step was to demur to the information on 28 grounds. The court overruled the demurrer and filed its opinion, dated March 8, 1920, in respect of the questions raised by the demurrer, and ordered defendant to plead to the information on March 15, 1920. United States v. Craig (D.C.) 266 F. 230.

Defendant pleaded not guilty, and the trial of the case began on May 10, 1920, and was concluded on June 10, 1920. The testimony is transcribed in 791 pages of stenographer's minutes, and the exhibits are many and voluminous. In response to the request of counsel and in view of the length of the record and the many exhibits, the court set a date in the fall for the submission of briefs. Extensions beyond the original date set were asked for and granted. The reply brief of defendant is dated October 30, 1920, and briefs were finally submitted to the court shortly thereafter.

In United States v. Craig, supra, the court pointed out the grounds upon which the letter of defendant, considered by itself, must be regarded as contemptuous in certain respects. There are certain parts of the letter which are within the domain of free and permissible criticism. There are certain other parts which are not.

In the opinion supra the court stated, among other things:

'The proceeding against defendant is brought under section 268 of the Judicial Code, * * * which is in part as follows: 'The said courts (United States courts) shall have power * * * to punish, by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of the court, contempts of their authority: Provided, that such power to punish for contempts shall not be construed to extend to any cases except the misbehavior of any person in their presence, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice. * * * '

'The right to criticize the correctness of the decisions of courts and judges has always existed under our form of government, and must continue to exist, not merely as a right possessed by the individual, but as a safeguard to our institutions. * * *

'But such right must not be confused with the 'the misbehavior * * * so near' the presence of the court 'as to obstruct the administration of justice.' Of this latter conduct the following from the letter of October 6, 1919, is a sufficient illustration: 'Before any such conference can be seriously considered, and as an evidence of good faith on the part of those acting by and under the authority of United States District Judge Mayer, there must be a reversal of the policy for which Judge Mayer is responsible, of denying to myself and other members of the board of estimate and apportionment any access to original sources of information concerning the property and affairs of these various public utility corporations holding franchises to operate in the streets of New York.' * * *

'Read with the entire context, there is no escape from the conclusion that the letter in this respect charged a court of justice with adopting a policy which denied to public officials access to original sources of information to which such public officials were entitled. On demurrer, the court can look only to the face of the writing, and is not enlightened as to what was in the mind of the defendant, as distinguished from what was expressed by him in writing.

'Such a charge is,

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