United States v. Cravatas, Crim. No. 12721.
Decision Date | 15 April 1971 |
Docket Number | Crim. No. 12721. |
Citation | 330 F. Supp. 91 |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. George C. CRAVATAS. |
Stewart H. Jones, U. S. Atty., Leslie Byelas and Barry J. Cutler, Asst. U. S. Attys., Bridgeport, Conn., for government.
J. Daniel Sagarin, Bridgeport, Conn., for defendant.
The motion by defendant George C. Cravatas, Esq., to withdraw his plea of nolo contendere and to set aside his judgment of conviction, Rule 32(d), Fed. R.Crim.P., presents the question whether an attorney, who is a member of the bar of this Court, after pleading nolo contendere to, and the Court having found him guilty of, a charge of willful failure to file his federal income tax return, 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (1964), and after having been sentenced to the maximum term of imprisonment and having been ordered to pay the maximum fine, should be permitted to withdraw his nolo contendere plea, chiefly upon defendant's representation that his attorney (formerly a trial attorney with the Criminal Frauds Section of the IRS) had told him he would not be incarcerated as a result of his plea — a representation flatly denied by the said attorney.
After an evidentiary hearing, and upon the basis of the findings of fact, conclusions of law and opinion hereinafter set forth, the Court holds that defendant should not be permitted to withdraw his plea. Defendant's motion is denied.
(1) On February 4, 1970, a grand jury in the District of Connecticut returned an indictment charging defendant with three counts of willful failure to file his federal income tax returns for the calendar years 1963, 1965 and 1966, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (1964).1
(2) On March 9, 1970, defendant pleaded not guilty to each of the three counts.
(3) During the seven to eight month period following defendant's plea of not guilty on March 9, 1970, he had numerous conferences with representatives of the IRS and of the United States Attorney's office; and during this period defendant was in contact with or had the assistance of no less than four attorneys of his own choosing (not including, of course, the attorney currently representing defendant on the instant motion).
(4) On October 26, 1970, while represented by retained counsel, John J. Lokos, Esq., defendant requested and was granted permission to change his not guilty plea to count two (willful failure to file his 1965 return) to a plea of nolo contendere, after which the Court made a finding that defendant was guilty of the crime charged in count two. The official court reporter's transcript of the change of plea proceedings before the undersigned on October 26, 1970 is attached hereto as APPENDIX A.
(5) The transcript of the change of plea proceedings on October 26, 1970 (APPENDIX A), to the extent relevant to the issues on the instant motion, shows the following:
(6) On January 11, 1971, following a pre-sentence investigation and report, and while represented by Attorney Lokos, defendant was sentenced upon count two to the maximum of one year in prison and to pay the maximum fine of $10,000 within 10 days. The official court reporter's transcript of the sentencing proceedings before the undersigned on January 11, 1971 is attached hereto as APPENDIX B.
(7) To date the fine has not been paid. No stay of execution thereof has been requested or granted. See APPENDIX B.
(8) At the time of sentencing on January 11, 1971, counts one and three were dismissed upon motion of the government,2 in accordance with the representation made by government counsel on the record at the time defendant changed his plea on October 26, 1970. APPENDIX A.
(9) At the time of imposition of sentence on January 11, 1971, neither defendant nor his counsel in any way protested what is now alleged to be the severity of the sentence; and nothing whatsoever was said, immediately following the imposition of sentence, along the lines of defendant's present claim that he had not expected to be incarcerated.
(10) Immediately after imposition of sentence on January 11, 1971, defendant, through his counsel, did request and obtain a one week stay of execution of the sentence of imprisonment to enable defendant to "put his affairs in order". APPENDIX B. He was ordered to surrender on January 18, 1971 at 12 noon.
(11) On January 18, 1971, instead of surrendering as ordered a week earlier, defendant, by his counsel, filed in the District Court a Notice of Appeal from the sentence imposed on January 11, 1971, attached hereto as APPENDIX C, together with a Motion To Stay Execution and Brief In Support of Motion, attached hereto as APPENDIX D.
(12) The brief in support of defendant's motion to stay execution (APPENDIX D) set forth the following alleged "very substantial questions of law" to be determined on his "appeal":
(13) The Court on January 18, 1971 filed a Memorandum Order Denying Defendant's Motion For Stay Of Execution Of Sentence Pending Appeal and For Bail Pending Appeal, attached hereto as APPENDIX E. In denying this motion, the Court expressly held that the appeal "appears to be frivolous and taken for purposes of delay, 18 U.S.C. § 3148 (Supp. V, 1965-69); Rule 46(a) (2), Fed.R.Crim.P., and in any event the undersigned is unable to find any non-frivolous ground of appeal set forth in defendant's moving papers". The Court nevertheless extended the stay of execution of the sentence of imprisonment until January 19, 1971 at 4 P.M. to enable defendant to make application to the Court of Appeals.
(14) On January 19, 1971, defendant brought on for hearing in the Court of Appeals a motion, variously described in the record before the undersigned as a motion for stay of execution pending appeal or for bond pending appeal. The Court of Appeals denied the motion from the bench on January 19, 1971.
(15) Later on January 19, 1971, Judge Zampano (with the oral approval of the undersigned) granted defendant a further stay of execution of the sentence of imprisonment until January 25, 1971, conditioned upon his posting a $5,000 appearance bond, which bond was posted. The stay of execution of the sentence of imprisonment...
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