United States v. Crawford
| Decision Date | 15 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | Crim. 3:21-cr-00006-GFVT-EBA-2 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL CRAWFORD, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
The grand jury indicted Michael Crawford and his co-defendant on two counts of conspiracy to defraud the United States. At Mr Crawford's initial appearance, the United States did not seek detention, and he was permitted to remain free on bond pending trial. The questions presented in this case are: (1) whether the United States can compel the man to provide his palm print while he is free on bond; and (2) if so, whether the Court must find that law enforcement had probable cause or reasonable suspicion that the man committed a criminal act.
The specific matter before the Court is Defendant Michael Crawford's Motion for Reconsideration of Magistrate Judge Edward B. Atkins's order granting the Government's Motion to Compel. [R. 48.] Mr. Crawford argues that the record is devoid of evidence necessary to establish either reasonable suspicion or probable cause to permit the taking of Mr. Crawford's palm prints, and that the probable cause standard is the appropriate standard to apply under the Fourth Amendment in this circumstance. For the reasons set forth below, Mr. Crawford's objections are OVERRULED and his Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
On March 18, 2021, Mr. Crawford and his co-Defendant John Goble were indicted by a grand jury on two counts of conspiracy to defraud the United States under 18 U.S.C. § 371. [R. 1 at 2.] The United States alleges that Mr. Crawford conspired to “commit a crime against the United States, that is the theft, conversion, and intentional misapplication” of Kentucky State Police-owned ammunition and firearms. [R 1-1 at 4-5.]
In late 2017, two individuals informed Georgetown, Kentucky, public officials about “a large stash of ammunition” that Scott County Coroner John Goble was keeping in the basement of his office and said Mr. Goble reported that he had received the ammunition from Mitch Harris, the Kentucky State Police Armorer. [R. 36 at 1.] This information was passed along to the Kentucky State Police, which initiated a criminal investigation to determine whether theft of government property may have occurred. Id. at 1-2. The Kentucky State Police interviewed Mr. Harris as part of the investigation, and Mr. Harris admitted to giving Mr. Crawford “a lot of ammunition.” Id. at 2. Mr. Harris also admitted to giving Mr. Goble a smaller amount of ammunition after he was directed to do so by Mr. Crawford, who was his supervisor. Id. Although there are “conflicting accounts as to how the ammunition came to be placed in Goble's basement, ” the investigators concluded that “most of the ammunition in Goble's basement went from Harris, through Crawford, and then to Goble.” Id.
The ammunition at issue in this case was recovered, and investigators lifted “a number of palm prints on the boxes of ammunition.” Id. at 3. The prints were compared to people who admitted to handling the boxes, including Mr. Harris and Mr. Goble, with negative results. Id. The United States believes that the palm prints belong to Mr. Crawford. Id. During the investigation, Mr. Crawford refused to provide his palm prints, and a state court trial judge denied a request that Mr. Crawford be compelled to provide them because “taking palm prints, as opposed to fingerprints, is not normal procedure for arrestees.” Id.
On August 5, the United States filed a Motion to Compel Mr. Crawford to “produce for comparison and analysis, a printing of his palm.” [R. 36 at 1.] The United States argued that taking Mr. Crawford's palm print would not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment because it “is analogous to requiring someone to appear before a grand jury to provide physical characteristics.” Id. at 6. After full briefing, Judge Atkins granted the United States' request on September 1, finding that the Court could compel Mr. Crawford to produce his palm print because the United States had demonstrated that (1) there was reasonable suspicion that Mr. Crawford had committed a criminal act; (2) a reasonable basis existed for believing that palm printing Mr. Crawford would establish or disprove his connection with the crime in this case; and (3) that palm printing Mr. Crawford would be carried out “with dispatch.” [R. 46 at 4 (citing Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 817 (1985)).]
On September 14, Mr. Crawford timely objected to Judge Atkins's order under Rule 72(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, [1] arguing that (1) Judge Atkins should have applied the probable cause standard instead of reasonable suspicion; and (2) even under the reasonable suspicion standard, the record lacks evidence sufficient to compel Mr. Crawford to provide his palm print. [R. 48-1 at 2.]
The parties agree that the Fourth Amendment provides the appropriate framework through which to analyze the Government's Motion to Compel Mr. Crawford's palm print. [R. 36 at 4; R. 48-1 at 3.] The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause….” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Supreme Court has held that “the obtaining of physical evidence from a person involves a potential Fourth Amendment violation at two different levels-the ‘seizure' of the ‘person' necessary to bring him into contact with government agents, and the subsequent search for and seizure of the evidence.” United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8 (1973) (citations omitted).
Judge Atkins, in his order granting the United States' motion to compel, examined both potential Fourth Amendment violations. First, Judge Atkins found that “an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy when it comes to his palm prints.” Judge Atkins cited to Sixth Circuit precedent demonstrating that court-ordered submissions, such as the one at issue in this case, are permissible and determined that Mr. Crawford could be required to submit to being palm printed so long as the Court determined “that law enforcement had a reasonable suspicion that the suspect committed a criminal act.” Id. (citing Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 817 (1985)). Ultimately, Judge Atkins found that (1) the United States demonstrated that law enforcement had a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Crawford committed a criminal act; (2) the United States demonstrated that there is a reasonable basis for believing that palm printing Mr. Crawford would establish or disprove his connection with the crime at issue in this case; and (3) that the palm printing of Mr. Crawford would be carried out with dispatch. Id. at 4-5.
Before analyzing Mr. Crawford's objections, it is important to address the scope of the issues presently before the Court. This is not a situation in which Mr. Crawford's fingerprints were requested as part of a brief investigatory stop pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). After all, “[a] brief detention in the field for the purpose of fingerprinting, where there is only reasonable suspicion not amounting to probable cause, is [not] necessarily impermissible under the Fourth Amendment.” In re Search Warrant No. 5165, 470 F.Supp.3d 715 722 (E.D. Ky. 2020) (quoting Hayes, 470 U.S. at 816). Nor is there a question in this case about whether the police may seize an individual against their will, take them to the police station to interview them, and tell them they would be restrained if they tried to leave. The Supreme Court has clearly stated this is something the police cannot do. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 203 (1979). There is also not a question here about whether there is probable cause that an offense occurred at all, given the grand jury's indictment in this case. Dibrell v. City of Knoxville, 984 F.3d 1156, 1164 (6th Cir. 2021) ( that a “grand jury's indictment creates a presumption that probable cause existed”).
Here, the narrow question is whether Mr. Crawford, who has been indicted but is currently not in custody, can be compelled to provide his palm print.[2] Mr. Crawford's specific objections in this matter ultimately boil down to (1) whether the applicable standard is probable cause or reasonable suspicion, and (2) whether the Government's evidence satisfies the requisite test.
Mr. Crawford argues that probable cause is the appropriate standard for detaining a noncustodial defendant for the purpose of getting a palm print. [R. 48-1 at 6.] However, the Court finds that in this case, the appropriate standard is reasonable suspicion, not probable cause.
In Davis v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court addressed the appropriate standard to apply to detentions related to fingerprinting in the Fourth Amendment context. 394 U.S. 721 (1969). In Davis, the Supreme Court held that taking the petitioner to police headquarters for fingerprinting and interrogation without a warrant or probable cause did not comport “with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 728. However, in dicta, the Supreme Court stated that “[i]t is arguable, however that, because of the unique nature of the fingerprinting process, such detentions might, under narrowly defined circumstances, be found to comply with the Fourth Amendment even though there is no probable cause in the traditional sense.” Id. at 727 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)). The Court did not elaborate on those “narrowly defined circumstances” because “no attempt was made...
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